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Lawrence Joseph Henderson: Bridging Laboratory and Social Life 
Abstract 
This study uses the professional trajectory of the Harvard-trained physical chemist and 
physiologist Lawrence Joseph Henderson to show how the nascent and highly mobile 
interconnections between biomedicine and social theory began to crystallize around the concept 
of the social system in the middle decades of the twentieth century. The social system became a 
powerful and persuasive way of relating vastly different concepts and their consequences, e.g., 
the laboratory and social life. By focusing on L.J. Henderson and the social system, this study 
brings the history of biomedicine into dialogue with the history of the social sciences in a new 
and interesting way by offering an alternative (pre-cybernetics) genealogy of systems theory. 
This dissertation is an examination of Henderson’s cross-disciplinary application of the concept 
of the social system in three domains: the social sciences, medicine, and industry. Henderson is a 
historically interesting case because he allows us a unique point of view—the ability to see 
border crossings between the social sciences and the life sciences in more than one domain. I 
argue that the transformation of social theory in inter-war America should be understood as part 
of a broader set of mid-twentieth century developments in the life sciences in general, and human 
physiology in particular. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence Joseph Henderson: Bridging Laboratory and Social Life tracks early- and mid-
twentieth century interactions between the social sciences and the life sciences through the 
professional trajectory of Harvard physiologist and physical chemist Lawrence Joseph 
Henderson. Henderson is most clearly remembered within the history of the life sciences for 
conducting research and publishing papers on the regulation of acid-base equilibria in living 
organisms and deriving the eponymous principle of equilibrium (the Henderson-Hasselbach 
equation). Henderson later developed a theory of the social system, which he applied to medicine 
and the psycho-physiology of work. This dissertation is an examination of Henderson’s cross-
disciplinary application of the concept of the social system in three domains: the social sciences, 
medicine, and industry. Henderson is a historically interesting case because he allows us a 
unique point of view—the ability to see border crossings between the social sciences and the life 
sciences in more than one domain. Henderson’s life provides a comparative frame for these three 
domains in a single figure. That itself is quite unusual, and is worth exploring. 
Henderson’s work assumes the existence of interdisciplinarity. Scholars have frequently 
looked at interdisciplinarity from the perspective of established disciplines that were once 
interdisciplinary fields struggling to establish themselves (biochemistry, physical chemistry, 
psychiatry, sociology), or from the perspective of such failed projects as human relations, human 
biology, or general physiology. In this case, the focus is less on success or failure in establishing 
a distinct discipline, and more on the nature of the border crossings. In this dissertation I use 
Henderson as a lens to examine the porousness of these boundaries, with the goal of 
understanding moments of interaction between the life sciences and the social sciences and the 
institutional conditions that enabled this type of movement of bodies and ideas. 
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Each chapter in this dissertation provides an analytic that allows us to learn something 
new about the porous boundaries between the life sciences and the social sciences in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. By exploring these differential border crossings between the 
social and the biological—within the space of industrial labor studies, within social medicine and 
within the social and biological sciences—we see a more robust picture of the dynamics of 
interdisciplinarity in the pre-war period than is generally suggested in existing histories of these 
fields.  
My secondary goal is to show that the distance between Henderson’s intellectual moment 
and ours is at least part of the reason why we have separated these intellectual spheres in our 
minds. Henderson is not an outlier, but rather an indicator to study a very different moment in 
time when such border crossings were actually not that difficult. Today, this kind of border 
crossing is considered quite difficult, largely due to existing institutional structures and 
disciplinary dynamics as well as professional priorities. This is made evident, for instance, in the 
existence of the so-called translational sciences. Translational science refers to the movement of 
scientific developments from bench to bedside.  
This study is not the first account to consider Henderson’s life and work. Other scholars 
have considered him and his writings, especially in the history of science. Sarah Tracy, for 
example, has extensively studied the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory and the work of Ancel Keys, a 
prominent physiologist who conducted research at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory. Her interest 
in exercise physiology and the physiology of extremes has helped us better understand the 
motivations and values of these large-scale research projects in physiology and human biology.1 
                                                        
1 Sarah W. Tracy, “The Physiology of the Extremes: Ancel Keys and the International High Altitude 
Expedition of 1935,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 86, no. 4 (2012): 627–660. 
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Joel Isaac has focused largely on the circulation of ideas in the social sciences.2 His work has 
taught us much about the role institutions—especially inter-war Harvard—play in the circulation 
and production of social scientific knowledge and the establishment of disciplines.  
This dissertation will draw heavily on these important works with the goal of 
understanding moments of bifurcation and crossing-over between the biological and the social 
sciences. As such, this dissertation moves our understanding of the development of the social and 
biological sciences in the twentieth century into different spaces—beyond the Harvard Fatigue 
Laboratory and beyond the Ivory tower—to the industrial workplace and the clinic. My interest 
in these border crossings is the very thing that brings focused attention to these different spaces. 
It is here that we can more clearly see the bifurcation of these domains—social science, 
medicine, and the industrial workplace—from different perspectives. I argue that bifurcation and 
crossing over are essential to understanding what was happening in these domains. As such, this 
study gives us a fresh look at the interface between social medicine and industry as well as the 
history of interdisciplinarity.  
Henderson is not the only person who engaged in border crossing. Henderson’s particular 
training and institutional location, however, enabled him to cross through domains ranging from 
physiology to sociology to social medicine to industrial research. Each of these domains gives 
new insight into the differential nature of disciplinary crossing at that particular moment in time.  
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Universty Press, 2012). 
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The Social System 
Early in his career, Henderson began studying logic with the famous American 
philosopher Josiah Royce. The two men developed an enduring intellectual friendship that in 
many ways transformed Henderson’s approach to scientific inquiry. While attending Royce’s 
seminar on logic, starting in 1913, Henderson was exposed to symbolic logic. This was also the 
first time Henderson thought seriously about the “speculative problems raised by the natural 
sciences.”3 Henderson emerged from the seminar interested in social theory and the 
philosophical implications of his scientific work. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his first 
two books intended for popular audiences, The Fitness of the Environment (1913) and The Order 
of Nature (1917).4 In the years following the publication of The Order, Henderson’s influence as 
an authority on systems thinking rose, eventually culminating in a 1927 grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation to establish a laboratory to study the psycho-physiology of work in 
industry. The resultant structure—the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory (HFL)—would become an 
unusually powerful vehicle coordinating funding and researchers across a broad range of 
research domains. Henderson’s involvement as director of the HFL marks his growing interest in 
the interface between systems theory, social order, and physiology.  
The HFL must be understood within the context of rapid institutional growth that 
characterized Harvard—and the American university in general—in the early twentieth century. 
Under the leadership of President A. Lawrence Lowell, Harvard University more than doubled 
its endowment, student body, faculty, and infrastructure. L.J. Henderson’s ideas about the nature                                                         
3 W.P. Montague, “The Oxford Congress of Philosophy,” The Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 5 (1921): 
128. 
 
4 Lawrence Joseph Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment: An Inquiry into the Biological 
Significance of the Properties of Matter, (New York: Macmillan, 1913); Lawrence Joseph Henderson, 
The Order of Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917). 
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of social interaction, human relationships, and social order flourished within this context of rapid 
growth and change. Henderson made little distinction between the class of subjects appropriate 
for social scientific inquiry and those requiring a life sciences approach—the topics differed only 
in that one dealt with the interactions between one or more persons and the other did not. What 
the social sciences lacked, he argued, was a scientific formulation, a theory or working 
hypothesis or even a rough conceptual scheme with which to study these interactions between 
individuals. His life work was to develop a transdisciplinary approach to studying both social 
and biological systems.  
As his work in the Fatigue Laboratory increasingly required him to see individuals within 
the context of their social worlds—such as the workplace—Henderson’s interests in social theory 
became more concrete. Henderson found Pareto’s notion of the “social system” a particularly 
useful alternative to a “cause-and-effect” understanding of social interaction. Unlike a cause-and-
effect analysis that posits a one-to-one relationship between variables, Pareto’s conceptual 
scheme offered a way of analyzing simultaneous variations of mutually dependent variables.5 
This notion of the system, Henderson urged, was a “genuine abstraction, useful despite the fact 
that it was a creation of the imagination.” The power of the system was not in its concreteness 
but in its ability to make concrete things intelligible: “Systems imposed boundaries and mapped 
out relationships: within them, facts made sense.” It was this promise of an effective and 
dynamic interpretive framework with which to study social phenomena that made Henderson’s 
articulation of the social system so compelling to his contemporaries.                                                          
5 On the most general level, a system consists of variables that are in a state of mutual dependence, each 
individual related to the other through logical necessity. In the case of social analysis, interactions 
between two or more persons, the ‘social system’ was thought to consist of heterogeneous individuals 
with a range of affiliations, such as church, school, family, from different social and class backgrounds.  
For an overview of Pareto’s Trattato di sociologia generale see George C. Homans and C.P. Curtis, Jr., 
An Introduction to Pareto, His Sociology, (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1934).  
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When applied to the study of social phenomena, the concept of the social system gave 
rise to a new and powerful notion of what social life was and what social science was for. By the 
late 1930s a new approach to studying social life was underway, one that was, at least in its 
intent, more aligned with recognizable “scientific” modes of inquiry in that it stressed the 
importance of standardized methodologies, an ideological commitment to objectivity, and efforts 
to develop a generalized description of social phenomena. Henderson epitomized this movement, 
in that he saw the problem of developing a method to understand non-logical human action as 
logically analogous to understanding blood physiology. Henderson offered a way of extending a 
method that had been successfully applied to reasoning about biological systems to reasoning 
about human action. Just as in physiology, the implications of this emergent systems analysis of 
life and social life were not immediately obvious. Knowledge gained using emergent social 
scientific methods could be applied to a situation immediately at hand, for instance, devising 
interventions to create a more efficient and effective workplace. But the methods could also be 
used to improve the interpretative potential of the conceptual scheme itself, for instance by 
studying a broader range of people engaged in a broader range of activities.  
The emergence of a naturalistic understanding of social life, with a concomitant 
confidence in the ability to render social life intelligible through scientific investigation and 
systematic generalization, has had profound implications for the social sciences, the sciences, 
and systems of governance. Henderson’s writings and teachings on the social system provided 
researchers in the natural and social sciences a language and a logic by which to make social life 
intelligible. This new systems view of life can be traced back to early-twentieth-century 
developments in physiology in general and human physiology in particular. Henderson stood at 
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the center of these developments, and his life provides us with a lens through which we can make 
sense of the emergence of a new relationship between the life sciences and the social sciences.  
 
Methodological/Theoretical Considerations 
 
L. J. Henderson makes a fitting subject for a dissertation on transdisciplinary systems 
thinking for a number of practical, historiographical, and theoretical reasons. As a practical 
matter, Henderson’s papers—conveniently located at Harvard, where Henderson spent most of 
his professional career—contain a unique and extensive record of the types of interactions 
between the social sciences and the life sciences that this dissertation seeks to investigate. But 
while this dissertation considers Henderson’s work in detail, it is not conceived as a biography of 
Henderson’s own life in a strict sense. Instead, the study unravels the various ways in which 
Henderson’s biography interacts with the trajectories of other prominent figures—Talcott 
Parsons, Chester Bernard, Elton Mayo, Pitirim Sorokin, and W. B. Cannon, to name a few—and 
how his work relates to the development of a new framework for studying biological and social 
life. The dissertation will therefore move back and forth between the specifics of Henderson’s 
intellectual and social trajectories and the points at which his biography intersects with other key 
elements in the development of the social and the life sciences.  
The choice of Henderson is, however, more than a matter of convenience. It is a central 
claim of this dissertation that Henderson played an important role in reconfiguring the 
boundaries between the social and the life sciences in the interwar years. While Henderson is not 
exactly absent from the historiography, published accounts of his life and work have depicted 
Henderson as a brilliant but vain and domineering man whose privileged position in life rendered 
him oblivious to the ‘real world’ problems of his time. In general, little effort has been made to 
understand Henderson’s work—both in the life sciences and the social sciences—within the 
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context of intellectual life at Harvard in the 1920s and 1930s.6 When scholars have focused on 
the specifics of Henderson’s views, they have usually focused on Henderson’s theory of 
equilibrium and his conception of the organism as in a state of dynamic equilibrium with its 
environment.7 Other scholars have attempted to make sense of how and why Henderson moved 
from physical chemistry, to physiology, and finally to sociology.8 By focusing too narrowly on 
factors motivating Henderson’s work, these approaches miss an opportunity to raise larger 
questions about the development of physiology, medicine, and the social sciences.  
A more interesting and historically relevant question might ask how Henderson’s work in 
physiology—especially his work on fitness and adaptability—put him in dialogue with people 
asking questions about the nature of social change. What, in other words, does the ready 
acceptance of Henderson’s interpretation of the social system suggest about the state of 
physiological and social research in the 1930s and 1940s? Two works have examined this 
problem by making claims about intellectual priority. In her widely cited article on the Harvard 
Pareto Circle, Barbara Heyl states that one of her goals was to “determine whether Henderson 
was indeed the one who shaped the thinking of the other scholars reading these [Paretian] 
                                                        
6 For biographical accounts by historians and contemporaries of Henderson see David B. Dill, “L.J. 
Henderson, His Transition from Physical Chemist to Physiologist; His Qualities as a Man,” The 
Physiologist 20 (1977):1–15; Jean Mayer, “Lawrence J. Henderson,” Journal of Nutrition 94 (1968): 1–5; 
W.B. Cannon, “Biographical Memoir of Lawrence Joseph Henderson 1878–1942,” National Academy of 
Sciences of the Unite d States 23, (1943): 31–58; Dickinson W. Richards, “Lawrence Joseph Henderson,” 
Physiologist 1, no. 3 (1958):32–37; John H. Talbott, “Lawrence Joseph Henderson (1878–1942), Natural 
Philosopher,” Journal of the American Medical Association 198 (1966): 1304–1306; Crane Brinton, 
“Lawrence Joseph Henderson, 1878–1942,” in The Saturday Club: A Century Completed, 1920–1956, 
eds. E.W. Forbes and J.H. Finlay, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 207–214. 
 
7 Cynthia Eagle Russett, The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1966). 
 
8 For Everett Mendelsohn’s account, see Mendelsohn, “Locating ‘Fitness’ and L.J. Henderson,” in Fitness 
of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning, eds. John D. Darrow, Conway Morris, Stephen J. 
Freeland, Charles L. Harper, Jr., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3–19. 
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concepts.”9 Similarly, Bernard Barber’s introduction to On the Social System—an edited volume 
of Henderson’s lecture notes and selected published works—opens by asking, “Was Henderson a 
Sociologist?”10 Both authors seek to delineate the exact impact Henderson had on the 
development of sociology as an academic discipline. Each comes to a similar conclusion: 
Henderson had an influence on individual sociologists within a very specific historical moment, 
but no direct influence on the field in general.  
There is also a literature that places L.J. Henderson’s work within the history of biology. 
There has not been much work in this area, and the work that has been published is now over 
forty years old. The most extensive scholarly work on this topics has been written by two 
historians of biology—John Parascandola and Iris Fry.11 This dissertation will draw on their 
discussions of the intellectual history of Henderson’s biological studies but clearly moves the 
analysis in a different direction. Historian Thomas Hankins has also published an article on the 
                                                        
9 B. S. Heyl, “The Harvard ‘Pareto Circle,’” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 4, no. 4 
(1968): 316–334. 
 
10 Bernard Barber, “Introduction,” in Lawrence J. Henderson, On the Social System: Selected Writings, 
ed. Bernard Barber, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 1–20. 
 
11 John Parascandola, “Lawrence J. Henderson and the Concept of Organized Systems” (PhD diss., 
University of Wisconsin, 1968). A modified version of his dissertation appears in Parascandola, 
“Organismic and Holistic Concepts in the Thought of L.J. Henderson” Journal of the History of Biology 
4, no.1 (1971): 63–113; Iris Fry, “On the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter: L.J. 
Henderson’s Theory of the Fitness of the Environment” Journal of the History of Biology 29, no.2 (1996): 
155–196; Iris Fry, The Emergence of Life on Earth: A Historical and Scientific Overview (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000). This section will only discuss works that have not been 
mentioned in prior sections. Jerome Lowenstein has also written a biographical novel featuring 
Henderson which draws on Henderson’s unpublished semi-autobiography and personal papers found in 
the Harvard Archives. See Jerome Lowenstein, Henderson's Equation: A Novel. (Great Barrington, MA: 
Gadd & Co., 2008). 
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development of nomographic techniques in general, and Henderson’s use of nomographic 
techniques to study blood physiology.12 
A simpler version of this dissertation might attempt to trace the most important ideas in 
twentieth-century American social thought back to Henderson and the Pareto Circle, focusing on 
rectifying factual and methodological flaws in these existing studies. As is, battles over priority 
have made it difficult to raise new questions about the intellectual exchange between researchers 
in the social sciences and the life sciences and the factors that made certain kinds of interactions 
not only possible but necessary. What these impassioned claims to priority nevertheless reveal is 
that a powerful notion of what social life was had greatly influenced the way sociological 
research was conducted and the types of research questions raised in the mid-twentieth century.  
The goal of this dissertation is instead to both complicate the received narrative and to 
offer a new way of thinking about the history of the relationship between the life sciences and 
the social sciences. In addition, this dissertation demonstrates that this new understanding of 
social life must be understood against the backdrop of important developments within the life 
sciences. Reconstructing what this notion of social life was, how it was studied, its relationship 
to developments in the life sciences, and the problematic from which it emerged is a central goal 
of this dissertation.13                                                          
12Thomas L. Hankins, “Blood, Dirt, and Nomograms: A Particular History of Graphs,” Isis 90, no.1 
(1999): 50–80. 
 
13My initial curiosity about what “social life” as a concept and object of study in the 1930s was inspired 
by Steven Shapin’s thoughtful discussion of Merton’s early work in Shapin, “Understanding the Merton 
Thesis,” Isis 79, no. 4 (1988): 594–605. In this article Shapin notes that there is something about the 
general orientation of Merton’s thesis that we should not allow to disappear from our view (605). He 
points out that “The problematic from which Merton’s work emerged in the 1930s was one that accepted 
the interest, importance, and legitimacy of macrosociological theorizing about the historical development 
and social setting of culture (605).” I would argue that this general orientation in Merton’s work was akin 
to Henderson’s systems worldview of life and social life. Both Merton and Henderson’s work is 
characterized by a drive toward generalized abstraction and an effort to draw connections among 
disparate parts at the highest level of abstraction.  
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In tracking the interactions between scholars in the social sciences and scholars in the life 
sciences, this dissertation also draws on the work of historians who have written on other 
members of the Harvard Pareto circle, including Talcott Parsons,14 Elton Mayo,15 Chester I. 
Barnard,16 A. Lawrence Lowell,17 and George C. Homans.18 My account additionally draws on                                                         
14 Talcott Parsons has been the subject of a number of studies written by historians as well as sociologists. 
The bulk of the scholarship written by sociologists is in the form of interpretive essays and anthologies 
elaborating Parsons’ contributions to sociology. Historical scholarship on Parsons tends to focus on the 
postwar period. The first published biography of Parsons was written by his former student Uta Gerhardt. 
Gerhardt, Talcott Parsons: An Intellectual Biography, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
In addition to Gerhardt’s intellectual biography, Tuk-Sang Pyun produced an unpublished biographically 
oriented dissertation on Talcott Parsons in 2002. Pyun, “Science, Social Science, and Society: Natural 
Images in Talcott Parsons’ Social Theory,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2002). See also Howard 
Brick, “Talcott Parsons’ ‘Shift Away from Economics,’ 1937–1946,” The Journal of American History 
87, no.2 (2000): 490–514; Howard Brick, Transcending Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in Modern 
American Thought, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Charles Comic, “The Making of a 
Method: A Historical Reinterpretation of the Early Parsons,” American Sociological Review 52, no.4 
(1987): 421–439; Joel Isaac, “Theorist at Work: Talcott Parsons and the Carnegie Project on Theory, 
1949–1951,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no.2 (2010): 287–311; Robert B. Owens, “Producing 
Parsons' Reputation: Early Critiques of Talcott Parsons' Social Theory and the Making of a Caricature,” 
Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences 46, no.2 (2010): 165–188.  
 
15 Mayo is often discussed in the context of the history of industrial sociology, anthropology, 
organizational theory, industrial relations, and the history of management. See Andrea Gabor, The 
Capitalist Philosophers: The Geniuses of Modern Business, Their Lives, Times and Ideas, (New York: 
Times Business, 2000); R. C. S. Trahair, The Humanist Temper: The Life and Work of Elton Mayo (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984). For a historical account of Mayo’s role in the 
Hawthorne studies see Richard Gillespie’s excellent book, Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge: A 
History of the Hawthorne Experiments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Gillespie’s study 
also contains a helpful overview of the enormous literature that has developed in response to the 
Hawthorne studies.  
 
16 Chester Barnard, a prominent business executive and close friend of Lawrence J. Henderson, has 
received considerably less scholarly attention outside of the field of management and organizational 
behavior. The following secondary sources help illuminate biographical details about Barnard and his 
work on organizations: William G. Scott, Chester I. Barnard and the Guardians of the Managerial State, 
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas , 1992); William B. Wolf, The Basic Barnard: An 
Introduction to Chester I. Barnard and His Theories of Organization and Management (Ithaca, NY: 
Industrial Labor Relations, 1974).  
 
17 For biographical and autobiographical information about Lawrence A. Lowell see, Lowell, What a 
University President Has Learned, (New York: Macmillan, 1938); Henry Aaron Yeomans, Abbott 
Lawrence Lowell, 1856–1943 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).  
 
18 An account of the Society of Fellows is provided in George Homans and O.T. Bailey, “The Society of 
Fellows, Harvard University, 1933–1947” In The Society of Fellows, edited by Crane Brinton, 2-7 
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historical surveys featuring such relevant institutions as the Harvard Fatigue Lab and the Harvard 
Business School.19 Most of these studies raise questions about the development of a single 
discipline, the development of particular theory or concept, or the development of a single 
institution. This study brings together select aspects of these different accounts to show how 
these seemingly disparate developments at times reinforced and at other times transformed 
notions about the social and the natural world.  
A key methodological challenge for this dissertation is differentiating between the social 
sciences and the life sciences during a period when the very boundaries between the two were 
being transformed. I approach this problem through the use of the actors’ own analytic 
categories. A benefit of using actors’ categories is that they allow us to gain an understanding of 
how these categories and boundaries functioned within their own historical and intellectual 
moment. A drawback of this approach is that sticking too close to these categories could lead to 
errors of analysis, similar to the ones made by the actors themselves. Henderson distinguished 
between the “life sciences” and the “social sciences” solely for the purpose of analysis: for him, 
the categories did not correspond to a deeper ontological distinction. The two categories will be 
treated as analytic distinctions that serve varying functions in the period under investigation.                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Cambridge, MA: Society of Fellows, 1948). George Homan’s autobiographical account of his career is a 
useful source of information regarding the state of social scientific research at Harvard in the late 1930s 
and 1940s. See, Homans, Coming to My Senses: The Autobiography of a Sociologist (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984).  
 
19 Steven M. Horvath, The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory: Its History and Contributions (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss Hall, 1973); Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge; Sarah Tracy, “The Physiology of 
Extremes: Ancel Keys and the International High Altitude Expedition of 1935” Bulletin in the History of 
Medicine 86, no. 4 (2012): 627–660.  Another article looks at the role of the HFL in advancing the 
science of work and its relationship to progressive politics of reform in the early twentieth century, Robin 
Scheffler, “The Fate of a Progressive Science: The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, Athletes, the Science of 
Work and the Politics of Reform” Endeavour 35, no. 2–3 (2011): 48–54. See also Jeffrey L Cruikshank, A 
Delicate Experiment: The Harvard Business School, 1908–1945 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 
1987); Bard Cosman, The Human Factor: The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory and the Transformation of 
Taylorism, (undergraduate thesis, Harvard University,1983). 
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Historiographic Context 
   
This work engages three interrelated questions: 1) How have the development of ideas in 
the natural sciences interacted with the development of ideas in the social sciences?; 2) How 
have the development of ideas in the social sciences interacted with the development of ideas in 
the natural sciences?; and 3) How are we to understand the dynamics of disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity in the academy during a moment of exuberant expansion of the social sciences 
in public life? These questions relate to multiple literatures, including the history of the social 
sciences, American cultural and intellectual history, and the history of medicine and physiology. 
In recasting the relationship between the social sciences and the life sciences as one of mutual 
engagement, this dissertation brings these literatures together.  
Studies that have looked at the impact of the natural sciences on the social sciences 
cluster around two main themes: the professionalization of the social sciences and the quest for 
objectivity. Too frequently, studies of professionalization rely heavily on general themes such as 
the centralization of government, industrialization, and urbanization as a means of explaining 
how and why professionalization took place between 1880–1920. 20 In these accounts, 
professionalization is treated as a rational and self-conscious response to social change on the 
part of an individual or group of social scientists. One of the limitations of this approach is that it 
still leaves one wondering just how these subjects were able to grasp the changes that were                                                         
20 For early writings on the “organizational synthesis” see, Louis Galambos, “The Emerging 
Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,” The Business History Review 44, no.3 (1970): 
279–290; Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).  
14 
 
taking place before they developed a new theory to understand the nature of that change.21 
Several of these studies share an assumption about the dynamic between technological change 
and social lag. This is perhaps best understood as a variant of the familiar “cultural lag” 
argument first proposed by sociologist William Ogburn in 1922.22 For example, scholars often 
write about the various ways social forms and individuals struggle to keep up with the large-
scale changes brought on by industrialization and urbanization. Changes brought about by 
scientific and technological developments overwhelm established social structures making it 
difficult to keep up with the changes. Social scientific theories and structures are always a step 
behind.  
The natural sciences have tended to serve as a model for the professionalization of 
disciplines. The paradigmatic example of professionalization is medicine. Historians of medicine 
have complicated the notion that scientific practices were immediately and universally integrated 
into medicine. They have shown, for instance, how laboratory science became slowly integrated 
into medical practice through a series of reforms in medical education. Other historians of 
medicine, including Christopher Crenner, for example, have offered more sophisticated 
explanations of how scientific authority translated into professionalization. Crenner has argued 
that it was not science per se that gave medicine its newfound authority; rather, it was how 
                                                        
21 Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science 
Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977; 
For a later study that picks up similar themes see, Thomas L. Haskell, The Authority of Experts: Studies in 
History and Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). Mary Furner also looks at the 
relationship between social organization and social theorizing in Furner, Advocacy & Objectivity: A Crisis 
in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905, (Lexington: University of Kentucky 
Press, 1975). See also Andrew Abbott, The Systems of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 
Labor, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
 
22 William F. Ogburn, Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1966); This text was originally published in 1922; William F. Ogburn, "Cultural Lag as 
Theory," Sociology & Social Research 41, no. 3 (1957): 167–174. 
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science was subsequently used and how it functioned within medicine.23 Framing these questions 
of professionalization and authority in more dynamic terms allows us to raise new questions 
about the ways in which changes in medical education—such as the emergence of a pre-medical 
undergraduate curriculum, a standardized medical school curriculum, and changes in admissions 
standards—shaped the professionalization of the life sciences as well.24  
One area in which scholars have considered questions of professionalization, disciplinary 
formation, and the hybridity of fields is in the literature on biomedicine. Scholars have examined 
the development of the concept of biomedicine within the context of early-twentieth-century 
developments in medicine and the life sciences. As scholars have noted, the term biomedicine 
was coined in the inter-war period. It has been conceptualized by historians of medicine and 
biology as a “hybrid domain, intersecting with many other scholarly disciplines.”25 Historians 
have characterized the development of biomedicine as a process of “molecularization” and 
homogenization of the methodologies used to study the phenomena of life. This dissertation 
examines Henderson’s scientific contributions within this context and aims to show how this 
undeniable trend toward “molecularization” was also coupled with a growing interest in the 
context—the physical and social systems—in which the phenomena of life occur. This approach 
became increasingly out-of-step with mainstream scientific research in the years after the World 
War Two. While scholars have argued that biomedicine emerged out of the introduction of new 
                                                        
23 See Crenner, Private Practice. 
 
24In his study on the development of biochemistry in the United States, Robert Kohler argues that the 
emergence of biochemistry as a discipline must be understood in relationship to changes in medical 
education. Kohler shows how this relationship was mutually beneficial. Kohler, From Medical Chemistry 
to Biochemistry: The Making of a Biomedical Discipline, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1982). 
 
25 Ilana Löwy, “Historiography of Biomedicine: ‘Bio,’ ‘Medicine,’ and In Between,” Isis 102, no. 1 
(2011): 116–122.  
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technologies and therapies to medical practice, an underlying argument of this dissertation is that 
biomedicine should be understood not only as a new relationship between medicine and 
technology, but a new relationship between medicine and the social sciences. Biomedicine 
emerged out of a particular relationship between medicine and social science that has not yet 
been fully understood or explored by historians in general and historians of medicine in 
particular. A thorough examination of Henderson’s work and his intellectual context provides us 
with a new window through which to examine the relationship between medicine and social 
science, a relationship that has informed how we think about and use biomedicine.  
Some research on the influence of the natural sciences on the social sciences has also 
focused on the notion of objectivity. Historians have shown that historical actors have often seen 
objectivity as closely intertwined with science. Therefore, in studying how the natural sciences 
have influenced the development of the social sciences, scholars have focused on the tensions in 
research and reform created by the quest for objectivity. These studies have yielded interesting 
insights into the internal dynamics of the sciences during periods of professional change. 
However, their focus on particular scientific disciplines makes it difficult to compare and 
contrast trends across disciplines. This literature places the emphasis almost exclusively on the 
tension between fields—how it emerged, how people responded, and what the consequences 
were—as opposed to showing how the embrace of objectivity lead to the establishment of a 
discipline.26 Historians of science, meanwhile, have greatly enhanced our understanding of 
                                                        
26Other studies taking up related themes include Robert C. Bannister, Sociology and Scientism: The 
American Quest for Objectivity, 1880–1940, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); 
George Steinmetz, ed., The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological 
Others, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005). Mark Smith looks at debates among social scientists 
regarding scientific methods and normative goals. He does an excellent job of showing how the embrace 
of objectivity was far from universal. Still in other ways he falls back on familiar assumptions—that 
objectivity is always linked with conservatism, and that conservatism is often linked to the culture of 
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objectivity by demonstrating how trust and objectivity are socially constituted through 
institutions, techniques, and technologies.27  
Studies that have examined how developments in the social sciences have influenced 
developments in the natural sciences have not been as fruitful. 28 One approach has been to track 
the movement of a concept or theory from the social sciences to the life sciences. For instance, 
Lily Kay’s work on cybernetics and the genetic code tracks how developments in information 
theory and the communication technosciences overlap with the elucidation of the genetic code.29  
A different way to conceptualize the influence of the social sciences on the natural 
sciences is through an expansion of the concept of the “social.” Sarah Igo’s recent work on the 
popularization of social scientific ways of knowing explores how the social survey transformed 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
scientific patronage. Smith, Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate Over Objectivity and 
Purpose, 1918–1941, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994). 
 
27 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Steven Shapin, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: 
Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). For a 
compelling set of essays on the objectivity question across different domains see, Lorraine Daston and 
Peter Galison, Objectivity, (New York: Zone Books, 2007). 
 
28 In studying how the content of scientific theories has impacted the social sciences a common approach 
has been to evaluate the correctness of the application of the scientific theories. When scholars attempt to 
track concepts in the other direction they tend to interpret the development of certain concepts as an 
expression of deeply held political ideologies. These approaches are certainly legitimate and if done 
carefully they can yield important and interesting insights. Some of these studies take an approach very 
similar to what was described earlier on the use of metaphor in the experimental life sciences. In this case 
social concepts and social theories about behavior are used to describe scientific objects. See for example, 
I. Bernard Cohen, Interactions: Some Contacts Between the Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Russett, The Concept of Equilibrium; John M. Jordan, 
Machine-Age Ideology: Social Engineering and American Liberalism, 1911–1939 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Andrew Reynolds, “The Theory of the Cell State and the 
Question of Cell Autonomy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Biology,” Science in Context 20, 
no.1 (2007): 71–95.; Jan Sapp, Genesis: The Evolution of Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 75–94; Steve Sturdy, “Biology as Social Theory: John Scott Haldane and Physiological 
Regulation,” The British Journal for the History of Science 21, no. 3 (1988): 315–340.  
 
29 Lily E. Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life?: A History of the Genetic Code, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2000). 
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Americans’ understanding of themselves and society. Igo’s study is also helpful in tracking the 
emergence of the concept of the averaged American and the emphasis placed on the ordinary.30  
 Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that the life sciences and the natural sciences 
are different disciplines, with different topics of analysis and discussion. Disciplinary histories, 
particularly from the history of biology and medicine, offer useful insights for understanding 
how researchers and institutions come to understand certain fields within their purview. As 
Robert Kohler’s study of medicine and biochemistry demonstrates, disciplinary development is 
more fruitfully explored within a broader social context. Disciplinary developments should be 
thought of within the context of mutual dependence—the authority granted to one profession or 
discipline has implications for other disciplines and professions.31  
The case of medicine is also instructive in that medicine has historically been seen as a 
socially relevant field. It is telling that in the 1930s social scientists started to become 
increasingly interested in the practice of medicine as a case study for examining inter-personal 
and institutional dynamics (the relationship between academic discipline and a profession).32 The 
                                                        
30 Sarah Elizabeth Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
 
31 Kohler, From Medical Chemistry. The virtues of this approach are most clearly articulated by Charles 
Rosenberg in No Other Gods: On Science and American Social Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997): 225–239. Gerald Geison describes the nature of this mutual dependence between 
physiology and medicine as one of convenience. Medicine, having been able to gain authority through 
physiology and physiology, on the other hand, has maintained a comfortable position in the university as 
a pre-clinical science. See, Gerald Geison, “'Divided We Stand': Physiologists and Clinicians in the 
American Context,” in The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of American Medicine, 
eds. Morris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 
67–90; Gerald Geison, Physiology in the American Context: 1850-1940 (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 
1987). Abbott, The Systems. 
 
32Samuel Bloom gives an account of the history of medical sociology in which he charts many of the 
same themes discussed above. He also points out that at Yale, the University of Chicago, University of 
Wisconsin, Harvard, Columbia, and Johns Hopkins, medical sociology emerged alongside sociology 
proper. This is an interesting fact given that the majority of these schools also had leading medical 
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clinical aspects of medicine made it a useful case for applying theories of social interaction. The 
interactions between social science and medicine are particularly useful in understanding how 
disciplinary developments, patronage, and social context must all be taken into consideration in 
developing an understanding of modern medicine.  
 The human, conceived as both a social and biological entity, became a particularly 
profitable and productive object of study for the life sciences and the social sciences in the 
interwar period.33 By the 1960s, diverse scientific disciplines become oriented around 
understanding human life as a social and biological entity. An interesting byproduct of this shift 
is the way the life sciences begin to draw upon social scientific knowledge in developing 
research questions and programs. This can be seen quite vividly, for example, in the context of 
personalized medicine and epigenetic research. Mid-century life scientists came to understand 
the social as a generative and productive means of extracting potentially biologically relevant 
information about the causes and prevention of disease. As the kinds of objects that were open to 
social scientific study grew, so did the application of social scientific knowledge.  
 
Chapter Overview 
 
The remaining four chapters of this dissertation examine the development of Henderson’s 
concept of system and the transfer of systems theory into the clinic and the industrial workplace. 
Each chapter aims to show how Henderson’s systems theory was part of a broader effort to 
establish a transdisciplinary basis upon which to study organisms as biological and social beings. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
schools and substantial Rockefeller funding during the 1930s and 40s. See Bloom, The Word As Scalpel: 
A History of Medical Sociology (New York, 2002).  
 
33Jack D. Pressman, "Human Understanding: Psychosomatic Medicine and the Mission of the Rockefeller 
Foundation,” in Christopher Lawrence and George Weisz, eds. Greater Than the Parts: Holism in 
Biomedicine, 1920–1950, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 189. 
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Chapter One gives an overview of who Henderson is, the factors that shaped his views, and the 
context of his intellectual and professional development. This chapter highlights critical turning 
points in Henderson’s career that help to illuminate his professional contributions as well as the 
elaboration of systems theory through his scientific and social scientific works. This chapter 
additionally argues that Henderson’s training and institutional location at Harvard University 
allowed him to move seamlessly in and out of different domains of knowledge production.  
Chapter Two examines what Henderson and his contemporaries understood by 
“systems,” in a physico-chemical sense. I provide a framework for understanding Henderson’s 
conception of systems and contextualize the significance of Henderson’s Fitness of the 
Environment (1913) and The Order of Nature (1917) by analyzing the reception of these two 
books by Henderson’s contemporaries. In this chapter I outline the basic logic of systems that 
Henderson used to study fitness and the relationship between environment and organisms. The 
primacy of systems was already apparent in these two early works; Henderson used an analysis 
of fitness to articulate the logic of systems more generally. Henderson later transferred this same 
logic to his study of social interactions, a switch that will be explored in greater depth in 
Chapters Three and Four.   
The last two chapters are dedicated to tracing Henderson’s application of the concept of 
system to the clinical encounter and the factory floor. Chapter Three examines Henderson’s 
conception of a social system through the case of medicine and the doctor-patient relationship—
a paradigmatic example of a social system. I argue that Henderson’s construction of the doctor-
patient relationship as a social system is an important conceptual bridge between the laboratory 
and social life. Henderson’s work on the doctor-patient relationship was both an application of 
the social system and part of a broader discussion about the need to integrate the social sciences 
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and the medical sciences. Henderson is not a unique figure but someone who is exemplary of this 
specific moment in time. The role of the social sciences has always, and perhaps shall always 
have, a tense relationship to medicine. In this case, Henderson attempted to bring the methods 
and values of physiology and biochemistry to create a disciplined (more than Hippocratic) way 
of studying and improving the mini-social system that constituted the doctor-patient relationship. 
It is this contribution and way of approaching the issue of social medicine that makes 
Henderson’s view peculiar and allows us to look more closely at the porousness of the 
boundaries between the social and the biological.  
Chapter Four follows the application of Henderson’s concept of the social system into the 
industrial workplace. In this chapter I look at how the study of man—as a biological organism 
and social being—brought together “communities of practice” that had little pervious contact—
physiologists, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists.34 People such as Wallace 
Donham (Dean of HBS), Chester Barnard (business executive), and Elton Mayo were convinced 
that a deeper understanding of the underlying physiological, psychological, and social changes 
that mark an individual’s everyday life would yield answers to the day’s most vexing industrial 
and managerial problems. I look specifically at the making of the factory floor as a social 
environment through an interview program that is known as the Hawthorne Studies. The 
Hawthorne Studies will serve as an example of how Henderson’s concept of the social system 
was applied to the study of the workplace. The second example consists of a series of HFL-
sponsored studies on work in hot climates. The hot climate studies illustrate how physiological 
field research and social theory were used as an attempt to minimize the risk of worker unrest.                                                         
34 A community of practice is a collective of people who come together on a regular basis for a common 
purpose.  These collectives form along the lines of a commonly held interest or social role.  The concept 
was first developed by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral 
Participation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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Whereas the previous chapter gave an example of a conceptual bridge between the laboratory 
and the clinic, the HFL serves as an example of an institutional bridge between the laboratory 
and the factory floor.  
 
Conclusion 
   
This dissertation charts the continuous moments of connection between the social and 
biological sciences that, on reflection, can be traced back over the course of the twentieth 
century. What is surprising is that, when we look for them, these kinds of connections no longer 
seem strange; they seem natural and commonplace. Henderson’s work shows us that when you 
look at medicine and the so-called labor sciences, it is very clear that these two fields are 
necessarily in conversation. Although an opposition between the biological and the social 
sciences may seem natural or instinctual, the idea only developed subsequent to Henderson. This 
dissertation shows how Henderson moved in and out of these domains of knowledge production 
at a time when the distinction between social science, medicine, and industry were not as rigidly 
determined as they are today. In so doing, this dissertation offers a new understanding of the 
relationship between the social sciences and the life sciences in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Great Nomographer 
 
Affectionately referred to as The Great Nomographer by his close friend and colleague 
Raymond Pearl, Lawrence Joseph Henderson was the first to demonstrate the quantitative 
relationship among eight key variables in blood. By making ingenious use of d’Ocagne’s 
technique of geometric computation known as nomography, Henderson was able to graphically 
represent blood as a generalized physico-chemical system. Unlike a table or chart used to 
summarize findings, a nomogram is used to represent multiple variables on a two-dimensional 
plane and yields solutions of a general class of similar problems rather than a solution of a single 
problem.35 The rise of nomography in mid- to late-nineteenth century France corresponds with 
railway development in that country. The technique had previously been used primarily by 
military engineers to calculate the strength of railway bridges, survey land areas, and calculate 
the trajectory of ballistics and artillery; Henderson was the first to apply this methodology to 
physiology.  
In a series of articles published between 1908 and 1927 Henderson advanced not only the 
nascent field of general physiology, but also a systems approach to the study of life. Life in this 
context refers to a technoscientific object of knowledge that can be systematically managed and 
studied; the instrumentalization of nature.36 A synthetic account of these articles and lectures was 
later presented as part of the Silliman Memorial Lecture series at Yale University, and published 
                                                        
35 H.A. Evesham, The History and Development of Nomography (Boston: Docent, 1982). 
 
36 For more on the concept of life and “life itself” see, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: 
An Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1978); Donna J. Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. 
FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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in 1928 as a single volume titled Blood: A Study in General Physiology. Blood represents the 
culmination of over two decades’ worth of intricate experimentation and analysis.37 The 
publication of Blood brought Henderson the recognition he longed for from the scientific 
community. More so than any of his previous publications, Blood was well received and 
celebrated by the majority of L.J. Henderson’s contemporaries.38 Following the publication of 
Blood, however, L.J. Henderson began to turn most of his attention to the study of social 
phenomena—interactions between two or more persons—an area that he believed to be in 
desperate need of more rigorous, scientific formulation.39  
Henderson came of age during a time of rapid transformation and excitement in the life 
sciences and the social sciences in the United States. It was a time when the U.S. emerged as the 
leading site for scientific medicine and research. At the turn of the twentieth century, Henderson 
and his contemporaries were on the verge of making major discoveries on the border of the 
physical and the life sciences. His work on blood physiology, in particular, illustrated not only 
the physiological function of blood, but also its interrelation with other parts of the body. As 
                                                        
37 The Silliman Memorial Lecture series began at Yale University in 1901. The lectures were “designed to 
illustrate the presence and providence, the wisdom and goodness of God, as manifested in the natural and 
moral world.” Delivering the Silliman Lectures was considered one of America’s highest honors in 
academic science.  
 
38 Lawrence J. Henderson, “Blood, A Study in General Physiology,” Science (1929); Joseph Berkson, 
“The Mechanics of Teleology,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 4, no. 3 (1929): 415–419; Lawrence J. 
Henderson, “Blood, A Study in General Physiology,” New England Journal of Medicine 199, no. 22 
(1928): 1126; A. W. Downs, “Blood, A Study in General Physiology,” The Canadian Medical 
Association Journal (1928): 755–756; Raymond Pearl, “Metaphysics and Blood,” Science 69, no. 1780 
(1929): 161–163. 
 
39 Early evidence of his interest in the work of Vilfredo Pareto and other economists, can be seen in the 
footnotes of the first Chapter of Blood. Henderson notes that mathematical economists—such as Leon 
Walras, I. Fisher, and Pareto—have shown that mathematics is indispensible for the treatment of 
quantitative relations between a large number of variables. This suggests that by the spring of 1928, 
Henderson was thoroughly engaging the work of economists. Henderson, Blood, 12, footnotes 12a, 12b, 
and 13. 
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such, his study on blood physiology served as an important illustration of organic integration and 
adaptation. More importantly, his work gave rise to the first study that analyzed a physiological 
function as a set of mutually dependent variables. Prior to his blood study, physiologists had 
primarily looked at individual variables, for example, the concentration of lactic acid or oxygen 
in blood. While many researchers had speculated on the relationship between these multiple 
variables, they had made little progress toward an understanding of this mutual dependence. This 
was largely due to the relatively poor training of biologists and physiologists in mathematics and 
statistics. Henderson and his contemporaries, including Walter B. Cannon and C.S. Sherrington, 
sought to develop a more integrated vision of physiological function.  
It was this demonstration of the interrelation of several discrete components of blood that 
moved the concept of system into physiology. The concept of the system was Henderson’s 
heuristic of choice, and, from this concept, he was able to convey a new understanding of the 
elementary conditions of the phenomena of life and social life. That understanding was one that 
maintained that a defining characteristic of living beings was that they are “always harmoniously 
organized and integrated.” The system then became the organizational concept that motivated 
much subsequent research in the realm of human physiology.  
Henderson’s work on the physiology of blood stands out as an early-twentieth-century 
breakthrough in field of general physiology in that he was able to provide scientists with a fully 
integrated picture of automatic acid-base regulation in the organism. His work provides an 
interesting contrast to studies conducted by his contemporary Jacques Loeb. As historian Philip 
Pauly shows, Loeb sought to define biology around the control of organisms. He considered the 
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exclusive aim of biology to be the control and manipulation of life-phenomena.40 Loeb’s 
“engineering standpoint” was one that was consistent with widespread rational reform and social 
engineering efforts in early-twentieth-century United States.41 Henderson, in contrast, envisaged 
himself as following in the footsteps of the great French physiologist Claude Bernard. Bernard 
saw the main problem of biology as identifying the elementary conditions for the phenomena of 
life. What, in other words, is life, and what differentiates it from the non-living? Bernard held 
that the task of general physiology was to study the phenomena of life common to all animals 
and plants. Bernard sought to establish a general physiology. Henderson, like Bernard, sought to 
understand the elementary conditions of the phenomena of life rather than identify means for its 
manipulation. More importantly, he was after a clear formulation of those elementary conditions, 
one founded on cutting-edge developments in the physical sciences, especially the work of 
Willard Gibbs. Henderson considered Bernard’s theory of milieu intérieur—the internal 
environment and its role in ensuring internal stability in the human organism—as encapsulating 
the spirit of this integrated vision of life as a physico-chemical phenomena. It was this approach 
that Henderson applied to the study of blood. In the second half of his career, Henderson would 
go on to apply this same approach to the study of social life.  
In retrospect Henderson’s engagement with physical chemistry, physiology, and the 
social sciences may appear idiosyncratic, but, in his day, Henderson was engaging in a familiar 
form of border crossing. What makes him unique is the fact that he was positioned in such a way 
that he was able to do this within a much broader set of domains. His disciplinary training in 
                                                        
40 Philip Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
 
41 John Jordan, Machine-Age Ideology and American Liberalism, 1911–1939, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1994). 
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physical chemistry, medicine, and physiology allowed him to bring a quantitative tool kit to the 
study of biology, one that was quite rare in his day. Even his more prominent contemporaries, 
such as Walter B. Cannon, lacked the depth of training in mathematics to do the kind of work 
Henderson did on blood and acid-base chemistry. His physiological sensibilities and institutional 
ties to a medical school gave him ready access to medical data and medical school colleagues 
(even though his relationship to the medical school was tenuous and fraught with professional 
tension). His love of French culture and mastery of the French language allowed him to read 
French scholarship, including Bernard’s work and French translation of Pareto’s Trattato, with 
ease. Finally, Henderson’s institutional location at Harvard gave him a degree of prominence and 
freedom to explore these ideas at a time when the boundaries between disciplines were still quite 
flexible. This chapter, then, takes as its starting point the question of how Henderson’s unique 
position made it possible for him to be involved in such a diverse set of pursuits in the early 
decades of the twentieth century.  
Harvard at the turn of the century was a place that was undergoing tremendous 
institutional change. In his book Working Knowledge, historian Joel Isaac carefully describes the 
world of informal intellectual communities at Harvard, a community that he refers to as the 
interstitial academy. Isaac defines the interstitial academy as the realm of intellectual 
engagement that existed between established discipline-based departments or schools.42 
Henderson made expert use of these interstitial spaces to promote his vision of the social 
sciences and the study of social life. Most importantly, this allowed him ample opportunity to not 
only transmit, but also refine a systems approach to the study of human relations. This was a 
vision of social life in which all variables were interconnected, existing in a state of mutual                                                         
42Joel Isaac, Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012): 23.  
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dependence. Henderson therefore stands out, not so much as an idiosyncratic individual, but as 
someone whose life circumstances and training allowed him to move in and out of these 
interstitial spaces. His life and work provide us with a comparative lens with which to look at 
disciplinary border crossing in the early decades of the twentieth century.  
This chapter highlights the key turning points in Henderson’s life, concentrating on the 
moments that contributed to his ability to move in and out of different domains of knowledge 
production. It starts with an overview of his childhood and upbringing with the goal of 
highlighting the ways in which Henderson was indeed a product of his time. The chapter then 
considers Henderson’s career at Harvard College, Harvard Medical School, and his post-
graduate studies. This biographical chapter highlights the ways that Henderson’s experiences 
were both representative of and divergent from the experiences of other scientists of his day. As 
part of this discussion, the chapter also goes into some detail regarding Henderson’s class 
background. This aspect of Henderson’s biography is relevant because it provides a new 
interpretation of his efforts to establish such institutions as the Society of Fellows and his 
somewhat unique appreciation of “practical” knowledge and experience. Previous studies have 
used these examples as evidence of his conservatism. Although there is some evidence that 
suggests that Henderson held politically conservative views, this chapter aims to give a more 
balanced account. Indeed, his class background and upbringing suggest that his views might be 
more in line with liberal and reformist ideals than has been previously considered. This insight is 
important because it reframes the ways in which Henderson’s subsequent work on Pareto should 
be interpreted and understood within the context of American intellectual history.  
 
*** 
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Family Background 
Lawrence Joseph Henderson and his twin brother, Clarence Bosworth Henderson, were 
born on June 3, 1878, in Lynn, Massachusetts.43 His parents, Joseph Henderson, a native of 
Salem, Massachusetts, and Mary Reed Bosworth, from Cincinnati, Ohio, with family ties to 
Massachusetts, happily welcomed their twin sons into their modest home at 37 Nahant Street in 
Lynn, Massachusetts. That summer, on July 6, 1878, the Henderson home was struck by tragedy. 
At the age of one month, seven days, young Clarence Henderson died of “debility.”44 Lawrence, 
also “small and feeble as an infant,” barely escaped death. 45 He was likely afflicted with the 
same illness that took his twin brother’s life. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the 
infant mortality rate was approximately 16 percent in Massachusetts.46 The Hendersons and 
hundreds of other families shared the painful experience of losing a very young child.  
Shortly after Clarence’s death, the Hendersons relocated to Joseph Henderson’s 
hometown of Salem, Massachusetts. A year-and-a-half after the birth of the twins, Mary 
Henderson gave birth to a third son, Harry Peters Henderson, in December 1879. A decade later, 
at the age of thirty-nine, Mary B. Henderson gave birth to her fourth and last child, Robert 
Graham Henderson in June 1889. All three of the surviving Henderson brothers attended 
Harvard College.     
In the years following Lawrence’s birth, Joseph Henderson worked as a commission 
merchant with strong business ties to the island of St. Pierre. He bought and sold hardware, and                                                         
43 Massachusetts Vital Records, City of Lynn, MA, 1878, 244. 
 
44 Massachusetts Vital Records, City of Lynn, 1878, 26. Cause of death recorded as “debility.” 
 
45 W.B. Cannon, “Biographical Memoir of Lawrence Joseph Henderson 1878–1942,” National Academy 
of Sciences of the United States 23, (1943): 31–58.  
 
46 Herbert S. Klein, A Population History of the United States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
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his business enjoyed a period of relative prosperity in the late nineteenth century. In 1893, a year 
before Lawrence entered Harvard College, Joseph’s business was severely affected by the 
depression of 1893. 47 The Panic of 1893 came at the climax of the struggle over the gold 
standard and is believed to have resulted from a railroad building “bubble.” It gave rise to a 20 
percent unemployment rate and a series of bank failures between 1893 and 1897.48 The fifty-
eight-year-old Henderson senior would spend the next decade trying to rebuild his business and 
doing odd jobs. That business never fully recovered.  
Despite the family’s precarious financial situation, Joseph did everything he could to 
support his son’s education. In the early years, Henderson attended Salem public schools, 
graduating from Salem High School in the spring of 1894. His high school transcript reveals that 
he was a fairly average student in all areas except mathematics and physics.49 “Mr. L.J. 
Henderson is a boy of supreme self confidence—with some reason in mathematics and science, 
to which he takes,” said his high school teacher, Mr. C. C. Dodge, in a letter of recommendation 
for admissions to Harvard College. “He despises the classics as of no value,” he went on, “and 
does poor work in them.” With regard to his character, Mr. Dodge had this to say: “Morally his 
character is good. He will do very good work in the subjects that he likes.”50 A second letter 
writer, a Mr. Arthur L. Goodrich, Esq., was less generous. Lawrence had worked for Goodrich as 
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an office assistant. His job was primarily to help Goodrich with basic calculations and 
bookkeeping. In a short two-sentence letter of recommendation, Mr. Goodrich stated that 
Lawrence was, “by nature,” as opposed to by effort, a young man of more than usual ability. “On 
nature’s kind supply,” he continued, “[Lawrence] has lately grown too heavy and become 
lazy.”51 Despite these relatively lukewarm letters of recommendation, Lawrence was granted 
admission to Harvard College. In the late nineteenth century, admissions standards differed 
dramatically from those of today. Lawrence’s classmates were primarily from Massachusetts, 
with a few men from neighboring New England states. In the fall of 1894, Lawrence J. 
Henderson set off for Harvard College.  
 
Training a Chemist at Harvard, 1894–1898  
In the late nineteenth century, those seeking admission to Harvard College were required 
to take a series of college entrance examinations. These examinations were administered in the 
summer months of June and September in Cambridge and other select locations. Henderson 
passed his examinations without much trouble. His results reveal a mild weakness in German 
language and an above-average grasp of French, Mathematics, and Physics. At the age of 
sixteen, Lawrence J. Henderson was granted admission to Harvard College and joined the class 
of 1898. L.J. Henderson took advantage of the opportunity to take intermediate French and 
enrolled in French 2—reading and composition—with Professor Lewis Sanderson in the fall of 
his freshman year. He assigned La Fontaine, Corneille, Racine, Moliere, Beaumarchais, Alfred 
de Musset, and Balzac. The following spring semester Henderson enrolled in French 4—practice 
in speaking and writing French—an intermediate half-course. By his junior year he was enrolled                                                         
51 Harvard University Archives, Henderson, Lawrence Joseph, A.B. 1898, Box 2172 1890–1968, letter of 
recommendation from A. L. Goodrich Esq. 
32 
 
in a course listed as being primarily for graduate students, French 15. The theme of the course 
was French Comedy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, taught by Professor F. Bucher, 
a Molière expert.  
 In his later writings and lectures on Pareto and the social system, L.J. Henderson was 
fond of using examples from Moliére’s comedies well as Balzac’s La Comédie Humaine to 
illustrate his perception of human nature. Henderson considered Molière to be one of the great 
diagnosticians of human nature. In the titles of Molière’s plays—such as Le Bourgeois 
Gentilhomme, L’Avare, Tartuffe, and Le Misanthrope—Henderson saw the embodiment of 
uniformities of human character.52 Moliére and Balzac, L.J. Henderson was fond of stating, best 
illustrated Pareto’s concept of uniformities and persistent aggregates. His strong grasp of the 
French language would also later enable Henderson to read and comprehend the French 
translation of Pareto’s Trattato. 
 Henderson’s transcript shows that he was placed in intermediate mathematics and 
physics his freshman year; by the end of his sophomore year, he had completed all of his college 
training in both.53 In the fall of his sophomore year he enrolled in his first chemistry course, 
Chemistry 1—a laboratory-based course on general descriptive chemistry. The course was taught 
by the prominent organic chemist Charles Loring Jackson. In his remaining two years at Harvard 
College, Henderson continued to take increasingly advanced coursework in both Chemistry and 
French.  
The Hendersons’ financial situation stabilized somewhat in the 1894, as they seem to 
have been able to pay for their son’s education for the 1894–1895 academic year. The cost of                                                         
52 Lawrence J. Henderson, “Sociology 23,” (1938): 30. 
 
53 Henderson’s student records for the academic year 1894–95 show that he received a ‘B’ in both French 
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tuition at Harvard College was $150.00 in 1894, the year Lawrence J. Henderson enrolled.54 The 
total cost of attendance—including room, board, club fees, utilities, and sundries—could range 
anywhere between $372—on the low end—and $1,010—on the high end.55 Modest fees by 
today’s standards, but nonetheless a considerable sum for most middle-income families in the 
late nineteenth century. That first year, the family was able to cover the full cost of his freshman 
expenses.  
The second year, however, Joseph found himself struggling to come up with the 
necessary funds. Joseph submitted an application for a scholarship in the spring of 1895, to 
defray the cost of his eldest son attending the College for the 1895–1896 academic year. Joseph 
reported his estimated household income to be $2000.00, $400.00 of which was to be set aside 
specifically to pay for L.J. Henderson’s education during his sophomore year.56 The remainder 
was to be spent on supporting his other two children, ages fifteen and six, and his wife. The 
scholarship application indicates that L.J. Henderson’s intended plan after graduation was to 
study medicine. Unfortunately, he had no special claim to any of the available scholarships other 
than a “decrease in parent’s income.”57 His application was denied. A generous aunt stepped in 
to donate $100 toward L.J.’s education.58  
                                                        
54 $150 is approximately equal to $3,878 when adjusting for inflation.  
 
55 Approximately equal to $9,672 to $26,260 when adjusting for inflation.  
 
56 This annual income comes to approximately $52,000 when adjusting for inflation. The amount set aside 
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The next year, the family’s financial situation had declined further. The scholarship 
committee awarded L.J. Henderson a Price Greenleaf Scholarship for the sum of $100.00 to 
cover the cost of attendance for the 1896–1897 academic year. 59 Toward the end of Henderson’s 
junior year, on April 26, 1897, Joseph Henderson submitted a third scholarship application. That 
year the family finances would be stretched even further, as L. J.’s younger brother Harry was 
expected to enter the College in the fall of 1897. The scholarship committee awarded L.J. 
Henderson the Browne Scholarship for the sum of $100 for the 1897–1898 academic year. 60 At 
the time, the bulk of financial aid came in the form of restricted funds to support specific groups 
of students according to the funders’ wishes.  
It was during this same year that Henderson began working as a research assistant to 
Professor Theodore W. Richards in the Chemistry department. It was here that Henderson really 
began to shine. His junior year transcript reveals that he enrolled in nearly every advanced 
chemistry course available to him that year.61 He concurrently enrolled in Chemistry 3—a 
laboratory-based qualitative analysis class taught by professors H.B. Hill and Messrs. Sylvester, 
Soch, Holmes, and Dow—and Chemistry 4—a laboratory-based quantitative analysis course 
with T.W. Richards, an up-and-coming professor. He performed well above average in both. The 
subsequent semester he enrolled in Richard’s famous Chemistry 8—History of Chemistry and 
Chemical Philosophy. The course was required to graduate with final honors in Chemistry. 
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Richard’s course instilled in Henderson a lifelong passion for the history and philosophy of 
science. 
In the fall of his senior year, Henderson also secured an assistantship in Richard’s 
laboratory. His paid assistantship was an acknowledgement of Henderson’s natural aptitude in 
chemistry and his evolving intellectual friendship with Richards. His first scientific publication 
was a product of his laboratory research in Richards’ lab.62 Henderson continued to work in 
Richards’ laboratory while a medical student at Harvard Medical School. He also worked as a 
teaching assistant during these years to help cover some of his living expenses. Given the 
family’s financial woes, the assistantship could not have come at a better time.  
Soon after enrolling in Chemistry 8 with Richards, Henderson joined the Boylston 
Club—one among at least a dozen undergraduate clubs dedicated to fostering community. The 
Boylston club began as an organization that discussed recent developments in chemical science 
and often invited guest lecturers from both the faculty and local industries to their meetings. In 
December 1893 the members recommended that there be more social meetings. Up until this 
point, the meetings had been primarily business-oriented and limited to the executive committee. 
Initially, discussions were open only to a small subset of members. Lectures were generally open 
to students interested in chemistry and the chemical sciences. The club was an exciting and 
growing group dedicated to expanding students’ knowledge of chemistry and exposing them to 
cutting-edge research conducted within the university and in industry. Guest speakers throughout 
the ‘90s covered topics that were both relevant to various local industries and innovative in 
themselves: the dissociation theory, the theory of isomorphism, methods of qualitative analysis 
of foods, and Mendeleev’s Classification scheme. The Club also hosted field trips to such                                                         
62 Lawrence J. Henderson, C. Gordon and W. L. Harrington, “Natriumchloride und Kadmiumsulfat,” 
Ztschr. Phys. Client, 27, (1898): 425. 
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companies as the Lora Art Tile Works in Chelsea, Massachusetts, and the Cochran Chemical 
Works in Everett.  
On February 23, 1897, in the spring semester of his junior year, Henderson’s name was 
proposed for membership. He was admitted with seven other applicants in March. The themes 
discussed must have left a very strong impression on young Henderson, as he would later go on 
to tackle several of the topics covered at Club meetings. In fact, the problem of dissociation 
would serve as the topic of his undergraduate honors thesis in chemistry. Henderson became 
increasingly interested in one of the key problems facing chemists and physiologists at the time: 
the regulation of acidity in the human organism. Little was known about the body’s chemistry at 
the time; even the idea that the body’s internal environment is maintained at nearly neutral pH 
was unknown at the time that Henderson was a student. Although Henderson’s membership was 
short, spanning from the spring semester of his junior year to the spring semester of his senior 
year, it is clear that the questions he was asking about the nature of inorganic matter, specifically 
as they relate to acid-basic chemistry, were of major interest beyond his own studies. The 
problems that L.J. Henderson tackled as a young chemist and physiologist were problems that 
captured the attention of a whole generation of physiologists.63  
Henderson’s junior year appears to have been an intellectually defining one for the young 
scientist. It was during this year that he began to form his identity as a chemist with a broad 
range of interests in philosophy as well as the various biological, medical, and industrial                                                         
63 For a first-person account of the problem of blood physiology—mainly the development of a full 
picture of blood as a functioning system perfectly adapted to support mammalian life on earth—and how 
it captured the attention of an entire generation of biological chemists and physiologists, see John T. 
Edsall, “Blood and Hemoglobin: The Evolution of Knowledge of Functional Adaptation in a Biochemical 
System. Part I: The Adaptation of Chemical Structure to Function in Hemoglobin,” Journal of the History 
of Biology 5, no. 2 (1972): 205–257. Similarly, for an overview of the centrality of the theory of 
dissociation, ionization, and acid-base equilibrium in the history and development of chemistry and its 
relationship to medicine see Harold M. Malkin, “Concept of Acid-Base Balance in Medicine,” Annals of 
Clinical & Laboratory Science 33, no. 2 (2003): 337–345.  
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applications of chemistry. His interest in the intersection of fields was explored at length in his 
senior thesis (discussed later in this chapter). In addition to his growing interest in chemistry, 
Henderson also enrolled in Economics 1, a course taught by Professor Frank William Taussig. 
The course covered the principles of political economy and consisted of lectures on economic 
development, social questions pertaining to economic change, and financial legislation. It was 
here that Henderson first encountered the works of mathematical economist, and father of 
general equilibrium in economics, Léon Walras, neo-classical economist and former student of 
Willard Gibbs, Irving Fisher, and Adam Smith. Henderson would go on to both utilize and 
criticize the works of economists in his writings for their over-reliance on the assumption that 
individuals act according to the rules of logic as opposed to sentiments.    
Henderson’s senior year began on September 30, 1897. His transcript shows that he took 
a substantially reduced course load during his final year at the College. He enrolled in English 
8—an English literature course—and Fine Arts 3. Fine Arts 3 was a course on ancient art that 
covered everything from classical philology and German religious painting and scripture to 
architecture. 
The summer before his senior year, L.J. Henderson had dedicated himself to writing an 
essay on Arrhenius’ theory of electrolytic dissociation for which he was awarded the prestigious 
Bowdoin Prize in the fall of his senior year. The essay, titled “The Hypothesis of Electrolytic 
Dissociation,” demonstrated his mastery of dissociation theory and the fundamentals of physical 
chemistry. In this essay he also explored his interest in interdisciplinary work. In the opening 
paragraph, he states that physical chemistry emerged from the borderland between physics and 
chemistry: “chemistry and physics developed and expanded toward each other. At first they were 
distinct and then they began to overlap.” “Of late,” he went on, “both chemistry and physics have 
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seen in this border land between the two sciences allying possibilities of new knowledge and 
conception of nature, and so it is being studied with care.”64 For L.J. Henderson, the most 
obvious point of contact between the two sciences—chemistry and physics—was the study of 
electrolysis. Electrolysis was, in L.J. Henderson’s opinion, “the inauguration of physical 
chemistry.”  
Incorporating lessons from Chemistry 8 on the history and philosophy of chemistry, L.J. 
Henderson presented a brief history of the development of electrolytic process, starting in 1805 
with Srothuse’s hypothesis—which posits that opposite charges would dissociate but gives no 
account of where the energy comes from—and ending with Arrhenius’ 1887 paper on the theory 
of electrolytic dissociation. Perhaps the essay’s most original contribution is its demonstration of 
how Arrhenius’ theory of dissociation is consistent with ordinary laws of chemical mass action 
and equilibrium.65 When one applies the law of mass action to the study of salt solutions, 
Henderson concluded, the hypothesis of electrolytic dissociation becomes “an important 
necessity.” He goes on to state, “No stronger evidence can be given of a theory than that it is in 
harmonious relation with our other ideas.” This he believed was the “strongest demonstration of 
the usefulness and consistency of a theory in establishing its truth.” Henderson believed that the 
fundamental principles of science were “interwoven; and the theory of Arrhenius has certainly 
shown some of the relations which were before hidden.” His essay on electrolytic dissociation 
marks his first attempt to formally write down his growing interest in the interdependency of 
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variables and equilibrium. He spent the next decade investigating the dynamics and implications 
of electrolytic dissociation in inorganic and organic systems.  
L.J. Henderson was fortunate to have come of age as a scientist during a period of 
exciting change within the established disciplines of chemistry and physics. As he wrote in his 
essay on Arrhenius, the field of physical chemistry was becoming increasingly well established 
as its own subfield within chemistry. The new frontier within his grasp was biology. Henderson 
would later describe biology as “the most progressive science” and the “science of the future.”66 
He would go on to make important contributions at the intersection of the physical sciences and 
biology. He considered this to be the area with the broadest potential for scientific development.  
 
Becoming a medical scientist, 1898–1904 
L.J. Henderson had, at the start of his sophomore year, dedicated himself to pursuing 
medicine upon completion of his undergraduate education. He was admitted to Harvard Medical 
School in 1898 and he continued to work in T.W. Richards Laboratory with a great deal of 
independence. He devoted himself primarily to his own researches and took the bare minimum 
number of courses required of him at the medical school. His goal was to develop himself into a 
biological chemist, and at the time the only way to prepare oneself for a career as a biological 
chemist was to attend medical school.67     
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 Henderson attended medical school during a period which has been described as the “The 
Innovative Period” in medical education by historian of medicine Kenneth M. Ludmerer.68 This 
period was characterized by important changes in curriculum, newly established entrance 
requirements, the proliferation of new scientific subjects being taught at the medical school, and 
the introduction of new methods by which medicine was taught. This new pedagogic style 
required the student to take an active role in his education rather than simply play the role of 
passive observer. This shift is best illustrated by the introduction of what has been called the 
laboratory and clinical clerkship. These changes also took place against a shift in medicine from 
a strongly French-oriented clinically based practice to a more German style of teaching 
medicine. This new German-oriented medicine stressed the importance of laboratory instruction 
and the clinical clerkship. Ludmerer documents a series of changes in the mid- to late nineteenth 
century that start with the rise of German medical science and the emergence of an academic 
elite and ends with the spread of reform across American medical schools, culminating in the 
Flexner report in 1910.  
 In many ways this account of the changes in medical education corresponds well with 
L.J. Henderson’s experience. He attended medical school at a time when more and more of the 
medical elite welcomed the incorporation of the basic sciences into the medical school 
curriculum. As historian John Harley Warner has demonstrated, however, this change was 
gradual and not without resistance. Warner shows the many ways in which French medical ideals 
and practices remained one of the most intellectually powerful sources of change that reshaped 
American conceptions of scientific medicine through the final third of the nineteenth century. 69                                                         
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Warner argues that the growing popularity of Germany as a site for post-graduate medical 
education had less to do with the “intellectual stagnancy of the Paris School,” and more to do 
with access to experiential knowledge.70 It was within this context that Henderson came to 
define himself as a chemist and physiologist.  
 In the year that L.J. Henderson embarked on his medical studies, the Harvard Medical 
School had made the four years’ course of study mandatory. This requirement had been 
established as early as the fall of 1892. Beginning in the fall of 1899 a new arrangement of 
subjects taught in the first two years had been established. In the first year, students were 
required to devote their time entirely to anatomy and the “correlated” subjects of histology and 
embryology. During the second half of the first year, students would be expected to take 
physiology and physiological chemistry. The first half of the second year was to be devoted to 
pathology and bacteriology and the remainder of the second year to clinical chemistry, materia 
medica and therapeutics. Students had the option of taking additional courses in pathology, 
theory and practice, clinical medicine, surgery, and clinical surgery. In the third year of study, 
students were to devote themselves to theory and practice in one of the specialties—pediatrics, 
surgery, obstetrics, gynecology, dermatology, neurology, or psychiatry. The fourth year was 
again focused on clinical medicine, with the option of exploring additional specialties such as 
legal medicine, ophthalmology, or orthopedics. What is notable about the period of Henderson’s 
medical education is that the word “experiment” had entered the course catalogue. In fact, 
starting in 1898, Harvard began requiring all of its first-year medical students to take a laboratory 
course in experimental physiology.71 What was once optional eventually became an integral part                                                         
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of the medical school curriculum at America’s best schools. In order to ensure that their students 
had access to patients, Harvard Medical School secured partnerships with local hospitals.72  
 L.J. Henderson never took to the clinical side of medicine. Years later he would candidly 
remark to his friend and colleague Walter B. Cannon, “No one but myself knows how 
incompetent I am in the clinical aspect of the matter, and in dealing with the actual living 
organism even in a physiologist’s way.”73 He was always quick to acknowledge his own lack of 
clinical knowledge and experience. It was his lack of clinical knowledge that drove him to 
partner with experienced clinicians such as Walter Palmer, a young physician associated with 
Massachusetts General Hospital. This lack of experience would eventually become a source of 
tension between Henderson and his colleagues. Although he spent many years teaching at the 
medical school and collaborating with physicians, his lack of clinical experience made him an 
outsider. For a man who wrote so much about the importance of practice, he practiced very little 
in the fields he influenced the most.  
 For Henderson, medical school was a necessary passage point, a means to an end. His 
focus was primarily on research at the intersection of chemistry and biology. Despite his relative 
lack of interest in practicing medicine, his years at the medical school helped him make contacts 
with key individuals in the field. He would later, upon completion of his post-graduate studies, 
serve as an instructor at the medical school. He also maintained ties to medical school faculty 
throughout his career.  
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Upon completion of his medical studies, Henderson joined the famous laboratory of 
Franz Hofmeister at the University of Strasbourg from 1902 to 1904.74 His interest in electrolytic 
dissociation and the impact of salts on the properties of solutions continued. Hofmeister had been 
studying the effect of salts on physical properties of protein solutions—i.e. viscosity and osmotic 
pressure—since 1887.75 Reflecting on Henderson’s experience abroad, W.B. Cannon remarked, 
“There is some question as to whether [Henderson] received any formal advantage from his 
experiences there; an associate has testified that he was prone to wander about the laboratory and 
converse and theorize with other advanced students, especially concerning the methods they 
were using and the results they were obtaining.”76 The implication being that, though he did not 
produce anything of significance during this period, he profited from the work of others. He 
joined the lab primarily in an effort to get a solid foundation in biological chemistry and its 
methods. He went to Strasbourg with a solid understanding of ionization and dissociation and the 
potential implications of these phenomena for the regulation of physiological processes—mainly 
the regulation of acidity in the organism. What we do know is that he came out of this experience 
a changed man. He had, in the two years from 1902–1904, established lifelong friendships.  
His experience in Strasbourg sharpened his political awareness—in particular the 
political history of Alsace, which had been passed from France to Germany after the war of 
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1870.77 In the years after the handover, no one could ignore the political and social tensions 
between French and Germans living in the Alsace-Lorraine area where the University was 
located. His love of French culture and literature was reinforced, and he left Alsace an intense 
Francophile with a genuine distrust of all things German. His closest friends and colleagues—
including Franz Luoop, Gustav Embden, and Karl Spiro—went on to become leaders in German 
biochemistry. Years later, when the First World War was nearing its end, Henderson offered his 
services to friends who had been stationed abroad. In a letter to Carl Alsberg, Henderson 
suggested that he be sent to Alsace “as a kind of intelligence officer or advisor with respect to 
problems affecting the population.” He reminded his friend that he was fluent in French and that 
after having spent two years at the University of Strasbourg he was on friendly terms with a 
number of “French men of some importance including Henri Lichtenberger, one of the most 
important Parisians of Alsatian origin.” He felt strongly that this knowledge of “the problem and 
the people” of Alsace would help to reestablish civil order.78 It was also during this time that he 
established his lifelong friendship with the young biological chemist Carl Alsberg.  
Henderson’s publication record suggests that he obtained more than just social 
experience in Strasbourg. In a paper titled “The Physical Chemistry of Milk” published during 
his time abroad, Henderson demonstrated that one could measure the molecular concentration of 
milk using its conductivity. This was a proof-of-concept paper. The goal was to show that a very 
similar method could be used with other solutions—mainly molecular concentration in renal 
secretion that could later be used for diagnostic purposes.79 In addition, his work with Karl Spiro 
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suggests that he was at the very least partially active during his years abroad. In his book Blood, 
he describes in great detail a series of experiments conducted in collaboration with Spiro—a 
senior scientist at the University of Strasbourg.80 In collaboration with Spiro, Henderson 
investigated the ionization constants of beta-oxybutyric acid and acetoacetic acid, which was 
used to show how that the kidney is an important means of defense against acid intoxication in 
diabetes.81 In another published study the two men investigated the physico-chemical basis of the 
variation in distribution of inorganic material between blood plasma and red cells under the 
influence of carbonic acid.82 In short, this period of his life was far from a casual waste of time; 
it was a period that both reinforced his interest in the emergent field of biological chemistry and 
expanded his vision of the broad-ranging biological implications of the physical properties of 
inorganic compounds. He went on to explore this topic in great breadth and depth in his first 
published book, The Fitness of the Environment (1913), which is the subject of chapter two.  
 
Navigating Administrative Waters: Between the Medical School and the College 
After completing his post-graduate studies at the University of Strasbourg, L.J. 
Henderson returned to the Harvard Medical School as a lecturer in biological chemistry in the 
department of physical and pathological chemistry. With the exception of a few years visiting 
other universities, L.J. Henderson made Harvard his professional home from 1904 until his death                                                         
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in 1942. Towards the end of his career he became increasingly interested in social theory and 
began using his leadership at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory to try out some of his ideas. After 
several decades studying physiological regulation, Henderson became interested in social 
regulation and stability. The following section traces Henderson’s path from a young professor at 
Harvard Medical School to his increasing engagement with social theory. 
 Just as he had in his undergraduate and medical school years, Henderson joined the 
laboratory of T.W. Richards while he simultaneously pursued a career as a professor at the 
Harvard Medical School. His first research project was an empirical study on the heats of 
combustion of organic molecules in relation to their structure.83 A year later he was promoted to 
instructor of Biological Chemistry at the Harvard Medical School, a rank he held until 1910. The 
Medical School, however, had only recently incorporated instruction in biological chemistry into 
its curriculum.  
Prior to 1904, the teaching of chemistry at the Medical School consisted primarily of 
problems of toxicology, the purity of the water supply, and analysis of urine.84 Walter B. 
Cannon’s biographers note that, early in the twentieth century, Cannon did everything within his 
power to encourage the formation of an independent biological chemistry department at the 
medical school. “There is no doubt,” he wrote in a letter to President Eliot, “that the most 
promising field for the future development of medical science is the field of chemical 
physiology.”85 Within this context of change and excitement, Henderson’s background and 
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mastery of physical chemistry and its biological implications might have lead to a successful 
career in the medical school. Some of his colleagues, however, harbored hostility toward his 
seeming lack of interest in first-year medical students and his lack of experience in the clinic. 
One of Henderson’s most vocal opponents was Otto Folin, a research chemist at McLean 
Hospital. Henderson and Folin experienced growing tension over their divergent views of the 
acidity of urine. In a paper published in 1906, L.J. Henderson directly discredited Folin’s work 
on phosphate equilibrium in urine, stating that Folin’s argument that urine contains no disodium 
phosphate because it does not precipitate upon addition of calcium chloride is “fallacious.”86 In 
this paper, Henderson systematically marshals empirical data in support of his view that “in urine 
there exists a mixture of mono- and di-hydrogen phosphates of sodium, ammonium, and other 
bases.”87 The paper publically points out Folin’s deficiencies in the area of chemical 
equilibrium—especially in relationship to animal fluids. His subsequent work only intensified 
the feud between the two men.  
What was at stake for Henderson in this debate was the idea that physico-chemical 
“habits of thought” and methods were important for the study and practice biochemistry. 
Henderson’s paper demonstrated that one could use analytical methods to quantify the degree of 
hydrolysis, ionization and concentration of substances in urine. He uses empirical evidence to 
argue that Folin’s method, which was largely qualitative, was unable to analyze the conditions of 
equilibrium in body fluids accurately. In a series of charts and graphs, Henderson shows that if 
temperature is not fixed, errors of at least five percent may be readily obtained; this was 
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especially true, he argued, “when Folin’s improved method is employed.”88 Henderson’s 
experiments attempted to create conditions in the laboratory closely resembling physiological 
conditions.  
Henderson also put forward a view of the body as self-regulating. He pointed out that a 
series of studies had shown that living cells possess an efficient mechanism to prevent 
considerable hydrogen or hydroxyl ionization. In other words, Henderson argued that excessive 
amounts of mono- or di-sodium phosphate might be added to the system without causing even 
faint acidity or alkalinity.89 At issue was the most appropriate way to study the biochemistry of 
the body, as well as a view of the body as a self-regulating system at the cellular and biochemical 
scale. Although Henderson succeeded in showing the very real limitations in Folin’s paper, his 
efforts did not translate into professional recognition at the Medical School. In 1905 when the 
chairman of chemistry at the Harvard Medical School died, L.J. Henderson’s name was quickly 
passed over as a potential replacement. Instead, Otto Folin was selected to take up the post.  
In 1906, the department of Biological Chemistry at Harvard Medical School was moved 
from physical and pathological chemistry to the department of comparative physiology. In 1906 
Henderson was joined by his former colleague from his Strasbourg years, Carl Alsberg. The two 
men, along with Otis F. Black—another of L.J. Henderson’s collaborators—and Francis H. 
McCrudden, taught the lecture and laboratory component of biological chemistry to first-year 
medical students. Soon Henderson was given additional responsibilities. In 1907, he began 
teaching graduate courses on the applications of physical chemistry to biology. He lectured five 
times a week during the January term. The course, biochemistry 4, was an introduction to recent                                                         
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applications of physico-chemical theories and methods in biology and medical science. Topics 
covered included the theory of solution, concentration law, catalysis, ionization, the theory of 
colloids, and the physico-chemical organization of the cell—all topics in which L.J. Henderson 
had developed expertise.  
That same year, Henderson inquired about his prospects at the Medical School. President 
Eliot told him in few words that his future at the medical school was far from secure.90 That 
same year, his friend and colleague Carl Alsberg abruptly resigned after being denied 
promotion.91 The mixture of hostility and indifference with which L.J. Henderson was received 
at the Medical School, despite his evidence expertise, gives us some indication of the enduring 
tensions between laboratory and clinic in the first decade of the twentieth century. Having had no 
clinical experience, L.J. Henderson was regarded with some suspicion as a perpetual outsider. 
His highly quantitative publications on acid-base equilibrium likely further alienated his 
colleagues at the medical school.    
According to some of his contemporary, these tensions stemmed from Henderson’s own 
natural tendency to provoke. In a biographical essay about Henderson, Cannon wrote that the 
scientist “enjoyed argument and often deliberately employed dogmatic statements in order to 
shock” listeners into reexamining their opinions.92 At the weekly meetings of the Society of 
Fellows, Henderson was fond of holding court. As Cannon recounts, Henderson would regularly 
expound his views, “often overwhelming his opponents by sheer force.”93 Perhaps most 
                                                        
90 Benison, Barger, and Wolfe, W. B. Canon, 127. 
 
91 Ibid. 
 
92 Cannon, “Lawrence J. Henderson,” 49. 
 
93 Ibid. 
50 
 
importantly, he was regarded as “an extreme conservative.”94 Others took this conservatism to 
stem from a general distrust of “rulers, the time-serving politicians.”95 His friend Arlie V. Bock, 
a physiologist, wrote that Henderson “distrusted many current visionary schemes of a social 
nature” and favored “old-fashioned routines upon which our society has been built, now too 
often lightly regarded by reformers.”96 This orientation towards society is clearly reflected in his 
embrace of equilibrium theory and its implications for social stability, as well as in his very 
explicit distrust of the reform-oriented politics of the first half of the twentieth century. Despite 
his gruff public image, Henderson had a warmer side—one that, Bock recalls, was “too often 
hidden from his more learned friends.”97  
 Despite all of this professional turmoil, Henderson’s research began to take off in the 
Laboratory of Biological Chemistry at the Harvard Medical School. These were years of 
profound productivity. In 1908 he made what would be his major contribution to our 
understanding of the balance between acids and basis in animal organisms, including the process 
whereby the organism maintains itself at the point of neutrality.98 He states in the opening 
paragraph of this groundbreaking paper that the theory was the result of the “last three years” of 
laboratory work “concerning equilibria of neutrality.”99 Henderson had discovered the capacity                                                         
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of carbonic acid to preserve neutrality in aqueous solutions that contained the bicarbonate. In this 
paper he proposed the equilibrium expression for which he most commonly remembered, K = 
[H+][HCO3-]/[dCO2].100 Henderson began to zero in specifically on the unique properties of 
carbonic acid and the role of the carbonic acid buffer system in stabilizing hydrogen ion 
concentration in living systems as well as the ocean.  
 The year after the publication of this groundbreaking paper, Henderson joined forces with 
Edward E. Southard, a well-respected professor of neuropathology, to publish a paper in The 
Harvard Bulletin proposing reforms in medical education. This work, titled, “Education in 
Medicine: The Relations of the Medical School and the College,” caused heated debate among 
the Medical School faculty. The authors wrote, “qualitative improvement in medical education is 
far more desirable than those forms of quantitative alteration now going on, far more desirable 
than either cramming or lengthening the curriculum.”101 Like other reformers of his day, 
Henderson was interested in refining the curriculum to “strengthen rather than lengthen the 
medical curriculum.”102 What should be the place of medical sciences in the collegiate 
department of the university, the authors asked? Why, in the case of Harvard, were they not 
found there? Moreover, they noted, Harvard Medical School, “has to a degree been sequestered 
rather than assimilated by Harvard University.”  
 Henderson’s and Southard’s main critique was that the so-called medical courses of the 
laboratory type were essentially courses in natural science; they were only medical in so far as 
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they are also indispensible to the art of medicine.103 The medical school needed a clear union 
with the teaching of the natural sciences in other parts of the University and College. This long-
standing division was not for “logical reasons, but for historical ones.” For this reason, the two 
men argued, the medical sciences should be opened up to the entire university and the courses 
taken should count toward the A.B. degree. Henderson and Southard believed that such courses 
as physiology could be of great value to general education. They specifically proposed that the 
Faculty of Arts and Sciences should be allowed to examine the science courses taught at the 
medical school and to include the ones found suitable in the approved choice of electives.  
The two authors noted that such a change would bring multiple benefits. First, it would 
allow the medical school to “articulate with the whole American University System.”104 A closer 
union with the university “system” as a whole, they thought, would only strengthen the medical 
school and the quality of training received by medical students. This change would also serve to 
increase the geographic diversity of the student body by removing barriers to entry by students 
with bachelor’s degrees from other universities, where they had been allowed to enroll in so-
called medical sciences. Students arriving from midwestern colleges and universities often held 
what was called a “combined A.B.,” which included basic courses in the natural sciences in the 
first year and strictly medical science courses in the second. These students had chosen this path 
with the goal of pursuing a medical career. According to Harvard Medical School’s existing 
admissions criteria, those students holding a combined A.B. would have to re-take those courses. 
As the authors point out, this made attendance at HMS either impossible or unnecessarily costly 
for many students coming in from the West. A third benefit of opening up these courses to the 
College would be that it would allow students who did plan to pursue a career in medicine the                                                         
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benefit of taking medical science courses. Henderson and Southard believed that this would offer 
a tremendous advantage to both the individual student and society, as nearly all students would 
benefit from a basic understanding of the medical sciences. Finally, Henderson and Southard 
suggested that their proposed changes might help break down what they saw as an overly rigid 
curriculum. They advocated for greater freedom of choice at the medical school—something 
akin to what had already developed in medical departments in European universities and 
American graduate schools. What they envisaged for the medical school was a more flexible 
curriculum “with no regular prescribed course of study.”105  
At stake in their proposal was a bigger question about the relationship between the 
medical school and the Faculty of Arts and Sciences.106 We can see, imbedded within the 
proposal, a growing recognition of the shifting lines demarcating the boundary between medicine 
and science. Similar debates were happening at Yale, Johns Hopkins, and the University of 
Pennsylvania throughout the first decades of the twentieth century.  Admissions and graduate 
requirements were in flux, with consequences for pre-medical and medical school curricula and 
medical practice. 
Among the many aspects touched on in the Southard and Henderson article, the argument 
for formalizing a pre-medical science undergraduate curriculum proved to be the most 
controversial. Perhaps in anticipation of the criticism, W.B. Cannon anonymously published a 
paper in support of the proposal.107 Cannon’s anonymous essay, however, could not prevent the 
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appearance of a scathing review by George V. N. Dearborn appearing in the Harvard Bulletin on 
November 3, 1909.108 Dearborn was at the time a professor of physiology at Tufts Medical 
School. He saw Henderson’s and Southard’s plan as an unwarranted attack against the education 
of the general practitioner. He felt strongly that the adoption of such a plan would lead to the 
preparation of medical scientists and specialists rather than well-rounded general practitioners. A 
few weeks later, Henderson and Southard responded to Dearborn’s critiques. Henderson and 
Southard argued that Dearborn “has been aiming, not at us, but at a phantom of his own 
imagining.”109 In an effort to counter Dearborn’s claims that their plan would produce 
specialized M.D.’s akin to the expert Ph.D., the authors reiterated, “No one, certainly not we, has 
for an instant thought of relaxing the requirements for the M.D., nor has it been suggested, and 
assuredly it shall not be suggested by us, that any of the important subjects of the medial 
curriculum be omitted from anybody’s medical education.”110 Instead the authors proposed that 
the rigidity of the medical curriculum should be relaxed and that students should be subjected to 
written, oral, and practical assessments similar to those required of the Ph.D. Henderson and 
Southard further argued that Professor Dearborn’s fear of their plan was “grounded on his belief 
that we were turning away from the ideal of developing practitioners.”111 Another critic was                                                         
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Thomas Dwight, a prominent anatomist and senior member of the Harvard medical faculty. 
Dwight’s disagreement went to the very heart of Henderson and Southard’s proposal. He took 
issue with the claim that one could draw a sharp distinction between laboratory and clinical 
courses, Southard and Henderson had suggested. The two had stated that laboratory courses of 
general importance to the natural scientist and medical man align, while the clinical courses were 
intended to specifically teach the application of science and the art of medicine. Laboratory 
courses should, therefore, be open to all students at the college, while clinical courses would only 
be useful to those planning on practicing medicine. Dwight felt that this distinction was 
meaningless and that the primary purpose of all courses taught at the medical school was to 
prepare students to practice medicine.112  
The degree to which the Medical School should integrate itself into the rest of Harvard 
was a topic of ongoing debate in the first decade of the twentieth century. This model of a fully 
integrated medical school is commonly referred to as the “Flexner Model.”113 The separation 
between undergraduate and professional education was an American phenomenon. In European 
universities, medicine was also an undergraduate discipline, and students were permitted to study 
medicine upon entering university. In the United Sates, in contrast, medicine was strictly a 
graduate discipline with its own standards for admissions and a separate curriculum.114 In the 
United States, most schools did not require a baccalaureate degree for admission to medical 
school. The one exception to this was Johns Hopkins Medical School, which was held up by 
reformers as the model of the future. After the publication of the Flexner report in 1910, pressure 
                                                        
112 Benison, Barger, and Wolfe, W. B. Canon, 231. 
 
113 Robert H. Ebert, “Medical Education in the United States,” Daedalus 106, no. 1 (1977): 171–184. 
 
114 Ibid., 172.  
 
56 
 
for reform in medical education began to mount, and slowly American universities began to 
increase their admission standards.115 Henderson’s published commentary on the future of 
medical education was therefore part of a much larger shift taking place in American universities 
and medical schools.  
The relationship between the medical school and the College would soon change upon 
the inauguration of Abbott Lawrence Lowell as the twenty-second president of Harvard 
University. On October 6, 1909, Lowell was officially inaugurated as the new president. With his 
presidency came a series of reforms, many aimed at better integrating the University’s faculties 
and resources.116 In Lowell, Henderson found a natural ally. Henderson’s 1910 marriage to Edith 
Lawrence Thayer, a relative of Lowell’s and his former mentor T. W. Richards’ sister-in-law, 
only served to strengthen their bond. In addition to their newfound familial tie, both men cared a 
great deal about improving undergraduate education and raising academic standards at the 
College and in the professional schools. At the time, Henderson was serving as an informal 
undergraduate adviser to students intending to study medicine. Shortly after the publication of 
Henderson’s co-authored essay with Southard, Lowell asked Henderson if he would be willing to 
chair an ad hoc committee on points of overlap in courses at the College and the Medical 
School.117  
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In part due to his connection to Lowell and prominence as a scientist, Henderson’s career 
became more firmly grounded in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, especially after he was denied 
promotion within the medical school. His uncertain future at the Medical School was replaced 
with a newfound freedom and security at the College. In 1910 Henderson moved across the river 
to the College as an assistant professor in biological chemistry. His introductory course in 
biological chemistry—a survey course on the chemical constitution of animals and plants—was 
strategically designed as a liberal arts course rather than a pre-professional course.118 Henderson 
continued to teach biological chemistry in the chemistry department from 1910 until 1939. From 
1915 to 1920 he served as the Chairman of the Division of Medical Sciences of the Faculty of 
Arts and Sciences. In 1913 L.J. Henderson published The Fitness of the Environment—a 
synthetic account of the research he had conducted over the previous decade and a 
groundbreaking study on the significance of inorganic substances for life. Fitness was followed 
by the publication of The Order of Nature in 1917.  
In the fall of 1919, L.J. Henderson was recruited by Johns Hopkins to serve as Chair of 
the Physiology Department. In an effort to keep him at Harvard, he was made an attractive 
counteroffer which resulted in his promotion to full professor that same year. L.J. Henderson 
would maintain the status of full professor until 1934, when he was appointed Abbott and James 
Lawrence Professor of Chemistry. The Hopkins offer, he told Raymond Pearl in a letter, “gave 
me conditions of work at Harvard which are entirely satisfactory.”119 Pearl expressed his 
disappointment, but stated that he “felt sure that Harvard would not let you leave.” “You now,” 
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said Pearl, “have things at Harvard about the way you want them, and will have for the indefinite 
future.”  
Pearl’s diagnosis of the situation was not entirely accurate. As part of the counteroffer 
Henderson had been promised the chair of the newly erected physical chemistry laboratory at 
Harvard Medical School. Henderson saw this as an opportunity to develop his own research 
program. This, however, never came to fruition. Instead, Edwin J. Cohn was chosen as the new 
chair of the laboratory. Cohn had previously worked with Henderson as a research collaborator 
from 1917–1918. Once again, the perception that Henderson was not committed enough to 
medicine as a science got in the way of his professional advancement at the Medical School. 
Henderson was perceived by his medical school colleagues as more of a true physical chemist, a 
scientist with only partial interest in the clinical side of things. Cohn’s work on the physical 
chemistry of proteins was seen as being more in line with the priorities and direction of the 
Medical School. This came as a major personal blow and professional disappointment to 
Henderson.  
In 1927 Harvard University received half a million dollars from the Rockefeller 
Foundation to establish a laboratory to study the psycho-physiology of work in industry. The 
Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, which started off as a unit in the basement of the Harvard Business 
School, would eventually come to revolutionize physiological research in the nascent field of 
exercise and work physiology. In the 1930s, Henderson increasingly spent his time on campus at 
his office at the HFL, organizing his lectures, guiding research on human relations, and 
recruiting top talent to the HFL. This topic will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Four.  
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Experiments in Social Theory, Philosophy, and History of Science 
After his appointment as chair, Henderson continued teaching at the College and at the 
medical school. A year prior to the opening of the Harvard Fatigue Lab, the entomologist 
William Morton Wheeler, urged Henderson to read Trattato Di Sociologia Generale, by the 
Italian economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto. With reluctance, Henderson agreed to read 
Pareto’s sociological treatise. His reluctance was quickly transformed into enthusiasm, and 
before long Henderson had mastered every detail of Pareto’s dizzyingly complex Trattato. In the 
early 1930s Henderson began meeting with a small inner circle of Harvard’s intellectual elite to 
discuss the implications and potential applications of Pareto’s work. People from all corners of 
the university were drawn to Henderson’s interpretation of Pareto’s concept of the ‘social 
system’ and the development of what he called ‘concrete sociology.’ 
Henderson’s turn toward the study of social life had begun in earnest following the 
publication of Blood in 1928. In fact, his appointment as the Mills Lecturer at the University of 
California, Berkeley, in 1930 is evidence of his rising importance in philosophical and 
sociological circles. He was invited to take on this position by Berkeley professor of philosophy 
George P. Adams. The lectureship had for several years been filled by many of “the leading 
philosophers in this country and in Britain.”120 The selection committee was eager to appoint 
someone who could explore the “intimate relations between philosophy and science.” 121 They 
wanted to fill the chair from time to time by “some scientist of distinction who is also interested 
in philosophical problems.”122 In his invitation letter, Adams remarked that the committee was 
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well aware of L.J. Henderson’s “interest in and contributions to the philosophical aspects of 
science.” Adams and other members of the philosophy department at the University of California 
had fond memories of Henderson’s presence at the Philosophical Seminar of Professor Josiah 
Royce.  
Henderson’s engagement with issues that were not strictly of interest to scientists—such 
as the place of teleology in natural science—was of great interest to his philosopher colleagues. 
His scientist colleagues felt that his engagement of teleology was too philosophical and only 
served to distract from the more scientifically relevant issue of fitness of the environment. In 
writing his first two books, Henderson clearly asserted that there are philosophical implications 
to scientific findings, and that men of science “can no longer shirk the responsibility of 
philosophical thought.”123 The assertion that the two were inextricably related sparked great 
interest within the field of philosophy of science.   
Eager for “a change and a rest in a pleasant climate,” L. J. Henderson happily accepted 
the invitation. Reluctant to teach a more advanced graduate class in the philosophy of science, he 
settled on an undergraduate Pareto seminar. The seminar was to focus on two key texts: Pareto’s 
Trattato di Sociologia Generale and Claude Bernard’s Introduction to the Study of Experimental 
Medicine. One of the most interesting aspects of Pareto’s book, Henderson stated in a letter, “is 
his discussion of scientific method, a treatment the most skeptical and the most radically 
empirical, so far as I am aware, that has ever been published.”124 By referring to Pareto as 
“radically empirical” Henderson was referring to Pareto’s insistence on sticking to “the facts” 
and guarding against the encroachment of sentiments in scientific analysis. The evolution of the                                                         
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Pareto Seminar and Sociology 23 will be explored in more detail in Chapter Three. Although 
Henderson’s engagement with Pareto’s social theory developed later in his career, it is clear from 
his correspondence with the philosopher George P. Adams that Henderson had, as early as 1913 
already established himself as an individual who seriously considered the philosophical 
implications of his scientific work. 
Henderson was interested in history as well as philosophy. Prior to his appointment as 
full professor, Henderson followed in the footsteps of his former mentor, T.W. Richards, and 
designed a course on the history of science. With President Lowell’s approval, Henderson went 
on to teach history of science to generations of undergraduates from 1911 until 1942.125 His 
lectures began with Copernicus and Galileo and ended with modern biology and medical 
sciences. On March 10, 1914, he told a class full of students that the “conservation of energy and 
the second law of thermodynamics have had more influence on pure science than the theory of 
evolution.”126 Evolution, he went on, “has had more of an influence on history, sociology and 
economics than on science pure and simple.” He held up the nineteenth-century generalizations 
about matter as the most important step toward developing a unifying theory of nature. Still, he 
warned the students, “natural laws must be qualified.”127 The need to qualify does not 
necessarily “affect their accuracy.” He gives the example of Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier, 
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whose work on the law of conservation of energy did far more than set forth “the facts”—
“chemical changes were henceforth thought of as rearrangements.” Henderson attempted to 
impart upon his pupils an appreciation for the empirical as well as the theoretical aspects of 
scientific inquiry.  
Henderson’s interest in history had left him convinced that the most important and 
exciting work left to do was in biology. “The Problems of Living Things,” he said at the start of 
his lecture, “baffles and stimulates the imagination.” Not shy about expressing his doubt 
regarding the adequacy of natural selection, as a mechanism to explain the process of evolution, 
Henderson went on to state that “the answer to how evolution takes place” is still unanswered. 
“Most men of science,” he noted, “admit that there is something more besides natural selection.” 
Acknowledging that natural selection did much to establish the theory of evolution, he pushed 
his students to consider that natural selection “is a factor” but perhaps not the only factor. 
Henderson’s first book, The Fitness of the Environment (1913), was entirely devoted to 
articulating the very crucial role that the physical environment played in facilitating the 
formation and evolution of life on earth. Like neo-Lamarckians, Henderson believed that the 
environment played a crucial role in the evolution of life on earth. Unlike the neo-Lamarckians, 
however, Henderson did not believe that acquired characteristics could be inherited.  
Henderson’s courses were designed to raise questions about scientific content itself. They 
were also designed to present students with a formalized message about what science is and what 
it ought to be in the modern world. “Science,” he exclaimed, “does not deal with origins.”128 In 
later iterations of the course, L.J. Henderson would further emphasize his view of science. A 
scientific theory or generalization “only needs to be useful, not true,” he told his students in                                                         
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1941. “To say a thing exists or happens is only a convenient assumption; it is valuable only if it 
is useful.” What one needs most in science is “a conceptual scheme.”129 Armed with a 
convenient conceptual scheme, scientists can then engage in experimentation: “experimentation 
is essential to replace accidental discovery.” Experimentation makes generalizations possible: 
“generalization is characteristic of science, not pre-science.” His lecture notes suggest that by 
1941, L.J. Henderson’s attention had shifted from a linear progressive story of scientific 
development to a more theoretical, perhaps sociological, view of science as a process. He 
believed that description and classification were necessary precursors to scientific generalization. 
This, he argued, could only be accomplished by many scientists, each working with an agreed 
upon conceptual scheme regarding a given basic principle. The conceptual scheme served to 
unify their thinking in a way that extended beyond their individual research projects. “His course 
ended with a lecture on the place of science in civilization. “There is constant pressure,” L.J. 
Henderson told his students in a lecture delivered in 1941 “to adapt to a new scale of living 
because of the very existence of scientific improvements.”130 Moreover, these developments 
have brought about the necessity for specialization, but, he warned, “the experts are a 
conservative force.” Despite all of these advances, however, “the laborer has not seen benefit to 
the extent which we would expect.” There can be no doubt, he said, “that industrial civilization is 
out of joint.” “No society,” he reminded his students, “is inevitable.” The point he tried to 
impress upon his students was that “Science is neither a moral nor an impartial force.” It is in the 
end, “society’s task to guide it to desirable ends.”  
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This proved to be his last lecture before his death nine months later in 1942.Over a 
decade earlier, in February 1931, just a month after having assumed his prestigious post as the 
Mills Lecturer, Henderson experienced a sharp pain in his lower abdomen. The pain followed by 
a nearly fatal gastrointestinal hemorrhage, landed Henderson in the hospital for a four-weeks 
stay.131 His hemoglobin levels, his wife reported in a letter to a concerned friend, had fallen 
down to 32 percent. A combination of bed rest, Whipple’s Liver Extract, and a diet consisting of 
heavy cream and eggs brought his levels back up to 85 percent in less than two months.132 At the 
time his doctor concluded that his ailment, much to his wife’s relief, “proved to be a duodenal 
ulcer.”133 Nearly a decade later, after experiencing a second attack, doctors would come to a far 
more devastating conclusion—cancer. L.J. Henderson’s experience with being told that he had 
cancer would become a subject he engaged in his writings on the physician-patient relationship.  
 
Conclusion 
In the interstitial spaces of the American academy in the early half of the twentieth 
century, Henderson was able to move somewhat seamlessly from the physical chemistry 
laboratory to the classroom where he taught social theory and history of science. Some of his 
contemporaries were engaged in similar border crossings, but perhaps to a lesser extent. 
Henderson was unique in that he crossed multiple domains, yet remained firmly grounded in his 
identity as a physiologist. He also published on the topic of medical education, business 
education, and the study of society. Very few people were willing, or perhaps bold enough, to 
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engage in such a vast array of intellectual enterprises. The nascent institutional structures at 
Harvard and other universities like it made such fluidity of movement possible in the first few 
decades of the twentieth century.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A State of Mutual Dependence: Articulating the Relationship Between Fitness and Systems  
 
 
The interdependence of the variables in a system is one of the widest 
inductions from experience that we possess; or we may alternatively 
regard it as the definition of a system. It also finds its formulation in the 
mathematical description of all kinds of systems.134  
 
    
 In this chapter I examine what Henderson and his contemporaries understood by 
“systems,” in a physico-chemical sense. It outlines the basic logic of systems that Henderson 
used to study the relationship between environment and organisms. Henderson later transferred 
this same logic to his study of social interactions, a switch that will be explored in greater depth 
in chapters three and four.  
 I begin with an analysis of Henderson’s articulation of the logic of systems in his first 
two books, The Fitness of the Environment (1913) and The Order of Nature (1917). Henderson’s 
articulation of environmental fitness in these two books allows us to understand how Henderson 
defined systems and the historical significance of his contribution to a mechanistic conception of 
organisms and the environment. Henderson’s formulation of the theory of the fitness of the 
environment for life inspired new research in oceanography, physiology, and geology.135 I argue 
that the primacy of systems was already apparent in these two early works and that Henderson 
used an analysis of fitness to articulate the logic of systems more generally.                                                          
134 Lawrence J. Henderson, Pareto’s General Sociology: A Physiologist’s Interpretation. (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1937), 86. 
 
135 Henderson’s first book The Fitness of the Environment was reprinted seven additional times following 
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interdisciplinary fields of oceanography and physiology. Wald likely new Henderson, as the two men 
were professors at Harvard University in the 1930s. Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment, (New 
York: Macmillan, 1913). 
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 Henderson and his contemporaries understood a “system” to be a known set of variables 
whose interrelations could be formally stated using symbolic logic and mathematics. They 
conceptualized systems as generalizable to all phenomenon involving two or more variables in a 
state of mutual dependence. Systems could be of a social or a physical nature (as in the case of 
Willard Gibbs’ work on phases). This concept of system—as variables in a state of mutual 
dependence—marks a movement toward a more cooperative and ecological view of nature. 
Henderson’s two books illustrate a growing emphasis in the works of biologists and physical 
scientists in understanding nature as cooperative, with permanence and stability in natural forms, 
coordination, and organization.136  
 This same trend can be seen in a growing number of publications by biologists who 
focused on the concept of emergent evolution, as seen, for example, in C. Lloyd Morgan’s 
Emergent Evolution (1923). The concept of emergent evolution was also explored by the 
entomologist William Morton Wheeler in studying the formation of insect and human societies 
in his book Emergent Evolution and the Development of Societies (1928). Others, like D’Arcy 
Wentworth Thompson, echoed Henderson’s concern that biologists had focused too narrowly on 
evolution—mainly the concept of survival of the fittest—to explain changes in the form and 
structure of living organisms. In Growth and Form (1917), Thompson argues that physical laws 
and “mechanics” ought to be considered. Henderson’s work tied together these intellectual 
concerns and observations into a theory of cosmic and biological evolution.  
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The chapter then examines debates regarding the role of mechanism versus vitalism in 
biology to provide context for understanding the impact of Henderson’s first two works. 
Henderson believed that his conception of environmental fitness was directly relevant to the age-
old debates between vitalists and mechanists. Henderson conjectured that the system, as a 
concept, could resolve this tension by insisting that one must take into account the specific 
variables and their relations as well as the organization of these relations. I then provide an 
analysis of the different intellectual communities that engaged this work and what they perceived 
to be the significant implications of these two books. I argue that Henderson’s first two books 
helped build a foundation upon which systems theory could be applied to both the natural 
sciences and the study of human relations. This chapter shows that, for Henderson and his 
contemporaries, this general logic of systems provided a seamless transition among disciplinary 
domains. 
  
Fitness: Organism and Environment as System 
This section discusses Henderson’s conception of fitness and its relationship to his 
articulation of the logic of systems. It specifically investigates what makes Henderson’s claims 
about environmental fitness unique, and how those claims fit into the broader picture of early 
twentieth-century discussions of biological fitness and the adaptation of organisms. Henderson, it 
will become clear, conceived of the environment-organism relationship as constituting a system. 
In so doing, he articulated a logic and structure of systems and a method of analyzing problems 
consisting of multiple variables in a state of mutual dependence. My approach here builds upon 
the work of previous historians of science, including Everett Mendelsohn and Iris Fry, who have 
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sought to place Henderson’s thinking on these topics within broader intellectual patterns in the 
early twentieth century.137  
In The Fitness of the Environment (1913) Henderson sought a more “precise” meaning 
for fitness, a quantitative formulation of the fitness of the environment for life. “To what extent,” 
he asks, “do the characteristics of matter and energy and the cosmic processes favor the existence 
of mechanisms which must be complex, highly regulated, and provided with suitable matter and 
energy as food?”138 In other words, to what extent is the environment fit to support life as we 
know it? His answer: the unique ensemble of physical and chemical properties exhibited by 
carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen make earth the “fittest possible abode of life.”139 Not only was the 
organism fit for the environment, but the environment was perfectly fitted for life. Unlike 
Darwinian fitness—which is concerned primarily with the ability of an organism to survive and 
reproduce through the process of natural selection—Henderson was interested in fitness as a 
physico-chemical concept.  
The Fitness of the Environment is, in a way, a collection and interpretation of examples 
of simple physical and chemical substances that help to illustrate the reciprocal character of 
Darwinian fitness. The focus was chiefly on carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, water, and carbonic acid. 
Henderson’s interest in the topic developed from a curiosity about “the problem of neutrality or                                                         
137 Mendelsohn notes that Henderson’s work on fitness was an extension of his studies on acid-base 
chemistry. See, Mendelsohn, “Locating ‘Fitness’ and L.J. Henderson,” in Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: 
Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning, eds. John D. Darrow, Conway Morris, Stephen J. Freeland, Charles L. 
Harper, Jr., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3-19. See also Iris Fry, “On the Biological 
Significance of the Properties of Matter: L.J. Henderson’s Theory of the Fitness of the Environment,” 
Journal of the History of Biology 29 (1996): 155-196. In another article Fry looks at the philosophical 
implications of thermodynamically informed conception of evolution see, Fry, “Evolution in the 
Thermodynamic Perspective: A Historical and Philosophical Angle,” Zygon 30 (1995): 227-248. 
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faint alkalinity of the organism,” which then developed into the much broader question of 
fitness.140 The transition in his research problem began, he states, with a “chance” reading of a 
paper written by the German chemist Maly in 1877 on the diffusion and dialysis of phosphates. 
The discovery was inexplicable to Maly in the absence of the modern theory of ionization. 
Henderson credited Maly’s paper with inspiring a series of experiments on the study of the 
neutrality of the organism. It soon became clear to him that the key to understanding the 
“peculiar conditions” of acid-base equilibrium in blood and protoplasm is also found in the 
phosphate solutions that Maly had observed, as well as in solutions containing carbonic acids.  
After nearly a decade of hard work on acid-base equilibrium—most importantly his 
development of a quantitative description of the chemical equilibrium of buffer solutions—it 
became clear to Henderson that phosphoric acid and carbonic acid have the “greatest power of 
automatic regulation of neutrality.”141 He struggled, however, to find an explanation for a fact of 
such far-reaching importance. Three things regarding the power of buffer solutions seemed 
apparent to Henderson: 1) It could not be accounted for by natural selection; 2) it could not be 
attributed to “mere chance”; and 3) it was not a unique or singular instance of simple substances 
serving a useful purpose in the process of life. “Like everyone who has received a chemical 
training,” he states, “I was vaguely conscious of numerous other similar cases.” The most 
obvious example of the fitness of the environment for life is that of the “remarkable thermal 
properties of water” which are of the upmost importance to living organisms. Prior to the 
publication of Fitness there had been almost no modern work on the role of the environment—
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described in physico-chemical terms—in organic evolution. Henderson had discovered 
biological fitness anew from the perspective of modern physical chemistry. 
Henderson’s insistence on the reciprocal relationship between organism and environment 
was not new. Indeed, Darwin had proposed this idea long before the publication of Fitness. 
Nineteenth-century natural theology attributed adaptations of organisms to the environment and 
the fitness of nature for the “activities of living things” to the wisdom and goodness of God.142 
For years skeptics struggled to propose a theory that could account for the apparent teleology in 
the adaptation of organisms to the environment without falling back on the “dogma of final 
causes.” With the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the hypothesis of 
natural selection provided skeptics with a much sought-after alternative to the concept of purpose 
in biology. For Darwin and his followers, the concept of fitness came out of a larger discussion 
of natural selection. Henderson contended that, while biologists had done much to advance the 
understanding of fitness in terms of adaptations of living organism to the environment, they had 
treated the environment, and its history, as an independent variable. Henderson instead asked: 
could the material universe be subjected to laws that are important in organic evolution? His 
inquiry into fitness therefore focused on a physico-chemical understanding of the physical 
environment and its ability to sustain life.  
The rapid production of physical and chemical data since the middle of the nineteenth 
century made such a question a reasonable line of inquiry in the early twentieth century.143 By 
the time Henderson published Fitness in 1913, physical science, he argued, had “provided the                                                         
142 William Whewell, Astronomy and General Physics Considered with Reference to Natural Theology, 
(London: William Pickering, 1834). 
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speculative biologist with a very accurate and extensive description of the physico-chemical 
structure of the material universe.”144 Henderson readily acknowledged that nearly all of the 
facts or theories covered in Fitness were, by the first decade of the twentieth century, well 
established and well represented in encyclopedic handbooks. Henderson’s unique contribution 
was, therefore, his interpretation of the facts as they related to the problem of biological fitness. 
Henderson was interested in using established facts about simple chemical substances to 
understand the role of the environment in shaping biological evolution.  
But Henderson’s goals were larger than this. Beyond biological evolution, he was 
interested in “cosmic evolution”: the history and origins of the material universe. He argued that, 
“logically, in some obscure manner, cosmic and biological evolution are one.”145 In the early 
decades of the twentieth century, a number of scholars were aggressively attempting to answer 
the question of the universe’s origins with scientific evidence. Replete with religious and 
metaphysical implications, Henderson’s Fitness sought to move away from the religious 
undertones of the study of the cosmos. His goal in Fitness, in other words, was to establish a 
plausible explanation of the past and present fitness of the environment for life based on rigorous 
treatment of a half-century’s worth of physical and chemical data on the behavior and properties 
of the most abundant chemical elements on earth. He showed how the Earth’s most abundant 
chemicals—mainly carbon, oxygen and nitrogen—possessed the ideal properties to facilitate the 
evolution of life on earth. Henderson invited biologists to make use of this work in investigating 
the relationship between life and the environment.  
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This reciprocal relationship between the properties of matter and organic mechanisms, 
Henderson argued, constituted a system that could indeed be analyzed using the methods of 
physical chemistry.146 This was a major move away from framing adaptation as a morphological 
problem. What was new about Henderson’s approach was his conception of this reciprocal 
relationship as a system, as well as his use of evidence from physical chemistry. With life 
defined as a physico-chemical system, the environment became a unique ensemble of properties 
perfectly fitted for life on earth. The properties of the environment, he stated in the final chapter, 
“biologically considered, present the same fitness as the properties of life.”147  
Henderson, in other words, was writing not about a particular local environment or 
organism but rather about the general conditions and characteristics of the material world that 
constitute an environment and that environment’s ability to sustain stable, diversified organisms. 
He used the concept of fitness to convey the “extraordinary” set of environmental conditions that 
are “favorable to life” in general.148 Among these conditions he included number, variety, 
complexity, adaptability, availability, activity, and richness in energy of the substances involved 
in the metabolic process and in the chemical and physical formation of the organism.149 Together 
and independently, Henderson went on, the “natural characteristics of the environment promote 
and favor complexity, regulation, and metabolism, the three fundamental characteristics of 
life.”150 Not only did Henderson claim that organism and environment constitute a system; he 
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also argued that they constitute a particularly complex and self-regulating system that favors 
stability (in a thermodynamic sense) and diversity of life forms. After establishing the terms 
upon which his treatment of life and environment is based—mainly the physical and chemical 
perspective—he stated that living things can be simplified into “mechanisms which are complex, 
regulated, and provided with a metabolism.”151 Finally, he reduced the problem of life’s fitness 
to an inquiry into the degree to which the physical and chemical characteristics of the 
environment—mainly water, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon—are favorable to 
mechanisms which must also be physically, chemically, physiologically complex, and well 
regulated.152 He concludes that the physical properties of the environment are uniquely fitted to 
life, life conceived as a physico-chemical system.   
 
Defining the Physico-chemical System 
Henderson’s inquiry into the functions of an environment lead him to formulate his 
problem a different way in a short article which appeared in the journal Science a year after the 
publication of Fitness: “what are, speaking generally and abstractly, the relations between any 
material system and the rest of the world?”153 Drawing on the thermodynamical studies of 
Willard Gibbs, Henderson stated that most of physical chemistry is concerned with systems, their 
classification, activities, and conditions of equilibrium. Henderson defined a physico-chemical 
system as an aggregate of matter occupying a position of space. Gibbs’ phase rule, he said, made 
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it possible to put together a complete and exhaustive classification and description of systems.154 
As such it was now possible to give a qualitative physical and chemical analysis of the 
fundamental characteristics of any system—including temperature, concentration, stability, and 
chemical activity.  
A key characteristic of all systems, Henderson argued, is that they manifest activity. 
Accordingly, Henderson concluded, “mechanism has come to mean merely any active 
system.”155 Henderson understood “mechanism” to refer to an active system that can be 
described according to its fundamental physico-chemical properties—in general, and not to a 
specific mechanism. This is precisely the new definition and meaning of mechanism that 
Henderson employed throughout his work. For Henderson, a mechanistic explanation of a 
phenomenon is “its explanation as the activity of a system”; this, he explains, is “the only 
explanation known to physical science.”156 He went on to state that, “for the purposes of physical 
science no others [factors] need be, or indeed can be, introduced.”157 He was speaking directly to 
vitalist claims that there had to be something more than mere mechanism.  
In this same 1914 article, Henderson gave a succinct definition of the system. Drawing 
once again on the work of Willard Gibbs, Henderson states that the fundamental characteristics 
of a system are its components, phases, concentrations, temperature and pressure.158 
Consequently, he states, fitness for any system involves the situation that produces the greatest 
                                                        
154 Ibid. 
 
155 Ibid. 
 
156 Ibid. 
 
157 Ibid. 
 
158 Ibid. 
 
76 
 
possible range of values for each of these fundamental characteristics of the system. As 
compared to other elements in the periodic table, the elements, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon 
yield the highest degree of possibilities for each of these measures, therefore producing the fittest 
environment for life. In his second book, The Order of Nature (1917), Henderson followed this 
line of inquiry into the universality of systems a step further. Here Henderson argued that the 
unique ensemble of properties found in hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon show that there is a “new 
order”—a law-like behavior of properties—in the environment. The concept of order is, of 
course, closely tied to teleological conceptions of nature that had long been associated with a 
religious worldview. Henderson, however, saw no need for God in this interpretation of nature. 
Instead, he identified this order with the physical properties of the elements. In the following 
section I discuss how Henderson’s concept of order in nature related back to his theory and logic 
of systems.  
 
The Teleology of Systems 
In 1916 Henderson published a brief essay titled “The Teleology of Inorganic Nature” in 
The Philosophical Review.159 In this essay, he focused his discussion on the study of adaptation. 
Adaptability, like fitness, he states, “at bottom is a physical and chemical problem, 
uncomplicated by the riddle of life.” 160 The question animating his inquiry into the teleology of 
inorganic nature was, “What are the physical and chemical origins of diversity among inorganic 
and organic things, and how shall the adaptability of matter and energy be described?”161 
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Henderson approached this question primarily through the concept of system discussed above. 
By conceiving of the fitness of the environment for life in physico-chemical terms, Henderson 
was able to account for the reciprocal relationship between environment and organisms by 
falling back on his concept of system—a state of mutual dependence among variables.  
 A year later, Henderson tackled these questions in a book-length essay titled, The Order 
of Nature: An Essay.162 In The Order of Nature, Henderson takes the philosophical problem of 
teleology head-on. “Order” here refers to the logical relationship between the properties of 
hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon and the characteristics of systems—a relationship that had, in 
Henderson’s opinion, a “philosophical as well as a scientific bearing.”163 Chapters two through 
seven are therefore dedicated to a philosophical problem: the historical development of 
teleological thought.  
 In the Order of Nature, Henderson set out to produce a systematic study of the chemical 
origins of diversity among inorganic and organic things as well as of the adaptability of matter 
and energy for life. Although his previous study demonstrated the fitness of the environment for 
life, Henderson admitted that it “only touches the surface of the problem.” The mutual 
relationship between organism and environment is not symmetrical; “it is something more than 
adaptation for it involves great adaptability.”164 In other words, in every case of adaptation, the 
particular characteristics of an organism fit a special environment, but its general properties—its 
incorporation of water and carbonic acid—fit the general characteristics of life. Moreover, 
stability, mobility, durability, complexity, and the availability of matter and energy, he pointed                                                         
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out, are favorable to any mechanism, “any possible kind of life in this universe.”165 In The Order 
of Nature, Henderson attempted to demonstrate that the “primary constituents of the environment 
are the fittest for those general characteristics of the organism which are imposed upon the 
organism by the general characteristics of the world itself; by the very nature of matter and 
energy, space and time.”166 Life, in other words, is conditioned by the environment. Henderson 
saw this as proof for the existence of a “hitherto unrecognized order among the properties of 
matter.”167 The order to which Henderson was referring is simply the logical relation of the 
properties of the three elements (hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon) that are characteristic of living 
systems in general.  
 Henderson’s conception of system is indeed teleological, but it nevertheless assumes that 
it is possible to study the system mechanically by considering the individual variables and their 
relations. He considered this order—the law-like properties observed in the material universe—
to be in part responsible for the teleological appearance of nature. Henderson addressed these 
teleological implications directly, writing in the conclusion that it is the “principle peculiarity” of 
the universe—the unique ensemble of its properties, including the uneven distribution of the 
elements—“which makes diversity of evolution possible is original and anterior to all instances 
of the process which it conditions.” 168 This order is original to the very structure of the universe 
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and ensures evolutionary developments. In other words, neither fitness nor evolution—of life or 
the physical world—can be “regarded as merely contingent.”169  
 In his final chapter on “The Teleological Order,” Henderson revisited Aristotle’s framing 
of the teleological problem: “the character of the material nature whose necessary results have 
been made available by rational nature for a final cause.”170 Henderson translated “rational 
nature,” nature conceived by human reason, into the modern term “laws of nature.”171 These 
laws are rational in that they are the product of human reason and do not have an objective 
existence. This, he said, “is clearly true of the relation between the properties of the elements 
and the characteristics of systems.” In other words, the teleological order observed in nature is 
essentially natural law. He continued, “all phenomena are phenomena of systems.” 
Consequently, final causes can only operate through the evolution of systems. As such, greater 
freedom for the evolution of systems “involves the greatest possible freedom for the operation of 
a final cause.”172  
At last Henderson arrived, full-circle, at a simplified version of the teleological 
implications of his investigation: How do we account for the characteristics of material nature 
whose necessary results have been made available by the laws of nature for any hypothetical 
final cause?173 Again, Henderson asserted that the uniformity of the characteristics of material 
nature throughout space means that there cannot have been “any contingency about the operation 
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of this cause.”174 Consequently, the properties of these elements “are to be regarded as fully 
determined from the earliest conceivable epoch and perfectly changeless in time.”175 He based 
this conclusion upon experimental evidence, namely astronomical spectral analysis that had been 
made available in the late nineteenth century.176 He concluded that the “abstract characteristics” 
of systems must also be regarded as fully determined and changeless in time. Based on this line 
of reasoning and evidence, Henderson argued that the connection between the properties of the 
three elements—carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen—and the evolutionary process is teleological and 
non-mechanical.177  
To summarize his argument, Henderson recapitulated the conclusion upon which his 
analysis rested: 1) All phenomena are phenomena of systems and therefore the characteristics of 
systems (phases, components, activities, etc.) are the universal conditions of all phenomena. In 
other words, the characteristics of systems do not depend on the peculiarities of matter, and they 
are changeless; and 2) the three elements—carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen—possess an ensemble 
of unique characteristics that should be considered fundamental properties of life.178 This pattern 
produced by the combination of these three elements is a universal condition of organic 
phenomena and therefore systems. The relationship between these two abstract qualities of the 
universe cannot, he argued, be conceived as dependent. Unlike mechanically conditioned 
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relationships where there is an opportunity for modification through interaction, as is the case in 
organic adaptations, the absolute properties of the universe are supposed to be changeless in 
time. Unable to give a mechanistic account of the relationship between universal systems and the 
fundamental properties of matter, Henderson concluded that the two must have a “functional 
relationship that can only be described as teleological.”179  
 
Reception  
Henderson’s first two books were received with great interest, if not always positively. 
The public response to them gives some indication of their significance and timeliness. The 
books raised anew age-old debates about mechanism versus vitalism, the place of teleology in 
science, and the underlying nature of the evolutionary process. Among the various reviewers, we 
find commentary from scientists, philosophers, journalists, and religious scholars.  It was treated 
by philosophers with great skepticism and at times outright animosity. Scientists saw it as a step 
forward, but felt that Henderson’s engagement of the philosophical implications of his scientific 
findings only served to confuse the more important issue of the role of the environment in the 
process of organic and cosmic evolution. To many of Henderson’s readers the two books were 
seen as either a restatement of the obvious or “a curiously tangled mixture of idealism and 
scholastic realism.”180 Most of these reviews leave the concept of systems largely untouched; 
instead, what resonated most with audiences was Henderson’s claim that the existing 
environment was the fittest possible abode for life.  
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In a short, but largely positive review, the biologist Raymond Pearl applauded The 
Fitness of the Environment as the “logical sequel” of Darwin’s The Origin of Species.181 He 
considered the book an intellectual achievement that “invites and creditably sustains comparison 
with that milestone marking the progress of human knowledge.”182 He noted that since the 
publication of William Whewell’s Bridgewater Treatises, there had been no systematic effort to 
examine the “specific fitness of the basic elements of the environment for the requirements of 
organic life.”183 In addition, he pointed out, the principle of natural selection or any other 
mechanistic explanation “utterly fails” to explain the fitness of the environment for life. 
Henderson’s most important achievement, in Pearl’s assessment, was his ability to show, 
conclusively, “that for living things constituted as are the only living things we know about, it 
would be impossible, with the physical agencies and chemical compounds now known, to 
construct an environment in fundamental respects better adapted to the needs of organisms than 
is the environment which exists in this earth.”184 It was the interpretation and implications 
stemming from these findings, not the findings themselves that inspired subsequent debate.  
Henderson’s claim that the earth was indeed the fittest possible abode for life turned out 
to be one of the most controversial arguments presented in Fitness. Interestingly, a scholar of 
religion, G.B. Foster, publishing in The American Journal of Theology, considered this to be one 
of the most intriguing insights of Henderson’s Fitness.185 Like Pearl, Foster pointed out that, 
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although we have known about the fitness of the organism for its environment since Darwin’s 
day, the fitness of the environment for the organism is indeed a rather novel finding. For Foster, 
this insight “stimulates reflections of both a philosophic and religious character.”186 An 
anonymous writer for The Biblical World was similarly interested in the theological implications 
of Henderson’s writings. Henderson, he wrote, allows for the possibility of the operation of a 
teleological tendency at the very beginning of the process of cosmic evolution. Noting that this 
was nothing more than the doctrine of “first cause,” the writer felt that Henderson left the vital 
question unanswered: Can philosophy and theology live in a mechanistic world?187 Ironically, 
this was precisely the question that Henderson hoped to avoid by being agnostic as to the 
question of the origin of this newfound fitness. Foster, in contrast, was especially taken by the 
potential theological implications of Henderson’s views. In concluding his assessment, Foster 
noted that if Henderson’s argument was not quite enough for the “entire religious need, it is quite 
too much for irreligion.” On this point, Pearl and Foster parted ways. Pearl regarded Henderson’s 
engagement of the philosophical implications of the fitness of the environment as falling short 
“in compelling logical force, of the purely scientific part of the work.”188  
Taking a strong stance against Henderson’s claim that the earth is the fittest possible 
environment, psychologist Howard C. Warren argued that acknowledging that the environment 
is well fitted for life as we know it does not imply that there could not be a different set of 
inorganic conditions in which a “different type of organism might have arisen.”189 In Warren’s 
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view, inorganic teleology is founded on particular facts, not the unchanging general facts that 
Henderson identified as “the new order” among the elements. As such, Warren criticized 
Henderson for not accounting for what he refers to as “unfitness.”190 In another review, Ralph 
Lillie pointed out that Henderson’s Fitness is in part an attempt to rehabilitate the natural 
theology of Paley “with an appeal to the results of modern physical science.”191 Lillie opined that 
most biologists would likely consider Henderson’s central thesis as “either self-evident or 
inherently unprovable” and would instead prefer to regard the book as a “scientific essay on the 
biological importance of the more general and elementary properties of the elements and 
compounds entering into the formation of protoplasm.”192 Much like Warren, Lillie maintained 
that, although the existing environment may be the best for organisms as they have come to exist, 
it might not be the best for the living beings of another “quite different cosmos.”193 Lillie did 
credit Henderson with showing that the ultimate constitution of the environment possesses 
characteristics that correspond with the living organism. The discovery of this truth, he stated, 
“will no doubt surprise many others, just as it surprised him [Henderson].”194 In Lillie’s opinion, 
this was Henderson’s most important contribution to biology. In Lillie’s view, the chief aim of 
biology “is to show how the characteristics of the organism are related, and ultimately proceed 
from those of the environment.”195                                                          
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Other reviewers took the teleological argument in a different direction. The philosopher 
Arthur Mitchell noted that Henderson’s argument implies “not only that one may learn the true 
nature of the universe from the biological point of view, as the environment fit for life, as well as 
learn the true nature of the organism from the evolutionary point of view as the agent fitted to 
exploit its environment.”196 Still, Mitchell felt that Henderson had not gone far enough in 
investigating the philosophical implications of his own insights. Mitchell believed that there was 
yet a “profounder idea” implied in Henderson’s argument. He claimed that the biocentric 
universe revealed that there was indeed a teleological tendency working steadily through the 
whole process of evolution. This tendency is at the very origin of things and is a necessary 
associate of mechanism.197  
Still others were far less enthusiastic about Henderson’s treatment of the teleology 
problem. Another philosopher and former student of William James, Harold Chapman Brown, 
wrote that Henderson’s effort to “give teleology a deeper and more acceptable interpretation” 
had not been “wholly successful.”198 Henderson’s failure to grasp the teleology problem, he went 
on, arises from his “theory of knowledge rather than from the facts.”199 In an effort to trivialize 
Henderson’s work, Brown stated that the universe is indeed rich in sources of wonder and that 
“science can do little to dispel them.”200 He agreed with Henderson in his claim that, if it were 
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not for the unique properties of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, life would be a very “different 
sort of living organism,” but why, he asks, “is this teleology?” In other words, for Brown, this 
was not a dispute of facts but one of epistemology. The two men utilized a different conception 
of teleology and its implications for a philosophy of life.  
Interestingly, another former student of William James, Edwin B. Holt, also wrote a 
response to Henderson’s Fitness.201 Like Pearl, Holt argued that Henderson had indeed 
overstepped the boundaries of natural science and ventured too far into the field of metaphysics. 
Like Brown, Holt felt that in introducing a teleology that “lay not in his empirical data but was 
insidiously contained in his procedure and his instrument of thought,” Henderson had simply 
succeeded in illustrating “human frailty.”202 This “infirmity,” he continued, could be described 
as the “misapplication of concepts.” Holt criticized Henderson for reaching too far with his 
application of the concept of teleology to describe the fitness between environment and living 
systems. For this reviewer, Henderson’s use of teleology was mere “factitious enhancement,” an 
unnecessary strategy for making sense of patterns that exist in nature.203 Holt’s efforts were 
motivated by the goal of vindicating the “cause of unqualified mechanism” and 
“illustrat[ing]…the locus of concepts.” By this he meant the proper application of philosophical 
concepts.  
Forging a similar critique, but attacking a different concept, the philosopher Ralph Barton 
Perry focused on Henderson’s use of the term probability.204 Perry argued that Henderson’s 
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misunderstanding of probability had led him to erroneously conclude that the fitness of the 
environment for life, remarkable as it may be, must have been from design. “It is not proper to 
infer,” Perry stated, “a law from a single simultaneity, but only from a succession of 
simultaneities.” Perry wrote his “dissent” from “the view that purpose is exhibited in all cases of 
system and unity,” including the phenomena of life.205 Purpose, he argued, is to be unmistakably 
found in the “behavior of man,” in particular cases of action. In Perry’s assessment, Henderson’s 
error was in applying the concept of purpose to describe the inorganic world. This, he argued, 
was a “doubtful extension of a conception derived from the datum of life.”206 In the three 
reviews by philosophers discussed so far, then, the concern was primarily with Henderson’s 
“boundary crossing” into the realm of philosophy. The philosophers who did review his work 
felt that Henderson had failed in his deployment of philosophical concepts. They left the 
empirical evidence unchecked.  
A fourth philosopher, however, J.E. Creighton, had an overall positive assessment of 
Henderson’s Order. Creighton felt that Henderson had done a good job of calling attention to the 
fact that both the biological and the physical sciences must now recognize the existence of an 
order that is not merely mechanical. This order forms “the ‘organization’ or ‘system’ or ‘pattern’ 
within which mechanical causes have meaning or relevancy.”207 Creighton pointed out that this 
view was fundamentally teleological, not only in the sense that it posits a complementary 
relationship between the different elements of the ‘system,’ but also in the sense that earlier 
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stages of the evolutionary process must be regarded as a “preparation” for the next stage.208 
Although biologists would readily admit to the importance of organization, he noted, the idea 
that the physical sciences must also assume there to be order in systems of phenomena is not 
readily apparent. This was, in Creighton’s opinion, one Henderson’s most important 
contributions. In order to successfully make this claim, Henderson had to show that the “problem 
of teleological form and behavior of the organism merges in the larger question of the order of 
nature.” He rightly pointed out that Henderson did not confine himself to calling attention to the 
teleological appearance of the world as a whole. This, he said, is a fact that is no longer possible 
to doubt. Instead, the bigger question in the Order of Nature is how the production of order is to 
be scientifically explained.  
Creighton’s review additionally suggested a growing acknowledgement among scientists 
and philosophers of science for each other’s work. “One cannot read The Order of Nature,” he 
wrote, “without realizing that philosophy and science are not opposed, or even separable 
methods of inquiry, and that the distinction between them is in the end provisional.” Noting that 
Henderson would likely disagree with this statement, Creighton went on to state that throughout 
the book one finds “cropping up here and there in the pages a strange hesitation in regard to 
philosophical results, and also the old assumption that mechanism affords a kind of 
intelligibility.”209 In Creighton’s opinion, Henderson’s argument used mechanism as an 
instrument that contributed to the intelligibility of reality in terms of individual, interacting, 
systems. This suggested that scientists might be becoming more open to philosophical reflection 
in an effort to make sense of “concrete categories which are demanded by the actual facts of                                                         
208 Ibid. 
 
209 Ibid., 663. 
 
89 
 
experience.”210 Nevertheless, in Creighton’s opinion, Henderson had failed to realize the 
potentially transforming effect of the concepts he had helped to establish for natural science. 
Like Mitchell, Creighton critiqued Henderson for not going far enough. Creighton was quick to 
contrast Henderson’s commitment to mechanistic explanations with those of Haldane, whose 
“primary point of departure,” in Creighton’s opinion, “is furnished by the facts of the organic 
world.”211 Like Haldane, Creighton believed that strict adherence to mechanical dogma had only 
hindered people from dealing with “the facts of biology.”212 Like others of his day, Creighton 
was of the belief that mechanism could no longer be regarded as a complete and final answer to 
the problems raised by the physical sciences.213  
The popular press also took note of Henderson’s first two books. The New York Times 
ran a brief review of Fitness shortly after its publication.214 “For all who have felt that the origin 
of life in the world….needed further explanation than that given by theology in…its naïve 
forms,” the author wrote, “there is much of interest in professor Henderson’s inquiry…”215 The 
reviewer went on to state that Henderson’s inquiry into the properties of matter and their 
correlative fitness for life on earth had lead Henderson to assume that life is “no more 
mysterious, no more in need of teleological explanation, than matter.”216 Like other reviews                                                         
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appearing in academic journals, the Times reviewer honed in on Henderson’s claim that matter 
shows as much fitness to life as life does to matter—the reciprocal nature of fitness. This, as 
noted above, was a main point of contention for Henderson’s scientific colleagues (with the 
exception of Raymond Pearl). The reviewer saw in Henderson’s argument a hidden dualism. 
Henderson, he argued, “sees in life a something more—a something unique, scientifically 
inimitable and inexplicable.” This “inexplicable” part of this was Henderson’s admission that 
although fitness is a fact it cannot be mechanistically explained. The reviewer placed 
Henderson’s book within the context of ongoing debates about the place of teleology in science. 
The old version of teleology, “argument from design,” was finally in ruin and admitted to be so, 
“even by dualists, or at least by all of them who have given any attention to scientific 
investigation.”217  
That same year, The Independent ran a short essay on “Fitness and Purpose.”218 Like 
Creighton, the author opined that philosophy “cannot make its account without science.”219 He 
considered Henderson’s claim that teleology is a necessary associate of mechanism as one of the 
most important insights to have emerged from the publication of Fitness. He noted that many 
studies had taken for granted that the physical environment is something ultimate. Those studies 
had treated the evolution of the organism as a process of adjustment to this environment. 
Henderson, in contrast, asked if fitness is accidental or if it were instead possible to find a “law” 
that could account for the remarkable fitness of the environment for life. The reviewer’s 
assessment was that Henderson’s view was an “impressive” and “startling, exposition of the 
unity of our world.”                                                          
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A third review appeared in the New York Times in 1925 under the title “Man Lives in a 
World Made to Order.”220 Like the previous reviews, this author was struck by Henderson’s 
assessment of the reciprocal relationship between fitness of the environment for life. This review 
was published following the reprinting of Fitness in 1924, which triggered a resurgence of 
popular interest in Henderson’s argument for the fitness of the environment and its 
implications.221 These three reviews, which appeared in prominent and widely circulated papers, 
suggest a broad interest and readership. For a certain segment of the reading public, the most 
intriguing issue was Henderson’s argument about the suitability of the environment for life.  
 In response to the objections aired in the scholarly reviews, Henderson published a brief 
essay in The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods in 1916. “I can not help 
thinking,” he retorts, “that my critic [Warren] has been hasty in supposing that any man of 
science, approaching this subject from the frontiers of physics and chemistry, could to-day hold 
such silly views.”222 Henderson was “anxious to point out the facts which” he believed Warren 
had overlooked and to make the case for inorganic teleology.223 Reiterating his main argument, 
and, as he put it, “putting aside all vain speculations about other possible worlds in which matter 
may have different properties and energy different forms,” Henderson attempted to clarify his 
point once again.224 The first fact, he noted, is that the physical and chemical properties that 
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constitute the earth “make up a unique ensemble of singular physical and chemical 
characteristics.”225 “Secondly,” he continued, “the world of physics and chemistry consists 
exclusively of systems.”226 Appealing to the authority of Willard Gibbs, Henderson reiterated 
that this is a recognized postulate of science. Systems, he continued, consist of phases, 
components and are characterized by concentrations and different forms of activity (such as 
pressure and heat).227  
 Henderson also tried, in this response, to clarify his thinking on the teleological 
conclusion of The Order. For Henderson, this was nothing more than the acknowledgement that 
the environment is made up of a unique ensemble of properties. These properties are uniquely 
favorable to the existence of systems, as defined by Gibbs. These systems favor number, 
diversity, and durability. No other known elements or substances even come close to 
approaching the kind of fitness for the proliferation of systems than hydrogen, carbon, and 
oxygen. Most importantly, for Henderson, this conclusion did not rest on a single observation. 
Instead, it was based on evidence from a variety of geophysical phenomena, including the 
meteorological cycle, the variety of dissolved material in the ocean, the temperature of the earth, 
and the penetration of water into soil.228 Speaking directly to Warren’s critique regarding the 
search for evidence of “unfitness,” Henderson stated that in all of his investigations he had yet to 
find a single instance of unfitness of the environment for “systems in general.”  
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 Here again, then, Henderson was stressing that his main argument in Fitness concerned 
systems—defined generally as physico-chemical systems—and their general fitness for the 
production of diverse life forms on earth and the course of cosmic and terrestrial evolution. He 
added one opinion: “the relationship between the properties of the three elements and the general 
characteristics of systems appear to be exclusively teleological.”229 This opinion was an 
induction from logic, he pointed out, as neither of the terms of the relationship is liable to 
modification over time. In other words, the elements as they appear to us today have been 
unmodified and “systems will be systems as long as mass is mass.”230  
 Speaking directly to the question of whether or not life would be different in other places, 
Henderson stated that he had no doubt that Professor Warren is right in asserting that life would 
be different if it were silicon-based, rather than carbon-based. However, if life were in fact 
possible under such conditions, it “would be restricted by any chance that excluded water or 
carbonic acid from the environment.” In the correspondence between Henderson and his critics, 
particularly in this initial response to Warren, one sees a gap between Henderson’s description of 
life as physico-chemical system and a more biological understanding of life in a specific 
environment. Henderson had, in Fitness and Order, simplified life and environment to terms that 
were legible to the average chemist of his day. This mode of conceptualizing living things, 
however, had not yet taken hold among most biologists.  
  
* * * 
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There was yet a third community of readers who engaged Henderson’s work. This was, 
of course, social scientists and such figures engaged in reengineering the industrial workplace as 
Chester Barnard and Elton Mayo. This community found much inspiration in Henderson’s 
writings on fitness, adaptation, and order. They found in Henderson’s writings justification for a 
new approach to the management and organization of the modern workplace. What were, they 
asked, the properties that determined the smooth functioning of the industrial workplace? How 
do we determine whether or not someone is a good fit? In what kind of environment does 
creativity and stability thrive? To answer these questions, they looked to Henderson’s conception 
of fitness and order. Henderson himself also went on to apply his concept of system to study the 
interactions that took place between doctors and patients. The movement of Henderson’s concept 
of system from a study of the physical environment to social interactions will be discussed in 
depth in the following chapters. In each, Henderson and his acolytes used the same approach and 
understanding of systems to study social phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Constituting a Social System:  The Case of the Physician Patient Relationship  
 
This chapter examines Henderson’s conception of a social system through the case of 
medicine.  Henderson saw the doctor patient-relationship as a paradigmatic example of the social 
system.  He used the relationship between the physician and the patient to define this system, 
demonstrating how the parts of the system related to one another and how the method could be 
used to explore interactions between persons. The main goal of this chapter, then, is to provide a 
robust overview of what Henderson’s concept of system meant in the context of social 
interactions and for the scientific study of social life.   
For Henderson, conceptualizing the doctor-patient relationship as a social system 
provided a way to critique the lack of attention to the importance of social relationships in 
medical practice. At a moment when new diagnostic technologies and treatments were 
universalizing conceptions of disease, Henderson and some of his contemporaries—such as G. 
Canby Robinson, Richard C. Cabot, and Henry Sigerist—in social medicine insisted on the 
importance of context for the proper diagnosis and treatment of the sick.  Henderson saw 
medicine as the ideal profession in that it required its practitioners to straddle the fence between 
the practical—directly dealing with patients—and the theoretical—biomedicine—at all times.  
The movement from an abstract concept of disease to the application in the clinic demanded, in 
Henderson’s opinion, keen attention to social interactions. As Henderson saw it, doctors could 
not avoid the task of having to move between two worlds—the abstract world of science and the 
practical world of the clinic, between knowing the body as an organism and knowing the patient 
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as an individual.  It was in understanding this tension that Henderson’s efforts to elaborate a 
theory of social system offered promise to both social science practitioners and clinicians alike.  
What did it mean for a physical scientist to insist that he could legitimately read a set of 
social interactions as a kind of scientific system that followed the same rules as, say, the 
biochemistry of blood? It was indeed somewhat paradoxical that Henderson, a man who had 
never actually practiced medicine would write somewhat pompously about the doctor patient 
relationship and medical practice. The middle decades of the twentieth century were an 
important time for contacts between medical science, social science, and social theory.  I argue 
that Henderson’s construction of the doctor-patient relationship as a social system should be 
thought of as an important conceptual bridge between the laboratory and social life.  To do so, I 
examine not only Henderson’s writings on medicine as a social system, but also how he 
developed those ideas in the context of the classroom.  
 
Medicine as Social System 
In 1967, twenty-five years after Henderson’s death, Dr. John H. Talbott, Henderson’s 
friend and colleague, described Henderson as “endowed with remarkable perception and 
profound wisdom,” an individual who “displayed an amazing understanding of bedside 
medicine.” 231  This statement was all the more remarkable given that Henderson never actually 
practiced medicine.  He saw himself as completely “incompetent in the clinical aspect” of 
medicine and “in dealing with the actual living organism even in a physiologist’s way.”232  In 
addition, not one of his scientific, medical, or popular works published between 1907–1932                                                         
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makes any reference to patient care or medical practice.  It wasn’t until 1934 that Henderson 
began to apply, at least publically, his sociological insights to the practice of medicine.   
Henderson turned his attention toward medical practice in the later part of his career. He 
made this move after becoming more familiar with the work of the Italian economist and   
sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, in late 1927. Henderson was introduced to Pareto’s work by his 
colleague, the Harvard entomologist William Morton Wheeler.  Though skeptical at first, 
Henderson soon became engrossed in reading Pareto’s Trattato Di Sociologia Generale in 
French translation.  In this work Henderson found what he believed to be the most promising 
writing on a scientific approach to the study of society. “The central feature of Pareto’s General 
Sociology,” Henderson wrote in 1937, “is the construction of a similar conceptual scheme: the 
social system.”233 He found Pareto’s social system to be logically analogous to Willard Gibbs’ 
physico-chemical systems, which held that systems are composed of individual components 
(individual people) that exist in separate heterogeneous phases (social roles: families, trades, and 
professions); together, they form a system.234 Just like in the physico-chemical system, the “parts 
and forces” of Pareto’s social system “are conceived as in a state of mutual dependence.”235  The 
“forces” in Pareto’s social system are the sentiments—non-logical verbal elaborations expressing 
an individual’s beliefs and values—“residues”—core values maintained by individuals which are 
made visible to the sociologist—and “derivations”—verbal rationalizations.   Henderson and his 
contemporaries believed that Pareto’s work could be applied to “all instances of interactions 
between persons,” including sociology, law, history, religion, business, education, and 
                                                        
233 Lawrence J. Henderson, Pareto’s General Sociology:  A Physiologist’s Interpretation (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1937): 16. 
 
234Ibid., 10-15. 
 
235Ibid., 17. 
98 
 
medicine.236 Interactions thus become a way of generalizing about relationships. Henderson 
believed that Pareto’s insights could be applied to all areas of study involving interactions 
between people, with the ultimate goal of developing a science of human relations.237 Over the 
next decade, Henderson would work through the possibilities of a Pareto-based science of human 
relations in a seminar that came to be known as the Pareto Circle, more about which will be said 
below. For now, suffice it to say that Henderson understood medical practice, and the 
relationship between doctor and patient, as just one more example of an area that might 
profitably be understood as a social system.  
Henderson began speaking about what he referred to as the sociological aspects of 
medical practice to medical audiences, including first-year medical students, graduating medical 
students, practicing physicians, and medical faculties, in the early 1930s. His first publication on 
this theme was published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1935 and was titled, “The 
Physician and Patient as a Social System.” This paper was based on an address Henderson had 
delivered at the Harvard Medical School colloquium in December 1934 and again at a medical 
staff meeting at Massachusetts General Hospital in the winter of 1935; he delivered a later 
version at the spring 1935 meeting of the Association of American Physicians. It was, in other 
words, his first attempt to share his thoughts on medicine as a social system with those who 
actually participated in the practice of medicine.  
In “The Physician and Patient as a Social System” Henderson offered both a critique and 
a potential solution to, what he perceived to be a growing tendency to disregard the “personal 
relations between the physician and the patient” in modern medical practice.  His critique                                                         
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focused chiefly on medicine’s failure to develop a scientific and systematic understanding of the 
personal relations between physician and patient.  Medicine, he argued, had failed to recognize 
the central role of social relations in the everyday practice of medicine.  “A multitude of 
important new facts and theories, of new methods and routines, so far absorb the physician’s 
attention” that personal relations “seem to have become less important.”238  When the personal 
relations of the physician with his patients are understood at all, they are understood “at the 
empirical level, as they were in the days of Hippocrates.”  After years of practice wise and 
skillful physicians might have an intuitive understanding of the role of personal relations in 
medicine, but “their skill dies with them except when their apprentices have learned in some 
measure to imitate them.”  Henderson believed that a firm understanding of the personal 
relations between physician and patient was not only important, but absolutely necessary for the 
effective and responsible practice of medicine.  Yet despite numerous scientific advances in 
medicine, the personal relations in medicine remained immune to scientific formulation.  
Henderson’s radical suggestion was to approach personal relations in much the same way as 
other natural phenomenon. What was needed was “some kind of theory, working hypothesis, or 
conceptual scheme” for the doctor-patient relationship.  Henderson theorized, “A physician and a 
patient make up a social system.”   
Throughout the lecture, Henderson described the moral responsibilities of the physician 
to his patient, as well as the attitude a physician should take toward his patient. And yet, he was 
not arguing for a return to the past, or for limiting the use of technology or science in medicine. 
Instead, he pointed to the gap between medical science and social sciences. Although physicians 
now applied the study of different aspects of disease and the body (down to the cellular level) to                                                         
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their medical practice, the social relations that constituted a large part of medical practice had not 
been treated scientifically.239 Henderson was, in a way, saying that physicians needed to be more 
scientific, not less. And, in fact, what he offered in this paper was something that could be 
thought of as a social technology, a way of seeing and observing, recording, and interpreting 
social behavior.   
What Henderson was after was the formulation of an effective means of transmitting 
acquired clinical knowledge. “Scientific formulation,” he argued, was a “necessary condition” 
for achieving this end.240  For the purpose of scientific formulation, “some kind of theory, 
working hypothesis, or conceptual scheme is necessary.”241  This was no mere economy of 
thought; Henderson claimed that an effective conceptual scheme provided a means of 
remembering the “successful and economical thought of the past.”242  A truly “well learned 
theory” is not learned by rote memorization, it is “remembered in the right place at the right 
time, and this is a necessary condition for its use.” 243  In order to be able to apply a theory at the 
right place and at the right time, Henderson argued, one needs a conceptual scheme. 
  Henderson’s faith in the importance of conceptual schemes to improve the practice of 
medicine perhaps explains why each of his two published articles on this topic attempt to 
illustrate, first, how one develops a conceptual scheme based on observation and 
experimentation, and second, how one might use a conceptual scheme to guide the use of 
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generalizations gained through observation. Fully developed, the conceptual scheme to which 
Henderson refers is the social system. In “The Physician and Patient as a Social System,” 
Henderson begins this effort by stating that his “first subject is the theory of the relation between 
physician and patient.” 244 In building up this idea of the conceptual scheme—in going back and 
forth between defining and illustrating the development of the conceptual scheme and also its 
use—Henderson draws on examples from a broad range of sources, including a discussion of 
Machiavelli’s science of statecraft, Willard Gibbs’ generalized physical chemical system, Lord 
Chesterfield’s letter to his son describing his efforts to convince the House of Lords to adopt the 
Gregorian calendar, and a discussion about the responsibilities of a physician to his patient.  
In suggesting that medicine apply the terms and methods of social science, Henderson 
was not simply suggesting a particular kind of scientific method. The key to understanding this 
approach as scientific is Henderson’s emphasis on the ability to transmit and preserve acquired 
knowledge. The ability to transmit and preserve acquired knowledge differentiates science from 
a purely empirical enterprise.  If medicine were to be fully scientific, it would have to find a way 
to effectively transmit acquired knowledge from one doctor to another about the personal 
relations that constitute a large portion of everyday medical practice as part of social formation. 
Henderson was fond of saying that professional psychologist and sociologists possessed 
almost no scientific knowledge about personal relations.245 By scientific knowledge he was 
referring to knowledge gained by systematic observation using a standardized methodology.  He 
claimed that the social sciences lacked a standard methodology by which to acquire systematized 
knowledge about human interaction. This was of course an exaggeration.  Efforts to establish a                                                         
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science of human relations flourished in the mid-1930s.  The Rockefeller Foundation’s Spellman 
Memorial Fund dedicated large sums of money to establish the Yale Institute of Human 
Relations in 1929, the social sciences at the University of Chicago, and human relations at 
Harvard. For Henderson, this lag was particularly galling in medicine, a field in which the 
understanding of disease had improved, but understandings of social relationships were at best 
empirical.  Physicians’ understanding of personal relations in medicine had advanced little since 
“the days of Hippocrates.”  There was, in Henderson’s view, no systematic way of thinking 
about the sociological aspects of medical practice.   
Sociology as the Science of Interactions 
Henderson’s understanding of the sociological aspects of medical practice make more 
sense when placed in the context of the definition of “sociology” and “sociological problems” 
common at Harvard at the time. Fortunately from the historian’s perspective, we have ready 
access to Henderson’s thoughts on this topic in the form of lecture notes for Sociology 23: 
Concrete Sociology, a course that Henderson first taught at Harvard College in 1933 (he would 
teach a slightly revised version of the course at Harvard Medical School five years later).246  
The course developed out of an informal gathering that has been memorialized as the 
Pareto Circle and at the time was referred to as the Pareto seminar. Henderson organized the 
Pareto seminar in the early 1930 to bring together an elite group of Harvard intellectuals from 
across the university—including Talcott Parsons, Joseph Schumpeter, Pitrim Sorokin, Fritz 
Roethlisberger, Hans Zinsser, Clyde Kluckhohn, W. Lloyd Warner, Elton Mayo, Crane Brinton, 
Bernard DeVoto, Henry Murray, A. Lawrence Lowell and Chester Barnard—to explore how 
Pareto’s insights might be applied to their respective areas of practice.  A number of graduate                                                         
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students—such as Robert K. Merton, Kingsley Davis, William Foote Whyte, and George C. 
Homans—who would go on to become major figures of mid-twentieth century social science 
also participated in the seminar. Henderson saw this gathering of minds as an opportunity to 
“weaken the constraints that are imposed by our department organization and exclusive 
professional point of view.”247 Reading Pareto’s Trattato, he explained to the sociologist, Pitrim 
Sorokin, affords a useful opportunity to bring together people who are separated by the relatively 
rigid organization and professionalist traditions of the university.”248 As discussed in chapters 
one and two, Henderson’s interest in the nature of scientific reasoning and organization grew out 
of his participation in the Royce seminar and his work on fitness early in his career.  The Pareto 
seminar was a way for him to promote his views on scientific methodology, epistemology, and 
the relevance of systems thinking for the study of social life. Although most literature on the 
Pareto Circle has focused on the political dimensions of Pareto’s work249, it was the 
methodological dimensions of the Trattato that mattered most to Henderson and his 
contemporaries at Harvard.250    
Historian Joel Isaac has argued that the exclusive group of Pareto adherents—participants 
in the Pareto seminar and Sociology 23—at Harvard is best understood as a network of people                                                         
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rather than a closely linked circle.  The Pareto network, in Isaac’s account, is a collection of 
institutional channels through which Henderson and his colleagues were able to disseminate 
Paretian social theory.251  The main channels include: Henderson’s course on concrete sociology, 
his work at the Harvard Business School, the Society of Fellows, and the Pareto seminar. These 
four channels make up, Isaac argues, a crucial part of the interstitial academy of the inter-war 
years. As Henderson noted in his letter to Sorokin, these were opportunities for people from 
across different disciplines to come together to discuss common problems of scientific 
methodology in the study of social life.  In other words, the Pareto network provided the 
institutional space for up-and-coming social scientists to develop a new way of studying social 
life. This new approach would come to be known as structural-functionalism in the post-World 
War Two period.  Sociologists like Talcott Parsons, George Homans, and Roethlisberger, used 
Pareto’s social system as a “scientific” framework to explain a wide range of social phenomena.  
The work produced by the Pareto network dominated the intellectual agenda of sociology for 
decades after Henderson’s death.252 Despite his utter lack of training in Sociology, Henderson’s 
reputation as “the arch exponent at Harvard of what made science science” made it possible for 
him to teach a course outside of his sphere of expertise. 253  At a time when the boundaries 
between the natural sciences and the social sciences were only just beginning to crystallize 
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Henderson was able to take advantage of his prominent position at Harvard to influence a 
generation of social theorists.  
By the mid-1930s, the informal gatherings evolved into Sociology 23, a course in the 
official Harvard College course register. Originally entitled “Seminary in Methods and Results 
of Certain Sociological Investigations,” the course would later be known as simply “Concrete 
Sociology: A Study of Cases.”254 Using the “case method”—originally developed at the Harvard 
Law School in 1870 by Christopher C. Langdell—as a mode of instruction, Henderson enlisted 
the help of Pareto Seminar participants—Brinton, Homans, Parsons, Mayo, Devoto, Lowell, 
Barnard, Whitehead, and Roethlisberger. Henderson claimed that studying cases is the next best 
thing to studying something directly because it allows the student to “observe first-hand the 
effect of first hand familiarity with events that is manifested by the lecturers in the presentation 
of their cases.”255 Each case was therefore presented by “a person who has himself been involved 
in the event, or who has intimate first-hand knowledge of the event, or who is a specialist long 
and intimately familiar with a professional discipline which sharpens his perceptions and 
heightens his understanding of the event.”256 Both the Pareto seminar and Sociology 23 were 
aimed at demonstrating applicability of the concept of the social system, as a conceptual scheme, 
to the study of human relations.     
The cases came from a variety of fields, including politics, industry, the practice of law 
and medicine, family and student life, history and religion, but all conformed to Henderson’s 
definition of sociology as the science of the study of interaction between persons.  The cases 
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were intended “to elucidate some of the most general uniformities in the interactions between 
persons.”257  
By 1937—the second time he taught the course—Henderson was confident that this way 
of treating the uniformities in interactions between people was “sufficiently extensive to serve 
not only the needs of sociologists, but also those of historians and political scientists, as well as 
of men who practice the professions or engage in business.”258 By the end of the course, a 
diligent student would have assimilated and internalized Henderson’s social system as his or her 
own framework for the study of interactions between persons.  Henderson continued to teach 
Sociology 23 until 1939.  By 1941, he became “seriously concerned about the arrangements for 
the future of the Fatigue Lab…as well as the Pareto seminar and Sociology 23.”259 He noted to 
Chester Barnard that it looked as though he “should have to spend a good deal of 
time…protecting what has been built up.”260 Henderson was correct, both the HFL and 
Sociology 23 were discontinued after his death.  However, the social system lived on in the 
works of the Pareto seminar participants.  
Henderson defined sociology as “the science that is conversant with a certain class of 
phenomenon,” more specifically, “the interactions between persons.”261 In defining sociology 
this way, Henderson was, on the one hand, extending the discipline’s relevance to a variety of 
fields, including medicine; on the other, he limited its analytic focus to observable human 
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behavior (including what people say).  By identifying interactions between persons as the 
primary unit of analysis, he opened the door to making phenomena that were once invisible and 
therefore beyond the scope of analysis suddenly relevant to social science. Nevertheless, 
Henderson reminded his students that his definition was, like all definitions, and within limits, 
“arbitrary.”  “The test of a definition,” he states, “is its convenience.”  
It was this conception of the social and of sociology that Henderson was referring to 
when he wrote about the “half-forgotten sociological aspects of medical practice.”262  Even so, 
Henderson’s path—via Pareto—was not the only route to seeing the practice of medicine as a 
form of social interaction. Henderson’s writings on the doctor patient relationship were a part of 
a well-developed discourse about social medicine, especially well-developed in Boston. In his 
articles “Doctor and Patient as a Social System” and “Medicine as Applied Sociology,” one finds 
themes that resonate with the writings of other physicians of his time. The notion that 
practitioners ought to consider the social factors that affect their patient’s lives was not unique to 
Henderson.  Richard Cabot, for example, was well known as an advocate for the importance of 
the social and spiritual dimensions of a sick person’s life.263  Like Henderson and Alfred 
Worcester, he believed that physicians were beginning to drop their traditionally broad attention 
to the multiple factors that contribute to a person’s illness and health.264 Unlike Henderson, 
however, Cabot maintained that physicians should delegate responsibilities for the personal, 
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spiritual, and social dimensions of healing to social workers, counselors, and clergy.265 Like 
other progressive reformers of his day, Cabot “saw a solution to the chaos of modern, urban life 
in the power of organized expertise.”266 As the founder of first American hospital based 
department of social work at Massachusetts General Hospital in 1905 he was a major supporter 
of professional medical social workers.  
Henderson, on the other hand, argued that these—attending to the social factors in 
clinical practice—responsibilities could not be outsourced to other professions. He argued that 
there were limits to the extent to which medicine could outsource this responsibility. “Social 
service [sic] so called is in some measure an attempt to take over a part of the physician’s office 
that he has forgotten or abdicated, but it is concerned only with a fragment of the forgotten task.  
And even when it is not vitiated by sentimentality and by ethical dogmatism it can be no full 
substitute for the well rounded work of the wise physician.”267  For Henderson, a fundamental 
part of medical practice was understanding and attending to the personal and social needs of the 
patient. To be responsible in medicine was to be attentive to the personal and social needs of the 
patient.  He was critical of the division of labor that was taking place in the medical profession 
and proposed that doctors be trained to “understand and treat real men and women, not mere 
medical, surgical or social cases.”268 In the words of Henderson, “there is need to fix and clarify 
the ideas of physicians concerning the half-forgotten sociological aspects of medical practice and 
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to give appropriate instruction to medical students, for here no more than a partial division of 
labor is possible.”269 
  Much like Henderson and Cabot, Hopkins trained physician and medical educator, 
George Canby Robinson, believed in the importance of grounding medical education in scientific 
training. Robinson advocated for the study of the social aspects of illness as a core part of 
medical training.270 Both Henderson and Robinson maintained that the complex problems of 
human disease were uniquely encountered by the medical profession.  The solution to these 
problems, he argued, “cannot be left to workers in other fields.”271 Robinson insisted that the 
patient must be seen as “a person,” the context in which a patient lives his/her life. Based on 
evidence collected from a series of home visits, Robinson concluded that “emotional and social 
problems disturb the health of a large proportion of the patients admitted to the medical 
service…and that they [emotional and social problems] frequently constitute the major cause of 
illness.”272 Addressing the emotional and social factors in medicine required that students be 
trained “from the beginning of their clinical experience to consider every patient as a person.”273 
Just how students might be trained to consider the patient as a person was not clearly articulated 
by Robinson.  
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Equally concerned about the importance of the care of the patient and the physician-
patient relationship was the Boston based physician, Francis W. Peabody. “The significance of 
the intimate personal relationship between physician and patient,” he wrote in 1927, “cannot be 
too strongly emphasized, for an extraordinarily large number of cases both diagnosis and 
treatment are directly dependent on it.”274 The failure to establish this relationship, he went on, 
“accounts for much of his [the physician’s] ineffectiveness in the care of patients.”275 For all of 
the above mentioned physicians, the physician-patient relationship was just as crucial a 
component of good care as modern diagnostics and therapeutics.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, the growing attention to the importance of the doctor-patient 
relationship as well as the social and emotional factors that affect health gave rise to curricular 
innovations in medical education aimed at encouraging a more preventive approach to health.276 
This turn towards preventive medicine and attention to social factors is commonly associated 
with social medicine and public health. In a recent article, historian of medicine, Dorothy Porter 
describes the evolution of social medicine as an academic discipline and its links to political 
conceptualizations of the role of medicine in society.277 She argues that in the inter-war years, 
medical reformers saw social medicine as a way to integrate medicine’s social role into the 
training of physicians. Inspiration for this new vision of social medicine’s potential came out of 
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experiments in social hygiene in revolutionary Russia in the 1920s.278  Advocates of social 
medicine—such as Henry Sigerist—believed that social science could provide a sociopolitical 
role for medicine.  
This more politically charged view of the role of the social sciences in medicine differed 
from Henderson’s account of medicine as applied sociology.  Henderson instead wanted to bring 
the methods and values of physiology and biochemistry to create a rigorous (more than empirical 
Hippocratic) way of studying and improving the mini-social system that constituted the doctor-
patient relationship. In Henderson’s work, we find a combination of intellectual perspectives that 
are genuinely unique. Alongside Pareto and Frederick Shattuck, Henderson references the work 
of Machiavelli, Emile Durkheim, and Lord Chesterfield.  In all of these works he found support 
for his conviction that human sentiments are often more important in determining the future of 
human events than reason.  He references the work of Chester Barnard, the President of the New 
Jersey Bell Telephone Company, on logical and non-logical thought to illustrate his point about 
the tendency of patients to unintentionally read meaning into statements made by physicians 
what is not intended. Just as in business, a patient “sitting in your office,” Henderson explains, 
“is rarely in a favorable state of mind to appreciate the precise significance of a logical 
statement.”279 Here again Henderson finds additional support for his claim that the sentiments 
are indeed the most important forces in social interaction. Combined, these influences gave rise 
to Henderson’s conception of sociology as a science of human relations that could be studied 
using the same methods used in the physical sciences and Pareto’s concept of the social system. 
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Disciplinary Formation and Medical Education 
Henderson’s efforts to redefine sociology took place against a background of a rapidly 
changing university structure. The institutionalization of the social sciences in American 
universities began in the period between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century.280 The leading figures of twentieth century American sociology and social theory had 
eclectic backgrounds.  For example, Albion W. Small, founder of sociology at the University of 
Chicago (1892), was trained in theology, German history, and politics. Harvard’s Talcott Parsons 
had a background in philosophy, biology, and economics. Others like George H. Mead and 
Robert Park had strong foundations in philosophy and psychology. Similarly, changes in 
institutional structures for medicine—the hospital, for example, was becoming an increasingly 
important site for practicing medicine, training doctors, and receiving care.281 The 1920s through 
the 1940s was an intense period of disciplinary formation and professionalization at American 
universities.282  
Disciplinary politics at Harvard mirrored these larger national trends. Harvard grew 
tremendously between 1900 and 1933, adding the iconic residential housing system for 
undergraduates, Widener library, Memorial church, the T. Jefferson Coolidge, Jr. Memorial 
Laboratory, three million dollars were invested in the construction and maintenance of chemical                                                         
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laboratories to replace Boylston Hall, a new fund was created by the Harvard Corporation for the 
maintenance of research and campus buildings, and the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration and the Harvard School of Public Health were both established during this period 
of expansion.283 During this period of institutional growth at Harvard, disciplinary identities 
were forged in the interstitial spaces—underinstitutionalized academic spaces—that provided 
opportunities for scholars to ask questions about scientific epistemology, research practice, and 
pedagogy.284. This was the context in which Henderson was attempting not only to create 
sociologists, but also to disseminate his vision of a transdisciplinary approach for the scientific 
study of social life. The fact that he was even trying to achieve this goal points to the moving 
boundaries between the social and the natural sciences at American research universities in the 
1930s.  
The fact that medical educators were so interested in Henderson’s approach to sociology 
of medicine suggests that the medical profession, too, was still trying to define itself.285 Charles 
Rosenberg and other historians of American medicine have documented the dramatic changes in                                                         
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the social organization of medicine underway during this time, from the proliferation of 
hospitals, professionalization of public health, and the growing emphasis of the natural sciences 
in medical schools.286 These developments, combined with the emergence of the modern 
university in the United States in the late nineteenth century and the influx of funds from 
philanthropic organizations, gave rise to a more rigorous and academically oriented medical 
education. One consequence of this change was the creation of a more standardized and formal 
system of training young doctors. Although medicine was well-established and well-respected by 
the American public in the 1930s, there was growing specialization and fragmentation within the 
profession.287  
 An enduring tension within medicine exists between a more contextualized view of 
clinical realities—antireductionist positions often associated with social medicine and public 
health—and a reductionist view that treats disease primarily as a mechanism.288 Contemporary 
                                                        
286 Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers; Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History 
of Medicine (Cambridge, England, 1992), 215-242; Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American 
Medicine (New York, NY, 1982): 79-144; Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Learning to Heal: The Development of 
American Medical Education, (New York, 1985): 47–71; Morris J. Vogel, The Invention of the Modern 
Hospital, Boston, 1870-1930 (Chicago, IL, 1980). For a history of Harvard medical school see, Mark D 
Altschule and Henry K Beecher, Medicine at Harvard: The First Three Hundred Years (Hanover, N.H, 
1977). For a review of the impact of science in medicine see, John Harley Warner, “Science in 
Medicine,” in Historial Writings in American Science: Perspectives and Prospects, ed. Sally Gregory 
Kohlstedt and Margaret W. Rossiter (Baltimore, MD, 1985), 37-58. 
   
287 Rosemary Stevens, Medical Practice in Modern England: the Impact of Specialization and State 
Medicine (New Haven, CT, 1966); Ludmerer, Learning to Heal; George Weisz, Divide and Conquer: A 
Comparative History of Medical Specialization (Oxford, England, 2005). 
 
288 For a discussion of this tension within American Medicine and in Europe see, Sarah Tracy, “An 
Evolving Science of Man: The Transformation and Demise of American Constitutional medicine, 1920-
1950,” in Greater Than the Parts; Holism in Biomedicine, 1920-1950, Christopher Lawrence and George 
Weisz, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 161-188; Sarah Tracy, “George Draper and 
American Constitutional Medicine, 1916-1946,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 66, no.1 (1992): 53-
89; Charles Rosenberg, “Holism in Twentieth-Century Medicine,” in Greater Than the Parts; Holism in 
Biomedicine, 1920-1950, Christopher Lawrence and George Weisz, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998): 335-336; Charles E. Rosenberg, Our Present Complaint (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
115 
 
commentators and historians have disagreed as to whether Henderson might best be described as 
a holistic thinker or a “reductionist” physical scientist. During Henderson’s life, one of his 
fiercest critics was J. B. S. Haldane, who saw in Henderson’s magnum opus, Blood, a 
reductionist tract.289 Another contemporary, Yandell Henderson, argued that Henderson was a 
scientist turned metaphysician.290 Historians of science, in contrast, have tended to focus on 
Henderson’s holistic thinking. John Parascondola, for example, identifies “organismic thought” 
in Henderson’s many published works.291  
Any attempt to claim Henderson as a holist misunderstands his work on a fundamental 
level. Henderson was a thoroughgoing reductionist. In his first book, The Fitness of the 
Environment (1913) Henderson expresses his views on mechanistic nature of life: 
…such conclusions depend upon the universal character of physics and chemistry.  Out 
of the properties of universal matter and the characters of universal energy has arisen 
mechanism, as the expression of physico-chemical activity and the instrument of physico-
chemical performance.  Given matter, energy, and the resulting necessity that life shall be 
a mechanism, the conclusion follows that he atmosphere of solid bodies does actually 
provide the best of all possible environments for life.292     
As discussed in Chapter two, Henderson saw the fitness of the environment for life as undeniable 
evidence that life can be described, in physico-chemical terms, as a system—a known set of                                                                                                                                                                                   
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variables whose interrelations could be formally stated using symbolic logic and mathematics. In 
his second book, The Order of Nature (1917), he argues that organization and order are 
important concepts for understanding life.  Despite the underlying mechanistic nature of life, in 
other words, it is additionally necessary to perceive pattern and order to advance our scientific 
understanding of life. Yet his two published book and a numerous articles reveal that he was in 
fact committed to a mechanistic conception of life.293 He did not believe, in any way, that the 
whole was greater than the sum of its parts. For him it was a matter of refining and improving 
theory through experimentation.  
Henderson’s reductionism almost certainly can be traced to his training in physical 
chemistry as an undergraduate at Harvard College, from 1894-1898. He spent the first quarter of 
his career studying the physical properties of chemical substances before moving on to the study 
of acid-base equilibrium toward the end of his medical school career. Before long, Henderson 
had undergone a transformation from chemist to physiologist, but he still did not have contact 
with patients. It was only because his medical colleagues could supply him with the raw 
materials—mainly blood and urine samples—necessary to conduct his physico-chemical studies 
that Henderson had contact with colleagues who had any direct contact with patients in clinics 
and hospitals at all.  
And yet: despite his limited experience in the clinic and the abstract nature of his own 
scientific work, when it came to medicine he believed in “using clinical observation as the basis 
for further clinical procedure.”294 Ironically, Henderson was speaking not from first-hand 
experience, but from a theoretical commitment to the importance of first-hand observation in                                                         
293 Henderson’s first two books are discussed at length in chapter two.   
 
294HBS Archives, LJH Papers, Carton 1, Folder 29, letter from LJH to to W.B. Cannon, October 03, 1917.  
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scientific research. Henderson’s goal was to describe a method of studying social interaction—
both within and beyond the clinic.  
Henderson’s commitment to a scientific, reductionist understanding of human social 
interactions is the key to explaining the apparent contradiction between his reductionist approach 
to the life sciences and his supposedly holistic approach to medicine—really, it’s not holistic at 
all. Henderson believed that, rather than being an art; the doctor-patient relationship could be 
studied scientifically. During the last fifteen years of his life, Henderson devoted all of his 
intellectual energy to the study of the social organism which, like the human organism, might be 
understood as a mechanism.   
In the first decades of the twentieth century physicians were trying to come to terms with 
the implications of this new mechanistic conception of life and disease as well as the 
introduction of new medical technologies, laboratory science, and the changing social 
organization of medicine.  For some, the introduction of such new therapies and diagnostic 
technologies in the early twentieth century helped to reaffirm, rather than diminish, the 
importance of the relationship between doctor and patient.  As one perceptive observer noted, “it 
seems as though medicine were for the time being more or less in the grip of science, at the same 
time struggling to maintain its great heritage as the most humane of the professions.”295  Others 
opined that modern medical schools had been “Carried away by the brilliance of etiological 
discoveries” and had subsequently failed to teach students the “therapeutic value of sympathy 
and encouragement.”296  Among those defending the preservation of a humanistic tradition in 
                                                        
295 Ida M. Cannon,“Teaching Medical Students the Social Implications of Sickness,” New England 
Journal of Medicine 211, no. 5 (1934): 216.  
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medicine was George Minot, who in his 1938 address of the Association of American 
Physicians, reminded his audience that “in order to understand the present, we must look both 
toward the past and toward the future.” He urged the men in the audience to take “advantage of 
every available bit of information and study of greater knowledge so that when we pass the torch 
to the other generation it will be nearer to the ultimate goal.” This forward movement, he added, 
“may be profitably combined with an effort to transmit to posterity all that was best in the 
past.”297 Even those who embraced the new developments in science felt that there were still 
things to be learned about the past. The challenge was in figuring out which things should be 
preserved, how to preserve them, and how to combine them with new developments to improve 
care.  
Henderson and some of his contemporaries were especially concerned with preserving 
what they referred to as “the social component of medicine.” The critique of the cold and 
impersonal nature of medical science was, in the early decades of the twentieth century, taking 
its now familiar form.  This critique would, in the politically and charged decades of the 1960s 
and 1970s, become a social critique of the “objectifying” power of medical science.298   But in 
the first third of the twentieth century, a host of medical scientists and practitioners, including 
Henderson, hoped to use scientific medicine to improve the lives of patients while finding some 
balance between bedside care and the laboratory.  Many of the mentioned in the previous 
                                                        
297 George R. Minot, “The President’s Address,” Transactions of the Association of American Physicians 
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298 Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New 
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Patients and other Inmates (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961); Michel Foucault, Madness and 
Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Vintage, 
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section, appeared to share the belief that the “authority” of medicine, and indeed the profession 
itself, depended upon medicine’s proper care of, and relations with, the patient.      
People outside of medicine proper were also part of these conversations on the future of 
medicine, through their participation in philanthropy and government agencies. A number of 
scholars from the nascent field of medical economics and public health, including Isidore Sydney 
Falk, J. Douglas Brown, and Charles-Edward Amory Winslow, were conducting research on the 
social aspects of medicine, socialized medicine, and the relationship between medicine and the 
state.299 One particularly fraught issue was the question of how to fund healthcare for the general 
population. The Committee on the Costs and Means, funded by large philanthropists, employed 
dozens of economists and a few willing physicians to conduct a national survey on the cost of 
care in various hospitals. Henry E. Sigerist, director of the Johns Hopkins Institute of History of 
Medicine from 1932–1947, was an important figure in the socialized medicine movement and 
pioneer in the social history of medicine.300  Sigerist’s research on socialized medicine in the 
Soviet Union sought ways to apply some of the insights of socialized medicine in the U.S. The 
major philanthropic funds and foundations, including the Carnegie Institute, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Commonwealth and Milbank Funds, and the Russell Sage Foundation all carried 
out large-scale studies on financing healthcare.                                                          
299 Falk is best known for his role as director of the Committee on Cost of Medical Care and head of 
health studies for the Social Security Administration in the mid-1930s.  For an overview of Falk’s views 
on the problem of health care provision see I. S. Falk, “An Introduction to National Problems in Medical 
Care,” Law and Contemporary Problems 6, no. 4 (1939): 497-506. J. Douglas Brown is considered 
remembered as one of the principle architect of the Social Security System see Brown, “The Development 
of the Old-Age Insurance Provisiosn of the Social Security Act,” Law and Contemporary Problems 186 
(1936): 186-198.  Charles-Edward A. Winslow was a bacteriologist, public health expert, and founder of 
the Yale Department of Public Health.  He was an advocate for a broad range of public health measures in 
the United States and Europe see Winslow, The Evolution and Significance of the Modern Public Health 
Campaign (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1923).       
 
300 See Henry E. Sigerist, Socialized Medicine in the Soviet Union (New York: W.W. Norton, 1937). 
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Unlike some of his contemporaries who either believed in an inherent antagonism 
between the science and art of medical practice, or others who sought to establish a division of 
labor between the two, Henderson advocated for a more scientific approach to the study of 
human relations in medicine. Henderson’s conceptual scheme combined elements of the 
Hippocratic method with continental social theory. By taking Henderson’s writings and project 
seriously, we can see the making of the boundaries between the biological and the social. 
Henderson offered his medical colleagues a means of making the heart of medical practice—the 
human relations that make medicine distinct from laboratory science—scientific.   
Although Henderson never practiced medicine, he spent years educating young 
physicians first as an instructor, and later as a professor, of physical chemistry and physiology at 
the Harvard Medical School.  He was in some ways always connected to medical practice.  He 
was elected to the Association of American Physicians in 1922. And of course, he was at various 
points in his life, a patient.  But more to the point, unlike many of his contemporaries, he did not 
think that personal relations were beyond scientific analysis.   
Attention to the social was on the minds of some of the leaders in medicine and medical 
education. Elite centers of medicine, such as Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and Johns 
Hopkins Hospital, were leading efforts to address the social components of medical care. It was 
in this context—where attention to the social factors affecting health became so important—that 
Henderson’s conception of the social system appealed to a broad audience ranging from social 
scientists to medical practitioners. Henderson offered a depoliticized and scientific method of 
studying social interactions.  
 
 
121 
 
A Science of Human Relations 
Henderson’s legacy in medical schools and at Harvard is mixed. He did not leave an 
obvious historical footprint.  His work, however, on the physician-patient relationship is often 
cited as evidence for the importance of sociological factors in clinical practice. 301 In spite of 
Henderson’s influence in medicine, more recent work by medical sociologists have paid almost 
no attention to his articles on the sociological aspects of medical practice. One reason for this is 
that Henderson was a scientist, not a sociologist. As sociology became more prominent and 
established in the   university, writing the history of sociology became an act of delineating a 
genealogy of contributions and thought of the discipline. Henderson is treated—at best—as a 
minor footnote in these disciplinary histories.  After the eclipse of Parsons and his intellectual 
project, structural functionalism, as a school of thought, the likelihood of considering 
Henderson’s texts in their historical context became even more remote. In sociology and 
medicine, there continues to be a divide between what is considered a social question and what is 
considered a medical question. Henderson’s work was different in that he emphasized the 
importance of “social interaction” as part of a scientific system rather than a political or                                                         
301 Years later, physicians and researchers continued to site Henderson’s articles on the physician patient 
relationship.  Web of science indicates that Henderson’s article on the physician patient relationship as a 
social system is cited 1110.  Here are a few of the more prominent sitations to illustrate the diverse range 
of contexts in which Henderson’s work on the physican patient was cited in the post-war period: Bo 
Gerle, Gerd Lunden, and Philip Sandblom, “The Patient with Inoperable Cancer from the Psychiatric and 
Social Standpoints,” Cancer 13, no. 6 (1960): 1206-1217; Robert H. Heptinstall, “Ivory Tower 
Humanist,” The New England Journal of Medicine 289, no. 16 (1973): 862-863; Talbott, “At the 
Bedside,” 109-114; Herman L. Blumgart, “Caring for the Patient,” The New England Journal of Medicine 
270, no. 9 (1964): 449-456; Abraham J. Simon, “Social Structure of Clinics and Patient Improvement,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 4, no. 2 (1959): 197-206; Mark G. Field, “Some Problems of Soviet 
Medical Practice: A Sociological Approach,” The New England Journal of Medicine 248, no. 22 (1953): 
919-926; Robin F. Badgley and Samuel W. Bloom, “Behavioral Sciences and Medical Education: The 
Case of Sociology,” Social Science and Medicine 7 (1973): 927-941; Robert W. Habenstein, “Critique of 
“Profession” as a Sociological Category,” The Sociological Quarterly 4, no. 4 (1963): 291-300; Paul L. 
Adams, “The Influence of New Information from Social Sciences on Concepts, Practice and Research in 
Child Psychiatry,” Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry 21, no. 6 (1982): 533-542. 
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economic system.  He offered social scientists and medical practitioners a new way of 
conceptualizing the interactions that take place in everyday life.      
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Industrial Workplace as a Social System 
 
Chapter Four examines the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory (HFL), a physiological 
laboratory dedicated to understanding the impact of the physical and social environment on 
“normal” individuals. This chapter focuses on two types of studies conducted by the HFL that 
illustrate how Henderson’s theory of systems was applied to the study of work.  The first is the 
well known Hawthorne Studies and the second is what I shall refer to as the Hot Climate Study.  
Each example highlights the way physiology and social theory were used to gain a new 
understanding of the workplace as a physical and social environment. 
Henderson was the official director of the Fatigue Lab from its inception in 1927.  
Although he was the official director, Henderson did not directly engage in laboratory work or 
field studies.  Instead, his influence was primarily intellectual.  Much of the work conducted by 
the HFL was dedicated to providing evidence in support of Henderson’s social theories regarding 
the dynamics of social control, social organization, and social equilibrium.  This was perhaps 
most prominently seen in the so-called Hawthorne studies lead by Elton Mayo.  This chapter 
follows Henderson’s ideas and influence beyond the laboratory, clinic, and into the industrial 
workplace.  It looks specifically at the ways in which social systems theory was applied to the 
study of human interactions on the factory floor. Located at the Harvard Business School, the 
Harvard Fatigue Lab was home to physiologists, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists.  
People such as Wallace Donham (Dean of HBS), Chester Barnard (business executive), and 
Elton Mayo were convinced that a deeper understanding of the underlying physiological, 
psychological, and social changes that mark an individual’s everyday life would yield answers to 
the day’s most vexing business and managerial problems.   
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To today’s readers, it may seem a bit puzzling that the Fatigue Laboratory, a 
physiological facility, was established at the Harvard Business School.  A more obvious choice 
might have been the medical school or the School of Public Health.   At the time, however, these 
institutions were committed primarily to the study of prevention or treatment of disease.  The 
Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, in contrast, focused on the normal rather than the pathological. In 
fact, the Fatigue Lab was focused on providing a more robust qualitative and quantitative 
distinction between normal and pathological physiological states. As philosopher Georges 
Canguilhem states in the introduction of his book, The Normal and the Pathological, governing 
disease is predicated upon becoming “acquainted with its relations with the normal state.”302 
Canguilhem explains that in order to establish a pathology scientifically, one must link it to 
physiology.  In other words, Canguilhem argues, “identity of the normal and the pathological is 
asserted as a gain in knowledge of the normal.”303  Normal and pathological exist along a 
spectrum, they are in the words of Claude Bernard, homogenous with one another.  For 
Henderson and his colleagues at the Harvard Fatigue Lab, the goal was to first establish a 
physiological baseline, a statistical norm against which physiological disruption or deviation 
could be measured.  Whereas Henderson’s contributions to medical sociology might be 
considered a conceptual bridge between the laboratory and social life, the Harvard Fatigue Lab 
serves as an example of an institutional bridge between the laboratory and social life.  Social life, 
in this case includes the workplace, the clinic, and all places in which human relations are acted 
out.  One of this chapter’s central arguments, then, is the idea that biological and social 
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understandings of man became relevant to different communities of disciplinary practice for 
different reasons.   
Existing histories of the Harvard Fatigue Lab have generally treated it as a rare and 
singular institution with a short life span.304 I will treat it here instead as a particularly salient 
example of the range of early-twentieth-century research projects, funded largely by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, to study the impact of the physical and social environment on healthy 
individuals.  Seen in this light, the HFL becomes a microcosm of a moment in time, rather than 
an anomaly. Examining the Harvard Fatigue Lab in this way shows a transdisciplinary desire on 
the part of Henderson and his contemporaries; an effort to cross boundaries and find a systematic 
way of studying people in their physical and social environments.   
 
Public-Private Partnership:  Funding the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory   
In 1927 Henderson, with the generous financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
set up the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory with the goal of developing much-needed quantitative and 
qualitative descriptions of the physiological experience of everyday life.  In collaboration with 
the Department of Industrial Research at the Harvard Business School and medical staff at the 
Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and other area hospitals, the HFL’s laboratory staff set 
out to study the experiences of individuals in their everyday environment, instead of the 
laboratory situations that typically informed physiological research.  
The move beyond the laboratory and into the workplace was inspired largely by the needs 
of a rapidly changing industrial landscape and changes in labor practices.  There was a growing                                                         
304 Steven M. Horvath, The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory: Its History and Contributions, (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss-Hall, 1973); Robin Scheffler, “The Fate of a Progressive Science: The Harvard 
Fatigue Laboratory, Athletes, the Science of Work and the Politics of Reform,” Endeavour 35, no. 2-3 
(2011): 48-54.  
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need, on the part of large organizations, to understand workplace dynamics and the factors 
contributing to worker “productivity”.  This area of study had long been dominated by economic 
theories that claimed that workers were primarily motivated by monetary compensation.  Elton 
Mayo and others based at the HFL were interested in studying the so-called non-logical factors, 
the social factors that contributed to worker productivity and satisfaction.  This became 
increasingly relevant in the depression years when more and more companies had to confront 
social unrest on the factory floor.  The introduction of new methods of production, mainly the 
assembly line and automation, dramatically changed labor practices.305 The late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth centuries were marked by profound changes in the nature and 
organization of work.  Such technological developments as the development of control loop 
feedback mechanisms and sectional electrical drives altered the organization of the industrial 
workplace; waves of recent immigrants establishing roots in places like Chicago, New York, and 
Boston altered the cultural landscape.306  The combination of a cheap labor force and rapid 
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industrialization resulted in a string of labor disputes throughout the twentieth century.307  Urban 
riots and strikes highlighted the need to improve working conditions as well as industrial 
relations.  It is within this context that a growing number of scholars, institutions, and 
philanthropic agencies began to express an interest in the scientific study of man.308 The 
scientific study of man is understood here as “the study of men as organisms, of their structures 
and functions, in sickness and in health, and of men as persons, in their activities and their 
interactions…the uniformities observable among men.”309 The existence of a “Department of 
Industrial Research” at Harvard is itself an indication of the desire to develop systematized 
knowledge on industrial practices, including industrial workers.   
The Rockefeller Foundation, in particular, funded a number of initiatives on the study of 
man.310   It should be of little surprise that the Rockefellers would have such a keen interest in                                                         
307 Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era, (Urbana: 
University of Illonois Press, 1998); Thomas G Andrews, Killing for Coal: America's Deadliest Labor 
War, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).   
 
308 For a comprehensive and authoritative account of the development of the social sciences in the United 
States see, Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991).  For an overview of the human sciences from the sixteenth century to the twentieth century 
see, Roger Smith, The Norton History of the Human Sciences (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).  A 
recent edited volume challenges and complicates our understanding of pre- and post-WWII development 
of the social sciences. Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens, eds., Cold War Social Science: Knowledge 
Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature, (New York: Pallgrave MacMillan, 2012). 
 
309Lawrence J. Henderson, “The Study of Man,” Science 94, no. 2427 (1941): 1-10.  
 
310For an account of the role of Rockefeller Foundation in funding important developments in medical 
science and medical education see, Robert E. Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural 
Scientists, 1900-1945, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).  For an account of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s role in facilitating the emergence of modern molecular biology and promoting 
interdisciplinary cooperation through the distribution of grants and fellowships in inter-war period see, 
Lily E. Kay, The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New 
Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).  A more recent account of the role of foundations on 
American Foreign Policy and America’s rise to global hegemony see, Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of 
the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).  
   
128 
 
mechanisms of social and biological control.  After all, the Rockefeller Foundation earned its 
fortune on the new industrialization.311  Rebecca Lemov argues that modern American social 
science could not have developed “without the concomitant rise of modern-day foundations and 
the goals that powered them.”312 Lemov notes that between 1922 and 1929 the Rockefeller 
Foundation distributed nearly $50 million in support of social science projects around the 
globe.313  This funding was motivated by a desire to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
social life and human behavior.  Historian Jack Pressman has argued that the Rockefellers 
believed that “the true power of science, as applied to human beings, lay not in the pursuit of 
isolated laboratory studies but in the dynamic integration of inward looking experimental 
research with the expansive vision of social sciences and even the humanities.” 314 The 
foundation carefully targeted different universities according to the existing strengths and needs 
of the universities in question.  This resulted in the creation of specialized centers at universities 
according to the funding patterns of the Rockefeller foundation.  For example, Caltech became 
the premier center for molecular biology while the University of Chicago became the nation’s 
most innovative social science research hub.   In other words, the foundation was attempting to 
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create a network of coordinate and organize research centers in the social sciences and the life 
sciences.  
The majority of scholarship on efforts to organize interdisciplinary research focuses on 
the growth of state funding following World War Two.  However, as this chapter attempts to 
demonstrate, the effort to organize experimentation across a wide range of disciplines and 
experimental efforts can be traced to the interwar period and private sources of funding.  Robert 
Kohler’s book, Partners in Science, presents the most comprehensive account of the system of 
patronage in scientific research led by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation 
in the early- to mid-twentieth century.  Kohler views these developments as part of “the 
inexorable trend toward large-scale organization.”315  
The scientific study of man served to bridge the gap between what was beginning to be 
called the pure and applied sciences.316  Man in all of his concreteness was to be the measure of 
all things—Homo mensura.  Nowhere is this more obvious than in the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
various studies on industrial hazards.  The Rockefeller Foundation’s program managers 
identified the quest to understand the physiology of work as a top research priority. A number of 
historians have examined the Rockefeller Foundation’s support for such research in biology, 
psychology, social sciences, and medicine; in general, their assessments have not been 
particularly generous. Scholars have criticized the Rockefeller Foundation for selfishly seeking 
to maximize scientific returns, preserving capitalism, and imposing a conservative American 
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ideal of scientific research upon other countries.317  Kohler is the exception, in that he argues that 
the system of scientific patronage that emerged in the inter-war years was far less bureaucratic 
than the “organization synthesis” suggests and that it retained the more personal spirit of 
nineteenth century institutions.  He points out that compared to corporations and government 
organizations the Rockefeller Foundation was small and informal, focusing on individual 
scientists and creating a system of mentors.318  
This chapter builds on some of Kohler’s insights, but emphasizes the growing centrality 
of the scientific study of man in organizing and coordinating research in the life sciences, social 
sciences, and medicine.  Kohler argues that the foundation managers attempted to impose their 
business methods onto academic research by emphasizing planning and functional organization.  
Business methods belong to a general category of techniques used to make, organize, and 
streamline organizations.  In the 1920s and 1930s, however, managerial science and 
organizational theory was in its infancy.  In the early decades of the twentieth century, most 
corporate managers lacked a language with which to describe what they did.  Instead of arguing 
for the imposition of a corporate logic onto the university, this chapter argues that the very 
notion of institutional organization and management first emerged out of the various partnerships                                                         
317 For examples see, Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Marriage of Convenience:  Rockefeller International Health 
and Revolutionary Mexico (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006);  Marcos Cueto, “The 
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of Indiana Press, 1994); Pnina Abir-Am, “The Discourse of Physical Power and Biological Knowledge in 
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Kohler so carefully documents.   The focus was not so much on research productivity as a purely 
economic measure, but rather on attempts to scientifically define man through his social relations 
and physical environment. 
It is clear that whatever one makes of RF’s politics, most of their efforts focused on man 
as an integrated whole. The system of foundation patronage took man as the essential unit upon 
which formal industrial and research organizations ought to be based.  
This ambitious effort to study man in his environment would require a degree of 
disciplinary and institutional coordination which had never been attempted before.  The 
coordination was dependent upon the parallel development of the various sciences which were 
needed to study man in his environment—the physical sciences, life sciences, medicine, and 
social sciences alike.  But moreover, fully integrating this knowledge would require a theory 
about the nature of coordination and organization: in other words, a conceptual scheme.  An 
understanding of man in everyday life required more than the mere summation of parts. What 
was needed was knowledge of how these parts interact. Enter Lawrence J. Henderson.  
Henderson’s understanding of complex systems included the idea that man might be 
considered a system of integrated parts. The complex nature of the human organism required a 
piecemeal investigation.  When considered as part of a larger system of organization, Henderson 
believed, these distinct pieces would shed light on Man as an organism. Understanding the whole 
required an understanding of the parts in relation to each other.  One had to understand the forces 
that governed the interaction between the parts.  The scientific study of man required both a 
description of the various activities of the human organism and the framework presupposed by 
those activities.        
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Henderson maintained that the scientific investigation of such complex problems could 
only be the product of the labors of many men, working skillfully in parallel and in succession, 
with shared methods, systematic descriptions, and classifications.319  Henderson envisioned a 
scientific community composed of distinct disciplines, each with their own conventions and 
methods of investigation, united by a commitment to the verification of facts and the 
development of adequate conceptual schemes.   
Henderson’s commitment to developing scientific disciplines should not be confused 
with a notion of planned scientific progress, which he ardently opposed.320 For Henderson, 
scientific progress could only proceed through trial and error and the adaptation of increasingly 
refined theories.  Those scientific ideas that survive, Henderson argued, do so because they are 
adapted to the needs of scientists.321 If theory became detached from need, it ran the risk of 
becoming disconnected from reality. It was through hands-on experience, practice, that 
disciplined physicians or scientists could submit their theories to more rigorous proof.  Theory 
and practice had to be consistently combined to avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness—
mistaking the abstract for the concrete.322  Henderson believed that this tendency could be 
avoided through acquiring intimate, habitual, and intuitive familiarity with the object of study. 
This degree of hands-on experience with the object of study would, in Henderson’s opinion, help 
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the investigator avoid the trap of falsely conflating the abstract theory about the object and the 
object itself in all of its complexity.    
Henderson’s attempts to understand the concreteness of man as an organism fit perfectly 
with the practical interests of the Rockefeller Foundation in the sociology and physiology of 
work.  The “physiology of work,” as used here, describes the scientific study of the laboring 
body. Unlike pathophysiology which focuses on the diseased body, studies on the physiology of 
work sought to determine what could be reasonably expected of an average worker in different 
environments.  The knowledge gained about the body’s regulatory processes could be applied 
broadly in the workplace, at war, and in everyday life.  The phrase “sociology of work,” in 
contrast, is meant to describe efforts to observe and describe worker interactions as well as the 
study of informal organization.  
The Rockefeller foundation invested heavily in both the sociology and the physiology of 
work.  A review of accounting documents maintained by the foundation reveals that from 1930 
to 1937 Harvard received $875,000 dollars in unrestricted funds for research in Industrial 
Hazards.323 Additional documents show that supplemental grants ranging in size from $1,000 to 
$12,000 dollars were occasionally made for the procurement of instruments over the course of 
the same seven-year period. At Harvard, foundation funding for Industrial Hazards was primarily 
used for infrastructure development, such as financing the fatigue laboratory in the basement of 
the Business School, or capacity building, for instance, recruiting scientists from around the 
world that the University would not otherwise sponsor through formal faculty appointments. The 
RF also made significant contributions to established Yale’s Institute of Human Relations.324                                                         
323 Rockefeller Archive Center,  RFRG1.1, Box 342.  
 
324 J.G. Morawski, “Organizing Knowledge and Behavior at Yale’s Institute of Human Relations,” Isis 77, 
no. 2 (1986): 219-242;  Arthur J. Viseltear, “Milton C. Winternitz and the Yale Institute of Human 
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Knowledge of the physiology of the normal laboring body could be put to generative 
use—it could be used to determine wages, to predict potential losses caused by worker injuries 
and turnover, or to determine how much work could be expected from a worker at extreme 
temperatures, altitudes, and other environments.  Henderson’s understanding of the scientific 
study of man is therefore best understood as a science of what is possible and what can be 
expected. For Henderson and the HFL, the emphasis was on elaborating the ways in which 
interactions (between workers and workers and the environment) mediate the limits of 
adaptability.  
Unlike previous studies that have argued that the Rockefeller Foundation sought to use 
business methods to reform the scientific enterprise to improve efficiency, then, this study seeks 
to ground the foundation’s work in a different rationality.  The study of man as a complex 
organism served as the basis upon which scientific research was to be organized. The RF’s 
system of patronage was focused on developing research capacity along distinct lines of 
scientific investigation.  This chapter will therefore examine a series of research studies 
undertaken by social scientists and physiologists at the Harvard Fatigue Lab, which took man, as 
a complex organism, as the object of investigation.   
The Strain of Social Contacts: The Factory Floor as Social Space 
 
Social contacts in industry, often close and constant, often unavoidable 
and formed without choice, are accompanied by emotional strain which 
may not only interfere with effective collaboration but lead to a marked 
decline in individual efficiency, and even to incapacity for work.325                                                                                                                                                                                   
Relations: A Brief Chapter in the History of Social Medicine,” The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 
57 (1984): 869-889 
 
325 The above quote was taken from a report made by the National Research Council’s “Committee of 
Work in Industry.”  The committee consisted of Chairman L.J. Henderson, secretary George C. Homans, 
and members Elton Mayo, F.W. Willard, W.S. Hunter, G. Canby Robinson, and H.J. Ruttenberg.  Future 
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With the emergence of modern welfare-states in the late nineteenth century—in countries 
like Germany, France, Britain, and some would argue the United States—came a new concern 
for the conditions of work in industry.  This concern took the form of work-related legislative 
acts meant to protect workers from injury, illness, disability, and/or poverty in old age.  In many 
of these countries, government leaders initiated elaborate research programs to study the 
economic cost and productivity of labor.  Attempts were also made to tap into the maximum 
potential of human labor power. In Germany, for example, compulsory accident and sickness 
insurance laws passed in 1883 and 1884 created “sickness funds”—providing monetary 
compensation—for injured workers and established that employers were liable for the health and 
safety of their employees.326  The First World War brought a new set of labor-related concerns:  
how do long hours and intensive manual labor impact human physiology and productivity? The 
British Government, for example, established the “Health of Munitions Workers Committee” in 
1915 to study the effects of physiological fatigue on workers.327 Following the war, the intense 
demands on war-related industries subsided.  The reality of physiological fatigue—working to 
the state of physical exhaustion—became less common among laborers.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
references to this report will be abbreviated as CWI (Committee of Work in Industry).  See, George C. 
Homans, Fatigue of Workers Its Relation to Industrial Production (New York: Reinhold Publishing, 
1941). 
 
326 For a study of the impact of thermodynamic theories in shaping modern conceptions of work and 
human potential in Western Europe see, Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the 
Origins of Modernity, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
 
327 The Ministry of Munitions, Health of Munition Workers Committee of Great Britain published a series 
of reports on the problems affecting munitions workers during World War One.  The reports covered 
issues relating to the employment of women, hours of work, and fatigue, see Health of Munitions 
Workers Committee, Final Report: Industrial Health and Efficiency, vol. 11, (London: Ministry of 
Munitions, 1918). After the war the committee was renamed the “Industrial Fatigue Research Board.”  
These institutes were precursors the Harvard Fatigue laboratory which was established in 1927.   
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It was within this social and economic context that Elton Mayo and his colleagues began 
their studies on the “social conditions” of work.  Mayo was an Australian trained psychologist 
best known for best known for his role in the Hawthorne Experiments and the development of 
the so-called Human relations movement.328 Mayo’s interest in the psychology of labor relations 
began in 1904 when he served as a volunteer teacher at the London based Working Men’s 
College. It was here that he worked closely with English laborers and became familiar with the 
concerns and struggles of working class people.329 Soon after this experience he enrolled in a 
doctoral program at the University of Adelaide to study a mix of philosophy and psychology 
under the tutelage of Professor William Mitchell.  In 1911 he was appointed lecturer in logic, 
psychology and ethics at the University of Queensland.  He spent the next eleven years at the 
University of Queensland, eventually becoming departmental chair.  During this time he 
explored new psychotherapeutic methods on shell shocked men returning from the war and labor 
activists.330 His observations during World War One yielded a small book titled Democracy and 
Freedom (1919) in which he fiercely critiques the failures and limitations of democratic 
government.  He argued that “Democracy, as we at present know it, is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the facts of human nature and social organization.”331 He claimed that 
                                                        
328Mayo is perhaps best remembered for his book Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial 
Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1933). For a biographical study of Elton Mayo and his work see, R. 
C. S. Trahair, The Humanist Temper: The Life and Work of Elton Mayo, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
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without a better understanding of social and political philosophy, one could not be certain that 
“democracy moves in the direction of human freedom and personal autonomy.”332  
Three years after the publication of Democracy and Freedom, Mayo emigrated to the 
United States to conduct research at the University of Pennsylvania.  In 1925 Mayo was recruited 
from the University of Pennsylvania to Harvard by Donham (Dean of HBS) and Henderson.  
Both men believed that Mayo’s work on human relations in industry was of “tremendous 
importance.”333 Despite their enthusiasm for his work, it was challenging to secure funding to 
support Mayo’s research and secure him a more permanent place at Harvard.334   
Henderson and Mayo both shared a mutual interest in sociological analysis and a 
politically conservative bent.  Most importantly, the two men shared an interest in applying the 
methodology of the medical sciences to sharpen the professional skills of social scientists and 
encourage social stability.335 Nowhere is their interest in the application of social theory and 
medical sciences more apparent than in the Hawthorne Experiments which took place from 1924 
to 1933 at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company.336  Located just outside of 
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Chicago, the Western Electric’s Hawthorne plant was an ideal site for Mayo’s research. For the 
first few years of his involvement, Mayo’s role primarily consisted of interpreting the data and 
suggesting potential avenues for future studies.  It wasn’t until 1930 that he was permitted to 
play a more active role in designing an actual study. From that point on, The Hawthorne studies 
represent an important shift from theories of scientific management toward an applied theory of 
human relations.  According to Taylorism and traditional efficiency studies, workers were 
primarily motivated by economic incentives.  The Hawthorne studies sought to show that social 
relationships and physiology—not economic interests—determined worker behavior and 
productivity.         
Nearly a century after the fact, scholars continue to reinterpret the data collected during 
the Hawthorne studies, and sociologists continue to apply some of the theoretical insights gained 
by the studies.337  The aim here instead is to historicize the transformation of the notion of the 
workplace as a social space in which individual workers forged relationships and participated in 
informal organizations. The Hawthorne studies were not only unique in matters of scale or in the 
overall argument developed by the researchers: they are historically relevant because they mark 
the moment that social theorists began to see the factory floor as a social environment.  The 
workplace is an environment that is governed and ordered because of, not in spite, of social 
relationships.  For these researchers, understanding the social environment of the workplace 
would be a crucial step in improving worker output.        
                                                        
337 As historian of science Richard Gillespie notes, very little historical attention has been given to the 
Hawthorne studies.  Gillespie’s book remains the only book-length work on the history of the studies.  
His book focuses primarily on the ways in which researchers made use of scientific rhetoric in an effort to 
legitimate their findings.  He places the Hawthorne studies within a broader moment in the history of the 
social sciences, in a period of popular and professional transformation. Gillespie, Manufacturing 
Knowledge. 
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The structured interview is perhaps the most important artifact to come out of the 
Hawthorne studies. Although Hawthorne staff had attempted to conduct their own interview 
program prior to Mayo’s involvement, their efforts were unstructured and unsystematic. In 
contrast, Mayo placed the 90-minute interview at the center of his studies. Many of Mayo’s 
future publications relating to the studies done at the plant draw on the several thousands of 
interviews conducted by his team between 1930 and 1932. The structured interview had, and 
continues to have, a far-reaching practical impact on the conduct of qualitative sociological 
research.338  The remainder of this section discusses the development of the structured interview, 
as it evolved during the Hawthorne studies.   
The interview was an empirical method for collecting social information.  It gave the 
researcher partial entry into the life of the worker.  It allowed the researcher to deal with the most 
difficult tasks facing social science—“the problems bearing on individuals in their actual 
situations.”339  When analyzed together, the individual interviews could provide a synthetic 
overview of the social conditions of a given work place.  At the end of their studies, the 
researchers drew four conclusions in relationship to the use of the interview method:  1) The 
interview method is indispensible in industrial and medical investigations; 2) it can yield                                                         
338 I differentiate the practical from the well-demonstrated rhetorical and ideological impact the studies 
had on the discipline of sociology (well demonstrated in Gillespie’s study).  The practical impact refers to 
the influence of the interview on the practice of sociological research.  Sociologists continue to use the 
90-minute interview as the gold standard of qualitative research.  Although different variations have since 
been developed, Mayo’s influence is undeniable.  It is also possible that Mayo’s interviewing method, has 
had an impact on other fields.  For example in the field of Human Relations (HR), one might speculate 
that the “job interview” is a shorter, more condensed version of Mayo’s interview method.  Robert K. 
Merton’s work on the focused interview also shares some key characteristics with Mayo’s work.  See 
Merton, The Focused Interview; a manual (New York: Columbia University, 1952). The interview can 
also be differentiated from other practices which Mayo introduced which have since been discontinued:  
for example taking pulse measurements of workers to determine their physical and psychological fitness 
for work.    
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information of theoretical importance; 3) its utility has been empirically proven; and 4) 
researchers can be trained to use the method.  In short, the method is scientific in its 
reproducibility.   
The Hawthorne Works provided the perfect setting in which to test, revise, and optimize 
the interviewing technique.  By 1929 the company had more than 40,000 employees from 
different ethnic and national backgrounds, and a mix of skilled and unskilled workers.  Prior to 
Mayo’s involvement with the interviewing program, employees from the personnel department 
at Hawthorne began to interview the workers as part of an attempt to gather information about 
worker’s attitudes towards their workplace conditions and employer.  Their approach appears to 
have been haphazard and unsystematic.  Richard Gillespie notes that the workers responded with 
mixed feelings to the interviewing program.340  They were suspicious of the interviewer’s 
intentions, and questioned the sincerity of management’s commitment to taking their grievances 
seriously.  This did not limit managers’ enthusiasm for the program: by the time the first round 
of interviews was completed by 1929, Gillespie notes, the interviewers had conducted and 
analyzed 10,300 interviews.341  The analysis of the results was equally unsystematic.  The results 
showed that workers were unhappy with their supervisors and felt they were not being taken 
seriously.  Aside from this consistent finding, the conclusions were mixed, and for the most part 
not very useful.   
In 1930, when Mayo joined the interviewing team, he had a new approach in mind. In a 
privately distributed document detailing the interview method, Mayo cites work of Janet, Freud, 
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Piaget, Pareto, and Henderson as providing the theoretical foundation for his interview 
method.342 In addition, his interviewing technique was informed by his own experiences—and 
those of his prominent colleagues—in anthropology, medicine, and clinical psychology.343  As a 
first step, Mayo hired new interviewing staff. By 1930, half of the interviewers from 1929 had 
been replaced, only two of which were permanent staff. Mayo directed his interviewers to 
conduct their interviews in a conversational style, as opposed to a survey style. As the method 
improved, so did the length of the interview, eventually reaching a standard of ninety minutes. In 
his book The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (1933), Mayo reports that within a 
month of conducting the interviews, the chief interest of the investigation had become “the 
proper method of conducting an interview.”344  Mayo soon realized that if executed properly, the 
interview could be used to extract almost any kind of personal information from an employee.   
A successful interview required the worker’s confidence—the interviewer had to 
establish rapport with his subject.  Developing the proper techniques with which to gain the 
confidence of a worker became the central methodological challenge.  To do this, Mayo 
suggested that the interviewer always follow the worker’s lead.  This began at the moment the 
interviewer was introduced to the employee:  the interviewer was directed to ‘catch-on’ in a 
conversational way, at any starting point mentioned by the employee.345  The main goal was to 
encourage the employee to talk, by following his lead and demonstrating a genuine interest in                                                         
342 Rockefeller Archive Center, Box 342, Folder 4072. 
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what he had to say.  The interviewer should take notes to enable him to keep track of the 
employee’s narrative.  The notes could then be used to ask clarifying, not leading questions.  At 
all points of the interview, the interviewer was to give his full attention to the person being 
interviewed. At no point should the interviewer argue with, or give advice to the interviewee.  He 
was instructed to never change the subject or to ask questions about topics the employee has 
shown little interest in.  The emphasis was on listening, not talking. At all times, the goal of the 
interview was to keep the employee engaged in conversation and at ease.  Last but not least, the 
interviewer must ensure the interviewee that the information shared during the interview would 
be kept confidential.346   
Underlying many of the rules and techniques of Mayo’s interview method are 
assumptions about the personal life and emotional needs of working-class Americans.347  In 
Mayo’s reports, the workers at the Hawthorne are represented as starved for attention.  Attention 
therefore becomes the central gateway for establishing their trust and confidence.  If the 
interviewer even suggests a slight lack of interest or skepticism, trust is lost, and the interview is 
rendered useless.  Similarly, in claiming that the interview encounter gave the employee a rare 
opportunity to express himself, Mayo was suggesting that the average working-class American 
lived a life of social isolation.  
If Mayo expected these more freeform, longer interviews to lend themselves to easier 
analysis, he was mistaken.  When the content of the interviews—the individual attitudes and                                                         
346 This last rule was added in the 1940s.   
 
347 It is unclear as to whether or not these are assumptions or empirically based conclusions.  It would be 
interesting to do a more complete study of the interview transcripts to try piece together a picture of the 
social and emotional life of workers in the 1930s.  Since I have not had the opportunity to do so, I will 
treat Mayo’s conclusions with some skepticism. 
 
143 
 
personalities of the employees—were studied, the workers’ responses were categorized as 
favorable or unfavorable toward the company.  They found that “comments on material 
conditions of work had a higher validity than comments about persons.”348  By higher validity 
they were referring to their ability to identify confirming evidence of the problem. This included 
complaints about workplace conditions such as smoke, ventilation, or insufficient space.  
Complaints about supervision were disregarded; they were interpreted as having meaning only 
within the context of the individual’s life.  In other words, those problems that were considered 
to be beyond the immediate control of the worker—occupational hazards and workplace 
structure—were categorized as material.  Issues deemed to be within the employee’s control 
were categorically dismissed.  Mayo and his colleagues concluded that the interview program 
had demonstrated that problems in industry—mainly labor dissatisfaction and cases of social 
unrest in the workplace--were more complex than poor material working conditions or bad 
supervising.  The real problems in industry were caused by “something more intimately human, 
more remote.”349  Problems in industry were reconstituted as simply “human situations.”  Each 
case had to be considered individually, and many had no solution.        
This mode of analyzing interview data reveals some basic assumptions about how Mayo 
and his colleagues conceptualized the relationship between the individual and the group.  Those 
experiences that motivate us to do certain things, that we talk about and care about, have a more 
universal meaning.  These motivations are formed on a group level; they are not individually 
determined.  And yet, the manifestation of these universally structured desires and motivations 
can only be understood on an individual level.  For this reason, different events—although 
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motivated by the same social forces—can take on a wide range of different meanings. The 
individual is often incapable of truly understanding why he has taken certain actions, or why he 
has chosen to discuss certain topics with the interviewer.  Motivation is not immediately 
accessible to the individual.350  An individual’s interpretation or attitude toward a given 
situation, however, is open to revision.     
It is interesting to consider how these assumptions about human nature have shaped the 
way in which we analyze interview data today.  At the time Mayo and his colleagues developed 
the structured interview, it proved to be a powerful social management technique.  One might 
even call the structured interview a “technology of the self,” in the sense that it focuses all eyes, 
ears, and solutions on the individual.  Technologies of the self refer to the methods and means by 
which the “self” is constituted and cultivated as a subject. This highly adaptive and flexible 
technique is said to allow the trained interviewer to help the interviewee become empowered by 
becoming responsible for his own unhappiness.  Although the data from the Hawthorne 
experiments have been discussed, disputed, criticized, and celebrated, the methodological 
breakthrough that produced the data has not been carefully examined.  Mayo himself stated that 
the interviewing technique should be used by industry “to exploit or anticipate emotional 
situations.”  By the time he finished his study; emotional situations were considered to be one of 
the most widespread threats to the social equilibrium of the workplace.  The interview was its 
only antidote.                                                           
350 This conclusion is drawn from the basic assumptions evident in Mayo’s interview method.  Although 
this method sets up a dichotomy between the accessible and inaccessible, it is not completely based on 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious.  Instead, Mayo’s argument turns on a fundamental difference in unit of 
analysis.  The individual is scarcely aware of those things which only emerge within a larger “social 
situation.”  He is always focused on making meaning of his own life and experience.  And yet the social 
allows the individual to exist.  Based on this assumption Mayo equates human situations to social 
situations.  The two are one of the same.  
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The Hawthorne studies made it clear that social interactions are just as important as the 
physical conditions of a workplace.  It also showed that the factors motivating workers are highly 
complex and in many cases directly related to the social order within a given context.  This social 
order is understood as part and parcel of the social system.  It is within the social system that the 
individual workers operate and impact one another; collectively creating the social environment.  
The Hawthorne studies showed that a workplace could be analyzed as a social system of 
mutually dependent variables.  It was perhaps the most popular and widely circulated application 
of the theory of social systems. Henderson and Mayo both believed that the Hawthorne studies 
had succeeded in establishing that the workplace was indeed a social system and that social 
interactions were just as crucial for understanding the conditions of work.  While other HFL 
studies looked specifically at physiological systems, the Hawthorne studies were primarily 
interested in the functions of the social system on the factory floor.  
Work in Hot Climates 
 The HFL studies in hot climates were some of the most interesting and notorious because 
of the debilitating impact excessive heat can have on the laboring body.  The studies were 
undertaken primarily to solve the problem of heat stroke; which can result in death and was often 
the cause of high turn-over rates in industrial worksites where workers are exposed to prolonged 
periods of intense heat.  In the 1930s, there were good clinical descriptions of the effects of high 
external temperatures on the body, but there was nearly no quantitative chemical data on the 
physiological effects of working in hot climates.351 In addition, the heat studies demonstrate a 
range of industrial priorities and new developments both within and beyond the United States.                                                          
351 David B. Dill, “A Resume of Some Physiological Reactions to High External Temperature,” 209 
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The need to understand how different bodies respond to high temperatures was directly linked to 
the growing presence of American industrial interests in tropical and semi-tropical climates.  The 
HFL studies on work in hot climate sought to “consider some of the means by which the body 
reacts in adjusting itself to high external temperatures.”352  Just as in the Hawthorne studies, the 
HFL was interested in understanding the mechanism by which individuals adjust or fail to adjust 
to a given environment.  Only this time they were interested in the individual as a physiological 
system.   
The heat studies were used to establish that the body worked at its best when in a state of 
equilibrium; a physiological “steady state”. The HFL found that if workers were given access to 
water containing added salt—to replace the loss of electrolytes during work—and air conditioned 
living quarters—they could maintain a physiological steady state. The HFL researchers 
concluded that intense heat in the workplace did not necessarily cause physical fatigue.  Instead, 
they argued, physiochemical “imbalance” or boredom was the true cause of fatigue.  In other 
words, these studies were used to justify harsh working conditions and resolve existing problems 
with minimal changes to the actual labor processes. Whereas the Hawthorne studies were 
primarily concerned with the social conditions of work, the heat studies represent a concern with 
the physical conditions of work in industry.  In both instances, at the Hawthorne plant and 
construction of the Boulder Dam, the HFL sought to move beyond the laboratory and study the 
organism’s adaptation to changes in the environment under “natural conditions.”  This section 
discusses how this initial research took place in Boulder Dam (1932), a publicly funded large 
scale infrastructure project.  
Like the Hawthorne studies, HFL’s heat studies applied the new field studies techniques 
to the study of healthy individuals experiencing a broad range of natural stresses.  The heat                                                         
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studies run parallel with some of the largest infrastructure development projects undertaken by 
the U.S. government during the middle decades of the twentieth century.  They demonstrate how 
developments in applied physiology were part of a larger project aimed at building the nation.  
Studies on heat exhaustion had a very direct and practical significance in the modern industrial 
workplace.  In addition to resolving some of the immediate practical problems confronted by 
workers in hot climates, the field studies sought to understand the nature of acclimatization. The 
researchers relied on the participation of native inhabitants—both people and animals.   
The building of Boulder Dam, formally renamed Hoover Dam in 1947, began in 1931. 
The dam was built to provide water to the region and a much needed source of hydroelectric 
power. At 730 ft. high, the Boulder dam was, at the time it was built, the highest in the world and 
subsequently posed great danger to the men engaged in building this massive concrete structure. 
This unprecedented public work was built cooperatively by government and business.353 In the 
first year of the project alone fifteen workers died from the heat. The dry heat and crude living 
conditions in Black Canyon, straddling the border between Arizona and Nevada made the 
backbreaking work intolerable. The deaths and associated injuries gave rise to worker unrest and 
public outcry regarding working conditions at the construction site.354 When Commissioner of 
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Reclamation Service, Dr. Elwood Mead, addressed an audience of engineers at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology he described the climate as follows: 
The summer wind which sweeps over the gorge from the desert feels like a blast 
from a furnace.  At the rim of the gorge, where much of the work must be done, 
there is neither soil, grass nor trees.  The sun beats down on a broken surface of 
lava rocks. At midday they cannot be touched with the naked hand.  It is bad 
enough as a place for men at work. It is no place for a boarding house or sleeping 
porch.355    
The conditions were widely recognized as dangerous, but very little effort was made to protect 
workers beyond providing them with housing near the work site.  As the number of deaths began 
to accumulate and news coverage circulated it became clear that something needed to be done.   
In 1932, after securing the cooperation of the government and the construction 
companies, the Harvard Fatigue Lab sent a team of nine investigators to Boulder City, Nevada to 
study the effects of dry heat on laboring bodies and to find the cause and solution to the “large 
number of prostrations, heat cramps, and breakdowns of other types.”356   This was the HFL’s 
first dry heat field study and their first government contract.  
Once on site, the HFL researchers established a temporary laboratory in the basement of 
the Municipal Building in Boulder City, Nevada, located approximately seven miles from the 
dam construction site.357 The lab was set up to conduct a range of laboratory studies—including 
urine analysis, blood analysis, changes in respiratory response, and heart rate monitoring—on 
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members of the lab and the workmen.  They found that in dry heat, the body is capable of 
maintaining a comfortable temperature and relatively low heart rate.358 However, comfortable 
internal temperature and low heart rate is accomplished by the evaporation of large quantities of 
water, “with inevitable loss of considerable salt in the sweat produced.”359 In most cases, the 
observed breakdowns were caused by the failure to maintain a proper salt balance.  They 
concluded that the failure to maintain the salt balance was related to a “poor instinctive 
mechanism of the human body.”360 Rather than craving salt, the workmen and researchers 
simply continued to drink regular water.  Without a mechanism by which these salts were 
replaced, the men quickly became deficient in salt which lead to “the breakdown state” and heat 
cramps. “Since instinct was not operating,” the researchers noted, “conscious planning had to 
take its place.” With these findings in hand, the HFL recommended that the workmen be given 
plenty of salt containing water throughout the day.   
 The HFL also conducted studies bearing directly on the proper living conditions for 
inhabitants of labor camps set up by corporations.  The labor camp that had been established for 
the laborers was erected in the river canyon. The shade temperature in the river canyon was 
frequently above 100°F past midnight. Sleeping under these conditions was nearly impossible. 
HFL researchers noted that the men were “unable to restore their bodies to a normal state by the 
end of the 24-hour period.”361 Finally, upon the recommendation of the HFL, new dormitories 
were established 1,500 feet above Boulder Dam where the temperature was approximately 15°F 
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lower than down the canyon. The newly built dorms were also equipped with air-conditioning 
equipment. Having achieved their goal of finding the cause and cure of heat related injuries, the 
HFL researchers concluded that the “average workman had become acclimatized and was able to 
carry on and enjoy life.”362   
 These studies helped to bolster the HFL’s evolving definition of fatigue.  “Probably the 
best general definition [of fatigue], which does not commit us to any explanation of its nature,” 
Mayo wrote, “is that it is a reduced capacity for doing work.”363 Fatigue, they argued, could not 
be defined as a single entity. This is where Henderson’s conception of system becomes crucial.  
Henderson argued that the living organism is best conceived as a number of variables in a state 
of mutual dependence. In certain situations—for example in the case of the laborers discussed 
above—there is a “defect of external relation” that gives rise to “an organic unbalance in the 
individual “worker.””364 The observed loss of sodium chloride due to excessive perspiration is 
understood as an imbalance between the worker and his physical environment resulting in a 
reduced capacity to do work.  The minor interventions proposed by the HFL—salt water and 
cooler living quarters—were designed to enable the worker’s body to return to a state of 
physiological equilibrium. In both the Hawthorne studies and the heat study at Boulder City, 
minor interventions were made to help the individual better adapt his/her environment.  
Conclusion 
 It was within the context of the work place that the link between the physiological 
and the social gained practical significance and meaning.  The field studies undertaken by the 
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fatigue lab are each directly connected to distinct infrastructure projects undertaken in the 1930s 
and 40s.  These projects were part of an effort to facilitate the transport of goods and people, 
trade, and harness new sources of energy.   
 An interactional approach to systems, in terms of work studies, differs from the case of 
medical practice in that we are presumably dealing with a healthy individual in the context of a 
public setting, the workplace.  It is similar to the analysis of systems thinking in the clinical 
encounter because here again, in the context of work, we see attention to the mutual dependence 
of variables that make up the system itself.  The context in which these studies take place are, 
however, much broader and of interest to a larger audience.   
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CONCLUSION 
 On February 10, 1942, Lawrence Joseph Henderson checked himself into Massachusetts 
General Hospital for surgery. He had been suffering from occasional bouts of pain and 
hemorrhage due to what he believed was an ulcer. Eventually he discovered that what he thought 
was an ulcer was in fact cancer. In the weeks prior to checking in for surgery, Henderson had 
been working hard on a new book based on his Sociology 23 lecture notes. The book was to be 
published as a series of case studies spanning topics as diverse as the Hawthorne Studies and 
social revolution. His work was interrupted by a visit to the hospital from which he never 
returned. The cause of death was recorded as carcinoma of the bladder and pulmonary 
embolus.365 
 Henderson’s life ended just as the United States was undergoing a revolution of its own. 
The timing of Henderson’s life and professional trajectory allows us to ask new questions about 
the relationship between the social sciences and the life sciences prior to disciplinary 
crystallization that occurred in the post-WWII era.  
 This dissertation has sought to capture the elusive moment when border crossings 
between the life and the social sciences were not only possible, but desirable. As I have 
attempted to show here, Henderson was not an outlier in any sense of the word. The kind of 
border crossing he was engaged in was not altogether rare. While it wasn’t exactly common, 
Henderson was certainly not the only person moving in and out of different disciplinary worlds. 
What is historically interesting about Henderson is how his life provides the ability to see border 
crossings in more than one domain—the social sciences, social medicine, and industry—at the 
same time in a single person’s biography. This dissertation has therefore used Henderson’s                                                         
365 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Count of Middlesex, City of Cambridge, Death Certificate, Record 
No. 313. 
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professional trajectory as a comparative frame within these three domains to gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between the social sciences and the life sciences in the first half 
of the twentieth century. In the years following Henderson’s death, this same kind of border 
crossing became not only more rare, but also far more difficult. This dissertation argued that, 
even though it appears that there is and has always been an opposition between the biological 
and the social, this opposition develops subsequent to Henderson’s life. By tracing the 
continuous points of contact between the social and biological sciences in the first half of the 
twentieth century, this dissertation sought to explain how work like Henderson’s could seem 
natural.  
 This is of course part of a much larger story of disciplinary politics and dynamics in the 
modern American university. The preceding chapters have illustrated one part of this story in 
detail by tracing Henderson’s boundary crossing by following his development from a laboratory 
scientist to a social theorist towards the end of his life and career. Chapter One, was largely a 
biographical chapter devoted to giving the reader a sense of who Henderson was, the factors in 
his life that shaped his views, and the context of his thought and work. This chapter showed that 
Henderson’s early border crossing from physics to chemistry in his study of physical chemistry 
was against the backdrop of rapid new developments in the physical sciences at the turn of the 
century. These developments made it possible for Henderson and his contemporaries to ask new 
questions about the application of physical sciences in the life sciences. The main goal of this 
chapter was to show how Henderson’s training in physical chemistry, medicine, and physiology 
allowed him to bring a robust tool kit to the study of biology. It also showed that his privileged 
institutional location at Harvard and greater Boston gave him access to some of the leading 
figures in both the natural and the social sciences. In chapter two I looked more closely at 
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Henderson’s first two published books, The Fitness of the Environment (1913) and The Order of 
Nature (1917). In this chapter I argued that in these first two books Henderson articulated a logic 
of systems that permeated all of his work. The goal of this chapter was to draw out what 
Henderson and his contemporaries meant by “system” and the uniqueness of a systems approach 
to the study of phenomenon. Henderson believed that a systems approach could be seamlessly 
used to study both physical and social phenomenon. This idea is then explored further in Chapter 
three which looked at Henderson’s essays on the doctor patient relationship as a social system. 
This chapter looked specifically at how Henderson further developed and articulated his systems 
approach within the context of medical practice. The goal of this chapter was to explore 
Henderson’s border crossings into a domain in which he had very little fist hand experience in, 
social medicine. Here we see Henderson once again promoting a “systems” approach to 
medicine with the goal of bridging laboratory practice and clinical practice. Systems could be 
used to understand these boundaries and ultimately bridge them. In the fourth and final chapter I 
looked at the application of this systems approach in the context of industrial practice and labor 
studies. In this chapter we see how Henderson brings together his interpretation of Pareto’s work 
and his previous work on physical systems to study social equilibrium and the conditions 
necessary to create a stable workplace. It is here that we see Henderson engaged in articulating a 
theory of social control and authority in his writings on Pareto as well as through his 
correspondence with other actors directly involved in industrial management. In this chapter I 
argued that the porousness of boundaries between disciplines can also be seen at the institutional 
level in the boundary crossing between the university and the industrial workplace. What we see 
is that as Henderson got older, most of his work began to focus on social theory and the study of 
“social” systems. He became more and more interested understanding social equilibrium and 
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most importantly social order. Henderson was indeed quite conservative when it came to 
questions of social stability and order. He favored a vision of the world where he and others like 
him were at the center, upholding the status quo. He believed that “the masses” did not have the 
capacity to rule themselves or others. Indeed, he despised Roosevelt and his progressive political 
agenda. Henderson, like Pareto, believed that people were dominated by their sentiments and 
were therefore rarely engaged in logical decision making. Although his political views can be 
easily criticized, it is nonetheless important to consider the context in which Henderson 
developed these views. As a son of a merchant, he had seen the devastating economic 
consequences that could be brought on by social instability. Perhaps even more importantly, he 
had lived through World War One and all of its destruction. Towards the end of his life he 
became increasingly concerned about the likelihood that the US would enter into yet another 
World War. In other words, Henderson came of age during a period of great change and political 
discord. His preference for political and social stability was at least in part a consequence of this. 
That said, Henderson was also part of a certain social class whose life was changing and 
becoming much smaller. He, like many of his contemporaries, did not want to let it go in 
exchange for a much more diverse, progressive (at least in theory), and democratic world.  
Together these chapters painted a picture of boundaries being crossed and made. This 
type of intellectual activity would today be classified as interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinarity in 
American universities in the first half of the twentieth century served two purposes. First, it was 
a response to the perceived complexity of the problems facing American society and the world. 
An emphasis on systems and mutual dependence mirrored the belief that indeed the world was 
interconnected, and interdisciplinarity offered an increasingly appealing approach to solving 
problems. Second, interdisciplinary research centers became an effective strategy for raising 
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funds from foundations and for organizing people and money around a common set of themes. 
The theme could be something large and ambitious that could not realistically be covered by a 
single discipline alone. This tension between disciplines, and the enormity of problems facing 
society, endured throughout the twentieth century and indeed into the present day. 
The kind of border crossing that Henderson and his contemporaries engaged in came at a 
time of major social transformation and instability. Henderson and his contemporaries were not 
just ambitious; they were entrepreneurial in their approach to knowledge production and 
collaboration. They were opportunistic and found ways to make the traditional university 
structure work for them. Today we see this type of activity in the restructuring of the academic 
labor market. It is no longer just tenure or bust; people are making careers in temporary and 
contract-based posts. Could this be the sign of a restructuring of the university?  
A future study might compare interdisciplinarity in the pre-WWII and post-WWII 
American university. One might examine, for example, the different functions of 
interdisciplinary projects in these two eras. The major limitation of this work is that it focuses on 
a single historical actor. Like all biography, the personal narrative is both compelling and 
limiting in historical analysis. Additional studies of other prominent figures who engaged in 
similar kinds of border crossing might help to broaden the context of these arguments. Were 
there, in fact, others like Henderson, but perhaps less prominent? Is this kind of border crossing 
something that could only have been done in the context of Harvard, or other elite schools? 
Future studies might focus their attention on other peer institutions—such as John’s Hopkins, 
Yale, Columbia University, or Stanford—as well as different kinds of institutions—state schools, 
land-grant schools, research institutions not affiliated with universities, and, in the postwar 
period, federally funded research contract centers..  
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The evidence presented in this dissertation examined the dynamics of interdisciplinarity 
in the first half of the twentieth century. On a more granular level, it showed how one individual, 
Lawrence J. Henderson, moved from physical chemistry to social theory over the course of his 
career. Along the way I demonstrated how Henderson used the concept of systems to articulate a 
transdisciplinary vision of how one might study interactions between seemingly unrelated 
phenomena. By looking at Henderson’s biography in chapter one we learn that Henderson’s 
unique training and interests allowed him to develop a robust skill set necessary for moving in 
and out of these different domains. This somewhat narrow conclusion shows that Henderson was 
able to do all of this because of the unique set of circumstances that marked the historical 
moment in which he developed as a student, scientist, and later professor. As stated before, this 
was a period rapid growth at Harvard University and development in the social and natural 
sciences. This early period of development made it easier for Henderson to cross borders and 
influence, even if just on a local level, the establishment of the social sciences—mainly human 
relations and sociology—as well as physical chemistry at the medical school. Henderson’s 
efforts to form bridges among distinct domains described in the preceding chapters can be 
regarded as part of a larger moment in which crossing boundaries and making boundaries was 
encouraged and necessary for the development of the social sciences and the natural sciences in 
the decades following WWII.  
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